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THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN HUNGARY AND 
THE LESSONS OF THE 1956 STRUGGLE FOR 
INDEPENDENCE 
I S T V Á N D E Á K 
Columbia University, New York, NY 
USA 
This presentation will discuss why Hungary has experienced a rather inordinate 
number of both bloodless and violent revolutions, encompassing urban uprisings as 
those of 1918 and 1919, and national struggles for independence in 1703-1711, 
1848-1849, and 1956. The explanation may lie in the fact that the country has had a 
long tradition of absolute sovereignty under the leadership of a powerful nobility; 
yet, because it lies on the crossroads of great migrations and invasions, it was often 
subjugated by great powers. Remarkably, in each case the national cause was com-
bined with a strong movement for social justice. 
Keywords: Hungarian revolutions, 1703-1711, 1848-1849, 1918-1919, 1956 
Revolutionary tradition in Hungary, which is what our gracious hosts have 
asked me to discuss, is an exciting topic. Undoubtedly, it has also caused me a 
great deal of headache because the more I thought about it, the more I realized that 
what was expected from me was to furnish an explanation why Hungarians fought 
and lost their revolutions during the last three centuries. I wonder whether such an 
explanation is possible. 
Please note at this point that I do not consider the peasant revolts of earlier cen-
turies, revolutions. 
In my presentation, I'll try to show that the Hungarian revolutions invariably 
originate from the real or perceived grievances of the social elite. Even though the 
grievances were directed primarily at the foreign power that held sway over the 
country, every one of these movements also contained a demand for substantial 
domestic reform. In each case, however, the movement for reform was hijacked, 
we might say, by people outside the social elite who turned it into a violent up-
heaval. This, then, caused an ever-growing section of the elite to demand the res-
toration of law and order by the very same foreign power against which the social 
elite had rebelled in the first place. 
And now for a bit of an explanation. 
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Like Poland, its historic soul brother, Hungary was a respected and dynamic 
middle-sized kingdom in medieval times. Later, however, both kingdoms fell on 
hard times. In the mid-sixteenth century, Hungary was divided into three parts, re-
gaining its unity and political sovereignty only in 1867; Poland, which was liter-
ally abolished late in the eighteenth century, did not regain its unity and independ-
ence until 1918. Yet throughout the centuries of division and foreign rule, the ex-
istence of these nations was never in doubt for the simple reason that within both 
countries the historic landowning nobility remained firmly in control. This nobil-
ity arrogated to itself the very concept of the nation: they were the populus, the 
gens, the natio, the citizens, the tribe, the nation; the others were the misera plebs 
contribuens, the poor tax-paying population. The traditional concept of Hungary 
and Poland as two noble, warrior nations remained alive over the centuries, and 
once foreign rule had come to an end, both countries became militantly nationalis-
tic states. Thus we must consider that the reform movements in Hungary and Po-
land invariably aimed not only at freeing the country from foreign domination but 
also at tackling the problem of noble rule. Some in the reform movements wished 
to overthrow the ruling elite; others hoped to make the country free and more 
prosperous in co-operation with the old elite, and again others fought for liberty 
and reform in order to perpetuate the predominant position of the old elite. 
What complicated matters enormously was the practical absence of a native ur-
ban middle class, which meant that the reformers themselves generally stemmed 
from the noble estate. Thus, with every radical action the reformers threatened the 
welfare of their own families and friends. As a consequence, most of the noble 
revolutionaries were eager to achieve national independence as well as to improve 
conditions in their country without thereby fatally endangering the pre-eminent 
position of their own class. The effort wasn't always successful because, inevita-
bly, the continued pre-eminence of the old social elite was endangered by new ele-
ments of society who had come to the fore as a result of the upheavals. 
It is an irony of history that the revolution of 1956 in some ways represented a 
repetition of the old pattern: namely, progressive members of the old elite, in this 
case dissident Communist intellectuals, had created a radical reformist movement 
which, in turn, brought forward such elements from other strata of society who 
had new and very different goals, and who threatened the security and welfare of 
the Communist cadres. These new elements, mostly workers and students, 
brought the conflict into the streets thereby precipitating armed intervention from 
abroad. Foreign intervention then put an end to both domestic reform and the na-
tion's striving for political independence. As in the early 1700s, in 1848-1849, 
and in 1919, armed intervention from abroad dissipated the dreams of the elite re-
formers while simultaneously securing the future of the elite to which the reform-
ers belonged. 
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Now one more general remark: even though the word "revolution" has been 
endlessly debased and abused, witness such terms as "revolution in the making of 
false eyelashes," one of the more viable definitions of the revolution is a violent 
attempt, by a large number of people, to institute drastic changes through the over-
throw of the political system and of the prevailing social order. Measured by this 
definition, not all of the great historical events I have mentioned qualify as revolu-
tions. Certainly, October 1918 and October 1956 were true revolutions because of 
their mass character and their overarching aims, but the proper characterization of 
the other great events is debatable. Consider that the professed aim of the Rákóczi 
and the Kossuth rebellions was not to overthrow the existing social and political 
order but to put an end to the abuses perpetrated by the king's evil advisers and to 
restore the ancient rights of the nation. And as far as the events of March 1919 are 
concerned, while it is true that Béla Kun and his companions advocated the anni-
hilation of the existing social order, for which they were able to mobilize a consid-
erable number of people, the Communists had come to power through peaceful 
negotiations. No matter, in my talk I'll treat the Rákóczi Rebellion of 1703-1711; 
the War of Independence in 1848-1849; the democratic and Communist take-
overs in 1918-1919, and the events of 1956 as revolutions. 
* 
Prince Ferenc Rákóczi's rebellion or uprising against Habsburg rule marked 
the culmination of growing public discontent with the way the Habsburg dynasty 
treated Hungary, or rather its ruling elite. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, Hungary was divided between an Ottoman dominated center, an autonomous 
Principality of Transylvania, and a rather small sliver in the west, called Royal 
Hungary. Until the 1680s, only the latter part recognized a Habsburg king as its 
ruler but then, in an extraordinary effort, Europeans combined their forces to rid 
Central Europe of the Ottomans. By 1699, almost all of Hungary, including 
Transylvania, had fallen into the hands of European history's last crusaders. 
The campaign represented a great victory for Western Christianity, to which 
Hungary belonged, but the crusaders extracted a heavy price from the Hungarians 
for their liberation. As a result, Hungarians in 1699 were no more grateful to their 
Christian liberators than their descendants were to the Red Army in 1945. Among 
other things, the Hungarian Diet had to recognize the Habsburgs' hereditary right 
to the Hungarian crown; the nobility had to give up its right to resist an unlawfully 
acting ruler; much of the devastated countryside was ceded to foreign money 
lenders and purveyors; and Catholicism, the religion of the Habsburgs, was 
force-fed to the mostly Protestant Hungarian nobility. On the opposite side, the 
Habsburg administration saw little reason for treating the Hungarians any better: 
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the country was infested with bandits and was economically almost worthless; 
moreover, the Hungarian nobles had proven themselves most fickle in their loyal-
ties. During the previous two centuries, the greatest dignitaries in the realm 
switched sides again and again from Turks to Habsburgs to Transylvanian 
princes, often immensely benefiting from the change of loyalties. How could one 
forget the Turkish and Tatar marauders of the great Hungarian magnate Count 
Imre Thököly who had repeatedly invaded and devastated the country? Or that the 
Hungarian hussars, who had participated in the Christian re-conquest of Buda 
Castle in 1686 from the Turks, had fought on the kuruc, that is on the Turkish side, 
just a few weeks earlier. Similarly, in February 1945, some Hungarian troops par-
ticipated bravely in the Soviet siege of Buda Castle, but the Soviets would not eas-
ily forget that the same Hungarians had been serving on the German side only a 
few days earlier. 
Hungarians at the turn of eighteenth century regarded every Habsburg move as 
a humiliation and a mark of oppression. At last, a countrywide rebellion broke out 
under Prince Rákóczi, a Catholic magnate, who led an army made up of mostly 
Protestant nobles and of peasants of all nationalities and denominations. The 
peasants or better, serfs, had been suffering much less from Habsburg rule than 
from their heavy feudal obligations and the near-total devastation of the land. 
True, Prince Rákóczi now proclaimed the unity of all the estates and promised 
freedom to the serfs who had served him well; still, when the other kuruc leaders 
spoke of the grievances of the "noble Hungarian nation", they meant precisely 
that: the injustices that had been visited on the nobility, which alone constituted 
the nation. 
It would be good to know how many people in the country sympathized with 
the imperial Austrian and how many with the revolutionary Hungarian side. 
Thousands of Hungarian subjects of the Habsburg emperor-king served in both 
armies, but we must keep in mind that more than half of the king's Hungarian sub-
jects were not Magyar-speakers. In any case, in those times, nationality counted 
for next-to-nothing and membership in one or another estate for nearly every-
thing. Young men had become soldiers so as not to be killed by the marauding 
military, or in order not to starve to death, or simply, because they had been 
pressed into service. The pattern would be repeated in every revolution. Still, it is 
also certain that a good number of young men joined the Hungarian ranks volun-
tarily in order to fight "Pro Libertate", for freedom. Only that for noble recruits 
freedom meant national independence and the preservation of noble privilege, 
whereas for the serfs in the revolutionary ranks, it meant freedom from feudal 
dues and services as well as, hopefully, a piece of land to be held in hereditary ten-
ure. The two different goals were not really reconcilable. 
Habsburg military victories as well as the devastation of the land and terrible 
human losses because of the plague caused Rákóczi's followers gradually to 
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abandon his flag. The rebellion ended in 1711 in a great compromise, certainly not 
the last in Hungarian revolutionary history. According to the terms of Hungarian 
surrender no rebel soldier was punished; the kuruc troops were to swear fealty to 
the emperor-king, and the nobility was to be confirmed in its privileges and rights. 
Yet one of the country's main problem remained unresolved, namely the complex 
relationship between the center of power in Vienna and the periphery, that is the 
fifty odd Hungarian counties dominated by the landowning nobility. The question 
throughout the century was who would reform the country: the central bureau-
cracy or enlightened elements among the nobility. Co-operation between the two 
was not inconceivable, but it occurred rarely. More often, the grievances of the 
county nobility and the arbitrariness of the Court in Vienna paralyzed each other. 
Things changed fundamentally with the rise of European nationalisms and the 
growing conviction within the Hungarian elite that the nation would perish unless 
Hungarian was established as the language of official communications, and when 
all the inhabitants of the realm accepted the notion that they were Hungarian patri-
ots, irrespective of the language they were speaking. Moreover, all the inhabitants 
of the kingdom were to be given the rights and privileges of the nobility so that to-
gether they might constitute a great nation. 
Reforms came gradually until events sped up immeasurably with the outbreak 
of the European revolutions in 1848, which temporarily paralyzed Vienna and al-
lowed the more radical elements in the Hungarian noble establishment to intro-
duce drastic reforms. Even though the Hungarian reformers exploited the tempo-
rary weakness of the central power in Vienna, the liberal constitution of 
March-April 1848 marked the triumph of legality; theirs was a bloodless revolu-
tion, or as I like to say, a lawful revolution. Bloodshed came several months later 
because Vienna wished to undo some of the concessions it had made to the Hun-
garians, concessions that, it is true, had made the efficient governing of the Mon-
archy very difficult. In addition, during the summer of 1848, Lajos Kossuth and 
his colleagues considerably sharpened Hungarian governmental policy toward 
the Court, the Austrian government, Croatia, and the national minorities. On the 
other side, the national minorities, who together constituted an absolute majority 
of the kingdom's inhabitants, wished to achieve some of the same liberties and 
privileges that the Hungarians had wrested from the king. In other words, the eth-
nic minorities opposed the centralizing policy of the Hungarian leaders in the 
same way that the Hungarians opposed the centralizing tendencies of Vienna. The 
result was war between Hungary and the rest of the Monarchy as well as a civil 
war within Hungary. 
By the time the followers of Kossuth were definitely defeated, in August 1848, 
most Hungarians had abandoned his cause. But the revolution had not been fought 
in vain; the Hungarians had lost the war but they would win the peace for the sim-
ple reason that the Habsburg Monarchy ofthat time was no longer a great power. 
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Rather, it was a combination of many territorial entities, which could function 
only if these entities were willing to co-operate. Because without Hungary the 
Habsburg Monarchy was inoperable, a compromise agreement became inevita-
ble, and it was concluded, in 1867, making Hungary an equal partner with the rest 
of the Monarchy. 
The ensuing liberal era allowed for unprecedented prosperity and progress. At 
the same time the liberal government's tough nationalist policy exasperated the 
increasingly dynamic ethnic minorities. Moreover, the Monarchy's shortsighted 
foreign policy as well as the aggressive hostility of some of Austria-Hungary's 
neighbors led to World War I; here, the Dual Monarchy could not but lose. 
The democratic "Chrysanthemum Revolution", at the end of October 1918, 
represented a dramatic departure from Hungary's entire political and social tradi-
tion. Hungary became a democratic republic that hoped to align itself not with 
Germany, its traditional protector, but with the Western democracies. The revolu-
tion also brought into the government, besides the usual nobles and bureaucrats of 
gentry origin, a good number of Social Democrats and radically-inclined Jewish 
intellectuals. 
The republic of the Red Count, Mihály Károlyi, ended within a few months for 
such reasons as the incompetence of Károlyi; the Utopian ideas of some of his un-
derlings; the rapaciousness of Hungary's neighbors; and the narrow-minded hos-
tility of the Western democracies. A take-over by the Communists and left-wing 
Social Democrats, in March 1919, was as inevitable as their ultimate collapse a 
mere four months later. The causes ofthat debacle were, again, the incompetence 
and Utopian ideas of the Bolshevik leadership, the rapaciousness of Hungary's 
neighbors, and the hostility of the Western democracies. But there was one more 
important force to cause the collapse, namely the implacable hostility of the Hun-
garian social, business, and political elite toward the Republic of Soviets. Counts 
István Bethlen and Pál Teleki, not to speak of Admiral Miklós Horthy, would 
rather have Romanian and French colonial troops occupy the country than to tol-
erate Reds in power. 
The conservatives' dream of violently restoring the status-quo-ante proved to 
be just a dream. During the counter-revolution, new, dubious elements came to 
the fore whom the old elite both needed and treated with contempt. These new-
comers on the political scene wished to discard the Hungarian liberal-conserva-
tive constitutional tradition and to replace it with some kind of an anti-Semitic 
dictatorship. Although this extreme right was never able completely to overcome 
the resistance of the conservative establishment, it succeeded in bringing about a 
fundamental social change by gradually expropriating the wealth of Hungary's 
Jewish population. This way, between 1938 and 1944, approximately one fourth 
of the national wealth changed hands. Add to this the utter destruction wrought by 
the war and then it becomes clear that the post-1945 democratic regime con-
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fronted a tabula rasa situation. Consequently, when the Communists seized 
power, in 1947-1948, they had a relatively easy time in expropriating whatever 
had not already been plundered. 
What took place between 1938 and approximately 1952 was a genuine social 
revolution. True, rather than having been brought about by mass upheaval, it was 
the work of relatively small domestic forces operating under the tutelage of two 
successive great powers. The German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, and 
the Soviet liberation in the spring of 1945 allowed for more changes: political, 
cultural, social, and economic, than all the previous and later revolutions com-
bined. In all this, the Hungarian people played mostly a passive role, either as 
beneficiaries of plunder or as the victims of plunder. 
In 1953 attempts began to remedy some of the economic and moral damage 
caused to national life by the Nazi and Soviet takeovers and the cruel as well as of-
ten mindless social revolution. The summer and early fall of 1956 represented the 
culmination of the attempt to undo the damage and to institute a more humane 
form of Communist government. But again, as after 1703, in 1849, and in 1919, 
political developments took such a turn as to cause many within the reforming 
elite to fear for their welfare and dominant position. Therefore, they silently or not 
so silently welcomed the decision of an outside power to put a violent end to the 
revolution. 
Back in the summer of 1849, much of the Hungarian elite quietly welcomed the 
law and order brought back by the invading Austrian and Russian armies. In 1919, 
the Romanian occupation of Budapest enabled the counter-revolutionary Whites 
to punish the unruly elements among the rural population and to make scapegoats 
out of the Jews. Finally on November 4, 1956, many sighed in relief that law and 
order was being re-established. Let us remember that the hundreds of thousands 
who marched carrying red flags on May 1, 1957 had not all been coerced to do so 
by the Communist authorities. 
Yet let us also remember that it was always a foreign power that put an end to 
the revolutions: at the Battle of Trencsén, on August 3, 1708, where Habsburg 
troops irrevocably defeated Prince Ferenc Rákóczi's forces; at Temesvár, on Au-
gust 9, 1849, where General Haynau triumphed over Kossuth's honvéd army; on 
August 1, 1919, when Romanian troops crossed the Tisza River and wiped out the 
Hungarian Red Army, and on November 4, 1956, when Soviet tanks rolled into 
the Hungarian capital. Nor were the Hungarian revolutions completely unsuccess-
ful because, with or without a compromise agreement, many of the revolutionary 
ideas were gradually translated into reality, whether under Maria Theresa and 
Leopold II in the second half of the eighteenth century, or in 1867, or in 1945 or, 
finally, in 1989. 
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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ONSET OF 
THE CRISES IN POLAND AND HUNGARY 
MARK KRAMER 
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 
USA 
This article looks at Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in 1953-1956, prior to the 
start of the Hungarian revolution. It shows that the leadership succession struggle in 
Moscow often caused sharp, and undesirable, fluctuations in Soviet relations with 
Hungary and the other East European countries. Abrupt shifts in Soviet policy, 
stemming mainly from internal political maneuvering, helped to produce a volatile 
situation in both Hungary and Poland in 1956. Soviet leaders were so preoccupied 
by domestic concerns that they failed to take timely action to cope with the deepen-
ing instability in Hungary and Poland. By the time events came to a head in October 
1956, the Soviet Union was faced with the prospect of the collapse of Communist 
rule in Hungary. 
Keywords: Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary, Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy 
The death of the long-time ruler of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, in March 
1953 soon led to momentous changes in the Communist bloc. Within weeks of 
Stalin's death, his successors encouraged (and, when necessary, ordered) the East 
European governments to enact wide-ranging "New Courses" of political and 
economic reforms. The abrupt introduction of these changes, and the sharp rise of 
public expectations in Eastern Europe, spawned strikes and mass demonstrations 
in Bulgaria in May 1953, a rebellion in Czechoslovakia in early June, and a much 
larger uprising in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) two weeks later. The 
Czechoslovak authorities succeeded in quelling a violent revolt in Plzefi and mass 
unrest in other Czechoslovak cities on 1-2 June, but in East Germany the govern-
ment and security forces quickly lost control of the situation on 17 June when hun-
dreds of thousands of people rose up against Communist rule. Faced with the 
prospect of "losing" a vital ally, Soviet troops and security forces in the GDR had 
to intervene on a massive scale to crush the rebellion and restore a modicum of 
public order. 
The Soviet Union's decisive response to the East German crisis was motivated 
in part by a concern that destabilizing unrest could spread to other East European 
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countries and even to the USSR itself unless urgent steps were taken. The spate of 
protests and strikes in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in the spring of 1953, and 
the much larger uprising in Czechoslovakia in early June, had demonstrated the 
potential for wider turmoil. As soon as the East German rebellion began, the head 
of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lavrentii Beria, contacted the Soviet 
foreign intelligence chiefs elsewhere in Eastern Europe and warned them that they 
would "pay with [theirj heads if anything like this happens" in their assigned 
countries." He ordered them to send status reports directly to him every few hours 
and to work with the local governments to prevent mass unrest and subdue any 
demonstrations supporting the East German protesters. 
The use of Soviet military power in the GDR eliminated the immediate prob-
lem facing the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, but the suppression of the East 
German uprising did not impart greater consistency to Soviet policy or eliminate 
the prospect of further turmoil in the Soviet bloc. Although the downfall of Beria 
in late June 1953 and the fonnál appointment of Nikita Khrushchev as First Secre-
tary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in September 1953 
helped mitigate the instability in Soviet domestic politics, the leadership struggle 
in Moscow continued to buffet Soviet-East European relations over the next few 
years.3 During the brief tenure of Georgii Malenkov as Soviet prime minister from 
March 1953 to February 1955, the Soviet government encouraged a significant re-
laxation of economic and political controls in Eastern Europe, similar to the 
changes that were being adopted in the USSR itself. Violent mass terror in the re-
gion came to an end, and vast numbers of political prisoners were released. The 
reforms in the East-bloc countries after June 1953 were not as far-reaching as 
those proposed before Beria's ouster, but they still represented a notable departure 
from Stalinism. In a region like Eastern Europe, which had been so tightly com-
pressed during the Stalin era, the sudden adoption of New Courses greatly magni-
fied the potential for social and political upheaval. The leaders in Moscow, how-
ever, were still preoccupied with domestic affairs and the ongoing struggle for 
power, and they failed to appreciate the increasingly volatile conditions in the 
Eastern bloc.4 Most of them simply hoped that the uprisings in Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany in June 1953 were an anomaly and not a portent of more explo-
sive unrest to come. 
The extent to which Soviet leaders misjudged the situation in Eastern Europe 
was evidenced by the confused approach that Malenkov's chief rival, Nikita 
Khrushchev, initially adopted. To outflank Malenkov in the leadership struggle in 
late 1954 and early 1955, Khrushchev had temporarily sided with the hardliners, 
and this shift was promptly reflected throughout the bloc. At Khrushchev's be-
hest, the East European governments slowed or reversed many of the economic 
and political reforms they had implemented after Stalin's death, and in Hungary 
the reformist prime minister, Imre Nagy, was removed in April 1955 by the 
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neo-Stalinist leader of the Hungarian Workers' Party, Mátyás Rákosi, who had 
been forced to yield the prime ministerial post to Nagy two years earlier under So­
viet pressure. Because the new Hungarian prime minister, András Hegedűs, was a 
much weaker figure than Nagy, Rákosi was able to reacquire a dominant political 
role in the country and to undo many of the recently enacted reforms. Khrushchev 
later acknowledged, in a conversation with Chinese leaders, that one of his "most 
serious mistakes" in 1955 was to have gone back to "supporting that idiot 
Rákosi".5 
The sudden dampening of popular expectations in Hungary and other East Eu­
ropean countries - expectations that had been raised by the New Courses of the 
previous two years - helped generate strong currents of public discontent. 
Malenkov had been able to avoid the emergence of widespread unrest in Eastern 
Europe after June 1953 by pressing ahead with steps to improve living conditions, 
boost consumer output, and provide for greater responsiveness to public con­
cerns; but after Khrushchev forced Malenkov to the sidelines in early 1955 (re­
placing him as prime minister with Nikolai Bulganin) and began curtailing the 
scope and pace of the post-Stalin reforms, he inadvertently heightened the poten­
tial for destabilizing turmoil in Eastern Europe. 
The threat of instability in Eastern Europe was not as easy to defuse as it had 
been during the Stalin era. The Soviet Union no longer had recourse to Stalinist 
methods of ensuring bloc conformity. Although economic retrenchment had been 
possible, a return to pervasive terror was not; nor would Khrushchev and his col­
leagues have desired it. Hence, Khrushchev altered his approach somewhat as he 
sought to replace the political subordination of Eastern Europe, which had been 
possible in Stalin's time, with economic and ideological cohesion. He advanced 
the concept of a "socialist commonwealth" (sotsialisticheskoe sodruzhestvo) in 
which the East European Communist parties would have the right to follow their 
"own paths to socialism" - that is, to have somewhat greater leeway on internal 
matters - so long as they continued to "base all their activities on the teachings of 
Marxism-Leninism".6 Khrushchev apparently believed that popular support for 
the East European governments would increase if they were given greater inde­
pendence in domestic policymaking, but he wanted to ensure that the Soviet Un­
ion would maintain long-term control of the bloc by promoting economic and mil­
itary integration. In keeping with these goals, Khrushchev attempted to mend rela­
tions with Yugoslavia and bring it closer to the Soviet camp, give greater sub­
stance to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and foster a 
more concrete Soviet-East European military relationship, most notably through 
the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1955. 
The bid for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia was of particular importance to 
Khmshchev, in part because he was able to use the issue as a wedge against one of 
his domestic rivals, Vyacheslav Molotov. Stalin and Molotov had provoked a bit-
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ter split with Yugoslavia in 1948 and had subsequently tried to get rid of the Yu-
goslav leader, Josip Broz Tito. Various efforts to remove Tito ultimately proved 
futile, but Stalin remained fiercely hostile toward Yugoslavia to the very end. 
Within a few months of Stalin's death, however, on 16 June 1953, his successors 
agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. This gesture marked the 
first attempt to end some five years of polemics and recriminations. Nevertheless, 
the significance of the move was limited because it did not yet entail a resumption 
of ties between the two countries' Communist parties. Molotov and a few other 
hardliners in the CPSU remained adamantly opposed to any suggestion of pursu-
ing a reconciliation with the Yugoslav Communists. 
Khrushchev began laying the groundwork in 1954 for a much fuller rapproche-
ment with Yugoslavia, and he stepped up his efforts in the spring of 1955 to over-
come the opposition posed by Molotov. On 26 May 1955, ten days after Khrush-
chev had returned from Poland for the signing of the Warsaw Pact, he traveled to 
Belgrade and held an extended series of meetings with Tito. The communiqué is-
sued by the two sides on 2 June at the end of the meetings - a document that came 
to be known as the Belgrade Declaration - pledged respect for their "differences 
in internal complexion, social systems, and forms of socialist development".7 The 
declaration also committed each side not to interfere in the other's internal affairs 
"for any reason whatsoever". The visit and the joint declaration were valuable for 
Khrushchev not only in giving him another conspicuous foreign policy accom-
plishment, but also in allowing him to step up his attacks against Molotov. At a 
CPSU Central Committee plenum in July 1955, which Khrushchev convened 
shortly after returning from Belgrade, the delegates voiced a torrent of criticism 
about Molotov's "ridiculous", "deeply misguided", and "erroneous" views on re-
lations with Yugoslavia.8 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations continued to improve over the next several months 
as a result of Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 
February 1956 in which he explicitly condemned Stalin's policy toward Yugosla-
via, describing it as "arbitrary" and "mistaken".9 A summary of the secret speech, 
along with highly favorable commentary, was published in the main Yugoslav 
daily, Borba, on 20 March. The following month, Khrushchev agreed to dissolve 
the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), from which Yugoslavia had 
been expelled by Stalin in 1948. Although the Cominform had become mostly a 
figurehead organization after Yugoslavia's expulsion, the dismantling of it was 
clearly aimed at alleviating Yugoslav leaders' concerns about "future excommu-
nications".10 By the time Tito paid a lengthy reciprocating visit to the Soviet Un-
ion in June 1956, the reconciliation between the two sides had proceeded far 
enough that they could issue a joint communiqué praising the "diversity of forms 
of socialist development" and affirming the "right of different countries to pursue 
different paths of socialist development". The communiqué repudiated the Stalin-
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ist legacy by indicating that neither side would "attempt to impose its own views 
about... socialist development on the other side".11 
Khrushchev proved equally successful in achieving a settlement in Austria, a 
country that had been a major point of contention between East and West since the 
end of World War II. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union had consistently linked pro-
posals for an Austrian peace treaty with other issues such as a settlement of the 
Trieste dispute and a resolution of the German question. The option of neutrality 
for Austria, which was first floated in the 1940s, was attractive to some officials in 
Moscow and in most Western capitals as well as in Austria itself.12 But hardliners 
in Moscow like Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich were firmly opposed to the idea if 
it meant that the Soviet Union would have to pull all its troops out of Austria.13 
Khrushchev, too, initially had been unwilling to accept proposals for Austrian 
neutrality and a troop withdrawal, but by early 1955 he had come to view a settle-
ment of the Austrian question as a way of defusing a potential East-West 
flashpoint, eliminating the U.S., British, and French troop presence in Central Eu-
rope, and spurring progress in the long-stalled East-West negotiations on Ger-
many by using the Austrian case as an example of how neutrality could be applied 
to a united German state. 
In closed forums Molotov and other Soviet officials still heatedly opposed the 
prospective withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Austria, and Molotov 
sought to derail the whole question of an Austrian treaty in early 1955 when the 
CPSU Presidium discussed it.14 In the end, however, Khrushchev and his support-
ers were able to face down the hardliners, arguing that the removal of U.S., Brit-
ish, and French troops from Austria would more than compensate for the with-
drawal of Soviet forces. Khrushchev alleged that Molotov's "insistence on keep-
ing our troops in Austria" must stem from "a desire to start a war".15 Having over-
come the main domestic obstacles, the Soviet authorities pursued bilateral talks 
with the Austrian government in March and April 1955, ironing out what neutral-
ity would mean. Those bilateral talks were soon followed by a four-power confer-
ence and the formal signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May 1955.16 The 
settlement marked a triumph for Khrushchev personally as well as for Soviet for-
eign policy. 
Moreover, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955, the day be-
fore the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, forestalled any concerns that 
Khrushchev's domestic opponents might have raised about the implications of the 
Soviet troop pullout from Austria.17 Until May 1955, the ostensible justification 
for Soviet military deployments in both Hungary and Romania had been that they 
were needed to preserve logistical and communications links with Soviet forces in 
Austria. The creation of the Warsaw Pact provided a rationale for maintaining the 
deployments in Hungary and Romania even after all Soviet troops were gone from 
Austria. The signing of the Pact was intended mainly as a symbolic counter to the 
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admission of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), but the legitimacy it conferred on the Soviet troop presence was part of a 
larger Soviet effort to codify the basic political and military structures of So-
viet-East European relations. Rather than simply preserving the mechanisms de-
vised by Stalin, who had relied disproportionately on terror and coercion, Khrush-
chev sought a less domineering approach that, he hoped, would permit greater do-
mestic "viability" in Eastern Europe. 
Despite the successful overtures to Yugoslavia, the conclusion of the Austrian 
State Treaty, and the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev's policy to-
ward Eastern Europe as a whole remained erratic. The Soviet Union's vacillations 
between reform and retrenchment both at home and abroad, far from promoting 
either the "viability" or "cohesion" of the Eastern bloc, directly contributed to in-
stability in the region, especially in Hungary and Poland. By early 1956, socio-
political pressures in Eastern Europe had reached a dangerous point, and they in-
creased still further as a result of the unintended spillover from Khrushchev's se-
cret speech at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress. Although the speech was 
geared overwhelmingly toward developments within the Soviet Union, it could 
not help but undercut the position of many East European leaders who had ad-
hered rigidly to Stalinist principles, as Mátyás Rákosi and Boleslaw Bierut had 
done in Hungary and Poland.18 (Rákosi was ousted for good in July 1956 and had 
to take permanent refuge in the Soviet Union, and Bierut might have met the same 
fate had he not suddenly died in March 1956, apparently of heart failure and pneu-
monia.) Khrushchev's speech also emboldened dissenters and critics of the East 
European regimes, leading to open hints of unrest in Communist ranks. The wide-
spread popularity of one of the victims of the Stalin-era purges in Poland, Wía-
dyslaw Gomulka, and the continued influence of the erstwhile prime minister in 
Hungary, Imre Nagy, merely heightened the instability. Political unrest thus be-
came intertwined with the economic discontent that had followed the re-imposi-
tion of harsh economic policies. 
When the unrest turned violent in the Polish city of Poznan in late June 1956, it 
ushered in a four-month period of growing turmoil. The Polish army and security 
forces managed to crush the uprising in Poznan, but the two days of fighting left at 
least 73 people dead and more than 700 seriously wounded.19 The clashes also 
caused tens of millions of zlotys' worth of damage to buildings, transportation 
systems, and other state property. At least thirty of the Polish army's tanks, ten of 
its armored personnel carriers, and dozens of its military trucks were destroyed or 
rendered unusable during the operation - an indication of how intense the fighting 
was. It is now known that a few Polish officers tried to resist the decision to open 
fire, but their opposition proved futile because the security forces were willing to 
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carry out the orders and because Soviet commanders (and their Polish allies) still 
dominated the Polish military establishment.20 
The lessons that Soviet leaders drew from the Poznan crisis were decidedly 
mixed. At a CPSU Presidium meeting on 12 July 1956, Khrushchev claimed that 
the rebellion had been instigated by the "subversive activities of the imperialists, 
[who] want to foment disunity and destroy [the socialist countries] one by one"." 
On the other hand, the notes from the meeting show that Khrushchev and his col­
leagues were well aware of the explosive situation that was developing in both 
Hungary and Poland. The CPSU Presidium dispatched a senior Presidium mem­
ber, Anastas Mikoyan, to Budapest on 13 July for a first-hand assessment of the 
growing political ferment in Hungary. Soon after arriving in Hungary, Mikoyan, 
who was one of Khrushchev's closest aides, oversaw the removal of Rákosi and 
his replacement by Ernő Gerő, who Soviet leaders hoped would be better able to 
defuse the mounting discontent.22 
Khrushchev and his colleagues also sent a group of high-ranking Soviet offi­
cers to Hungary to inspect Soviet forces based there (the so-called Special 
Corps).23 The officers, led by General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the 
Soviet General Staff, discovered that the command staff of the Special Corps had 
not yet worked out a secret plan to prepare for large-scale internal disturbances in 
Hungary. (In the wake of the 1953 East German uprising, the commanders of all 
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe had been ordered by the CPSU leadership to de­
vise appropriate plans for anti-riot and counterinsurgency operations.) When this 
omission was reported to Soviet defense minister Marshal Georgii Zhukov, he or­
dered that the requisite documents be compiled immediately. The visiting Soviet 
generals helped the commander of Soviet forces in Hungary, General Lash-
chenko, put together a "Plan of Operations for the Special Corps to Restore Public 
Order on the Territory of Hungary", which was signed on 20 July.24 This plan, 
codenamed Volna (Wave), envisaged the use of tens of thousands of Soviet troops 
at very short notice (within three to six hours) to "uphold and restore public order" 
in Hungary. The plan required a special signal (known as Kompas) to be put into 
effect, but the formulation of Volna at this stage indicates that Soviet leaders 
wanted a reliable fall-back option in case their attempts to bolster political stabil­
ity in Hungary did not pan out. 
Despite these precautions and the growing recognition in Moscow of the unsta­
ble situation in Eastern Europe, Soviet policy in the region remained hesitant and 
uncertain over the next few months, in part because Khrushchev was still under 
pressure at home from hardliners in the CPSU, who had forged close links with 
old-line Stalinist leaders in Eastern Europe. Fluctuations in Soviet domestic poli­
tics thus continued to roil intra-bloc ties. This internal-external dynamic helped to 
precipitate the crises that erupted in Poland and Hungary in October 1956 - crises 
that are discussed at length elsewhere in this special issue. 
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This paper will analyze Hungary's political, military and economic role in the So-
viet Empire and the implications of this for the Soviet Union's response to the 1956 
revolution and war of independence. The paper will review Soviet politics within 
the imperial-ideological paradigm and will argue that Hungary served as a Marx-
ist-Leninist client state that fits the description given by Edward Luttwak with the 
exception that economics played a hitherto unappreciated, crucial role in Soviet ex-
pansion. Ideology shaped in the Kremlin's perception of the Hungarian scene as 
well as world politics. 
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This paper will not attempt to provide a systematic narrative of Soviet-Hungar-
ian relations. Instead we shall attempt to provide a framework of analysis in which 
to discuss it. Therefore our treatment of the topic will discuss a historical problem 
with the methods and the vocabulary of political science. To some extent at least, 
it is hoped that this approach will help remedy the problem arising from perspec-
tives, namely, that a great power, in our case Russian view of Soviet role in East-
ern Europe,1 may differ significantly from the way a small power like Hungary 
may tell the same story. Not to mention the fact that - absurd as it was - the USSR 
was the victim of Hungarian aggression in 1941 while Hungary suffered the same 
from the Soviet part in 1945. Needless to say, the aggressor-victim role introduces 
further elements of divergence.2 This is not to mention ideologically motivated 
explanations, which ascribed a messianic role to the Soviet Union's postwar poli-
cies. Hopefully then, the methods and language of international relations theory 
will help overcome at least some of these difficulties. 
Two inextricably linked questions are to be answered: why was Hungary 
Sovietized and what was its position and function within the Soviet empire? An-
swering these basic questions will address the relationship between ideological 
and imperial aspects of Soviet conduct.3 Such discussion cannot escape dealing 
with the various forms of power as it is exercised in interstate relations. With Ger-
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many's collapse the states of Soviet occupied Eastern Europe had no choice but to 
align themselves with the Soviet Union, the region's most threatening and only 
military great power. International relations theory actually predicts that weak 
states tend to bandwagon when allies are not available.4 It is easy to demonstrate 
that virtually all responsible Hungarian politicians and political movements 
wished to pursue a pro-Soviet political line as evidenced by the discussion on the 
Soviet-Hungarian economic treaty of 1945. The only question was whether this 
should be an all out pro-Soviet line, or whether friendly terms should be main­
tained with the Western world as well. Even the historian Gyula Szekfű in his ca­
pacity as Hungarian minister in Moscow advocated a unilateral Soviet line. The 
question we shall attempt to answer is why this fell short of Soviet expectations. 
Recently scholars have pointed out that Stalin regarded conquered territories as 
war trophies. Stalin thought that each victor's share should be proportionate to the 
number of soldiers "spent" and enemy killed in the war.5 On the fiftieth anniver­
sary of victory day the side of GUM overlooking the Red Square a gigantic image 
of Marshall Zhukov, the victor of Berlin was displayed. Clad in Marshall's uni­
form Zhukov was depicted riding a white horse.6 In fact the Red Army "spent" 44 
thousand Soviets (plus 26 thousand Romanians) and killed 48 thousand enemy 
troops in the fighting in and around Budapest alone,7 meaning that Red Army 
losses exceeded 10 percent of the total US losses in World War II. Recent scholar­
ship has shown that the Hungarian occupation units committed massive atrocities 
against the civilian population in Ukraine.8 Hungary was a country to be con­
quered, not liberated. The Soviet position was clearly formulated by Vladimir 
Dekanozov the deputy director of the State Directorate of Soviet Property 
Abroad, the former minister of foreign affairs, Beria's close associate, who ex­
plained Hungary's economic subjugation along the following lines: "the victori­
ous country demands to assert its rights for the reason that the vanquished country 
started war against it."9 
That Hungary was a closed zone in the 1950s, with human, commodity and 
other types of exchange reduced to a bare minimum towards the Western world 
should come as no surprise to anyone even vaguely familiar with the history of the 
Soviet bloc. But the fact that this was so right from the outset has not been ade­
quately noted. As Chairman of the Allied Control Commission Kliment Vo-
roshilov put it: "This is our zone of occupation and we are going to ask informa­
tion on every person that comes in."10 Indeed for foreign travel the same rules 
were applied in Hungary as in the Soviet Union itself. Soviet authorities deter­
mined access to Hungary and granted exit visas for Hungarian officials that 
wished to travel abroad. Even the allied members of the ACC needed Soviet clear­
ance to enter, which on quite a few occasions they did not get. Airspace was (and 
remained) under Soviet military control. When prime minister Ferenc Nagy 
sought landing rights for US civilian airlines on behalf of the Truman administra-
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tion, the Soviet diplomatic representative, Georgii Pushkin, who regarded the 
American request as a question of military bases, asserted that "it would be easier 
for the US to get landing rights in the USSR itself."11 In fact Hungarian airspace 
remained under the control of the Soviet military authorities seated in Wiesbaden 
even after the peace treaty came into effect. 
The armistice agreement signed with Hungary on January 20, 1945 provided 
the Soviet armed forces freedom of maneuvering on Hungarian territory without 
any measure of Hungarian oversight and this provision was never lifted in the pe-
riod under examination. In fact this state of affairs was reaffirmed by the bilateral 
military treaties signed in 1948. That is, Hungary became part of the Soviet mili-
tary space. Moreover as a result of Moscow's unilateral decision the Hungarian 
budget financed the whole of the Soviet occupation costs, including transporta-
tion, industrial supplies, food and pay. This came to 511 million forints (50 mil-
lion dollars) in 14 months from 1946,1" meaning that Soviet occupation cost at 
least 150 million, almost the same amount as the official reparations to the USSR. 
From 1945 onwards Hungary was both the Soviet Union's military and eco-
nomic space. As a result of the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 the Soviet Union es-
tablished an economic empire in occupied territories, meaning that it seized alleg-
edly German owned, in reality property of all kinds of ownership in key branches 
of the economy and transferred them under the State Directorate of Soviet Prop-
erty abroad. In Hungary alone 400 companies came fully or partly under Soviet 
ownership. These were taken out of the jurisdiction of local authorities and were 
exempted from local dues and taxes. In Hungary Soviet or Soviet-Hungarian joint 
companies established in 1946 controlled much of the mining, machine and heavy 
industries, Danube shipping and air traffic. Most importantly perhaps for the So-
viets, they controlled the strategic aluminum and bauxite industry. In fact Mos-
cow controlled all natural resources in occupied territories it wished to acquire 
without legal or political constraint. This and other means of economic penetra-
tion such as foreign trade furthered political expansion as well. This fits well into 
theoretical constructs of economic imperialism. The structural realist Kenneth 
Waltz's definition is an apt description of the Hungarian scene: "states use eco-
nomic means for military and political ends and political means for economic 
ends." For Waltz then economic imperialism is both means and an end.13 In fact 
states like Germany in the 1930s used economic penetration to create virtual colo-
nies or economic satellites.14 Special mention needs to be made of reparations, 
which together with other payments such as the maintenance of the Soviet army 
destroyed Hungary's prewar economic structure by generating the worst hyperin-
flation in history. Reparations, inflated by the arbitrary nature of Soviet pricing of 
commodities took up 29-32 percent of the national income between 1945 
andl947. In 1947 reparations consumed 18 percent of the national income, but all 
international obligations, the vast majority of which went to the USSR, the same 
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figure is 42 percent. In a matter of only three years Hungary serviced its full repa-
rations to the USSR, although the armistice envisioned six years in January 1945, 
and even this figure was considered to be the absolute limit of the Hungarian 
economy. If one looks at the financial indicators of 1945 and 1946, there is no 
doubt about the causal relationship between reparation shipments and hyperinfla-
tion.15 It is interesting to note that the second largest hyperinflation in history, the 
German one of 1923 was caused by reparation payments as well, and coincided 
with the French occupation of the Ruhr region. The problem was not the fact that 
reparations were being paid, but by their unbridled nature, which exceeded the 
economy's capacity to pay. Shortly after the stabilization of the forint inflation got 
under way again - we don't read about it in the textbooks because this state of af-
fairs was top secret - and as an emergency measure the Hungarian gold reserve 
held in Switzerland was used to curb another runaway price hike. ' 
Historians still debate whether Stalin intended the Sovietization of Eastern Eu-
rope, when he made the decision or whether it was a result of external influence. 
We may never know the definitive answer, or an answer possibly does not even 
exist. Similar debates are pursued around the origins of other momentous events. 
In the literature of the Holocaust for instance scholars still argue whether Hitler in-
tended the destruction of Jews from the very outset, and if not, when exactly the 
Nazi leadership opted for the genocidal solution.17 Over half a century after the 
events there is still no consensus on this basic score. Moscow regarded Eastern 
Europe as a buffer shielding it form imperialist expansion. As the Novikov tele-
gram of 1946 put it, the Soviet Union's influence in the countries of South Eastern 
Europe was an "obstacle in the path of the expansionist policy of the United 
States".18 Initial communist moderation in Hungary was a tactical measure as both 
Révai and Rákosi readily admitted. In his memoirs Rákosi claimed that "even at 
the party Congress we talked about the socialist nature of people's democracy in 
generalities ... this ... was not because we ourselves were unclear which way we 
were heading ... but because tactically this was correct at the time. We agreed to 
avoid the tenu dictatorship of the proletariat, which would have made it only 
harder for us domestically and internationally ... But for the politically literate 
what we said at the Congress was enough."19 Having met Stalin in April, in his se-
cret speech of May 1946 Rákosi announced the construction of a proletarian dic-
tatorship irrespectively of the domestic or international conditions. "Whenever a 
country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for social-
ism this will be carried out."20 The statement that there was a causal relationship 
between the Marshall Plan and Sovietization cannot be substantiated with docu-
mentary evidence. It is also illogical in the sense of arguing post hoc ergo propter 
hoc and goes against counterfactual arguing - foreign aid seldom triggers political 
expansion. By the time it was announced the USSR was in absolute control of 
Eastern Europe politically, economically and militarily. The existence of a coali-
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tion government explains very little since its scope of authority was so severely 
impaired that it had virtually no control on formulating policy. Moscow exercised 
external authority, and changed the makeup of the Hungarian government at will 
- a case in point was Molotov's intervention into the coalition arrangement as a 
result of which the Ministry of the Interior was given to the Communist Party. So­
viet authorities also exercised police functions in Hungary and arrested the gen­
eral secretary of the Smallholder Party in February 1947. 
If, in Geir Lundestad's definition the American empire in Western Europe was 
an "empire by invitation",21 the Soviet Union's was undoubtedly an empire by co­
ercion. Moscow enjoyed both power and influence having had the ability to exer­
cise influence and the ability to prevent influence from being exercised over itself. 
But because its presence was uninvited, Moscow's power was limited to coercion 
and lacked a crucial component of power: the ability to attract.22 Hungary's func­
tion in the Soviet empire can be described within the paradigm offered by Edward 
Luttwak: "it was a Leninist client state which satisfied a growing hierarchy of So­
viet imperial needs".23 
It has long been speculated that Eastern Europe served the Soviet Union's se­
curity. The Hungarian budget covered most, if not all occupation costs and pro­
vided unrestricted use of Hungarian territory for the Soviet military. The USSR 
paid an annual fee of less than two hundred dollars for all the Hungarian military 
installations used by the occupation army. The Hungarian army adopted the So­
viet military doctrine and threat perception, thereby extending the Soviet defen­
sive perimeter to Hungary (the Hungarian authorities were not even informed of 
the size of the Soviet army stationed there); contributed financially to Soviet mili­
tary build-up: in 1951 at Stalin's instruction the plans for heavy industrialization 
were raised three fold in preparation for war; the size of the Hungarian army 
reached 240 000, the largest standing peacetime army in its history, a cost born by 
the domestic budget. Thus super industrialization can be explained only in part 
with ideological considerations, but perhaps more powerfully with the military 
and foreign policy needs of the hegemonic power.24 
Military services were intertwined with economic ones - maintenance of over­
sized armed forces plus the Soviet military (e.g., construction costs of airfields, fa­
cilities for occupation forces removed from Austria in 1955), war preparation, 
militarization of the economy; forced investments, such as the construction of an 
aluminum-oxide plant at Almásfüzitő in 1949-1950, where two-thirds of the 235 
million forint construction cost was to be shouldered by the Hungarian budget. 
The investment was undertaken because the USSR signed a bauxite agreement 
with Yugoslavia.*"5 Similarly, the expansion of the aluminum oxide plant of Ajka 
was undertaken under Soviet instruction, where 63 per cent of the 600 million fo­
rint construction cost plus the construction of a 30 km railroad line leading to it 
was financed by the Hungarian treasury. 6 
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There was also a considerable transfer of wealth: reparations (the very lowest 
figure can be estimated at 385 million dollars), other payments, such as Hungarian 
debts to Germany (over 45 million), share transfer, 1949 (15 million), compensa-
tion for damage to German property (up to 180 million), sale of Soviet companies 
in 1952 (165 million in commodities and cca. 110 million in investment); sale of 
mixed companies in 1954 (cca. 150 million, the rest ofthat payment was cancel-
led), war trophies (whole industrial plants, inventories, food, livestock, grain, art 
treasures, etc. - the value of this is impossible to quantify, Tungsram alone was 
worth $12 million). Industrial removals involved the flagships of industry: 
Tungsram, Hofherr and Schrantz, Feiten and Guillaume, Goldberger, Ganz, 
Weiss Manfred, MOM. 1200 tons of Neményi paper work machinery as packed 
up by 350 people. Moscow also benefited from preferential trade agreements; the 
transfer of dividends and profits made by the Soviet companies (in 1950 alone 138 
million forints worth of commodities were taken to the USSR under this heading, 
including 25.8 million tons of bauxite); forced labor (the value of which cannot be 
quantified), maintenance of the Soviet army (cca. 150 million up to 1948 alone). 
Moscow continued to enjoy unlimited access to Hungarian natural resources even 
after 1954: the Soviet imposed uranium agreement of 1955 provided full access: 
sole purchaser under production costs - while Hungary paid for the bulk of the re-
quired investments, the amount being 380 million forints in the first year alone. 
Thus the USSR, if we include military costs took approximately 1.3 billion dollars 
up to 1956 excluding the many items which cannot be quantified. This roughly 
equals the Austrian figure, which in turn was compensated by US aid. The Hun-
garian figures show that the estimate of 22 billion dollars of Soviet compensation 
from occupied territories will probably have to be modified significantly upward. 
Bilateral trade relations became a source of coercive power. In 1953 the USSR 
accounted for 34 percent of Hungarian foreign trade and then declined somewhat 
to 22 per cent in 1955. The Hungarian economy was so reliant on Soviet commod-
ities to keep its economy going and on the Soviet market to be able to pay for its 
imports that this in itself provided a leverage of political control. Foreign trade be-
comes a source of power if other countries become economically dependent on 
the dominant state and thus provide it with an instrument of coercion. The power 
to interrupt and redefine commercial relations with any country helps provide the 
power position the dominant state acquires over other countries. This ability is 
achieved through the creation of exclusive complementarity.27 This effect became 
apparent in 1955 when the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade refused to accept the 
list of goods Hungary desired to sell to and purchase from, the Soviet Union. The 
situation was so threatening to Hungarian economy that after an unsuccessful mis-
sion to Moscow by minister of foreign trade László Háy, Rákosi took the matter 
up himself but was able to achieve only a modification of the Soviet list of com-
modities.28 
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During the 1950s Hungary arguably was not a sovereign state. Hedley Bull de-
scribed the relationship between the USSR and its satellites as hegemonic in the 
descending hierarchy of dominance, hegemony and primacy. But considering that 
the Kremlin changed the Hungarian leadership in 1953 without having to resort to 
violence and used it to extract a variety of imperial services, this relationship may 
have constituted a stronger form of mastery, a most flagrant "exploitation of pre-
ponderance, dominance".29 Stephen Krasner articulated the Westphalian defini-
tion of sovereignty as an "institutional arrangement for organizing political life 
that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external factors 
from domestic structures", which is violated either by voluntary or coercive ac-
tion, that is intervention and invitation.30 Based on these criteria Hungary's sover-
eignty was violated because it was subjected to external sources of authority. Sim-
ilarly, according to Kenneth Waltz "to say that a nation is sovereign means that it 
decides for itself how it will cope with its external and internal problems, includ-
ing whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its free-
dom of action by making commitments to them". That is to say sovereignty is vio-
lated by coercion. While Waltz appreciates that there could be normally con-
straints on nations' freedom of action, he does not regard a nation as sovereign un-
less it surrendered its freedom of action voluntarily. ' Although Hungary's com-
munist leaders sought Soviet political and even military intervention of their own 
accord, it is questionable that in this instance "voluntary" had any significance 
since the Hungarian leadership owed its very existence to the Soviet Union in the 
first place. 
The importance of voluntary obedience to the USSR, stemming from the iden-
tification of Hungarian interest with the world communist movement and its 
leader, the USSR cannot be overestimated from the perspective of Soviet domi-
nance. Hungarian leaders such as Nagy and Rákosi sought consultations to settle 
domestic disputes. When the danger of Soviet troop withdrawal resulting from the 
Austrian state treaty came up, the Political Committee resolved to petition the So-
viets to stay. Hungarian leaders actually requested Soviet advisors they were not 
always imposed from Moscow. Occasionally the Soviets failed to send their advi-
sors on time and the Hungarians had to urge them to do so.32 Soviet participation 
in domestic affairs was hence needed only at critical junctures. Thus for example 
Anastas Mikoyan participated in the decision making process on Rákosi 's re-
moval in the summer of 1956, or appointment of Imre Nagy at the consultations in 
Moscow in June 1953. On some economic matters the Hungarian leadership did 
occasionally challenge the Soviets. In 1949 for instance Hungary rejected a Soviet 
proposal for the bilateral coordination of planning and prices. In 1954 a signifi-
cant dispute emerged over the price Hungary was to pay the Soviet Union for the 
joint companies. 
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Soviet presence was in part of a traditional, imperial in nature in an effort to 
maximize political, economic and military power. Bolshevik regimes may have 
been introduced for the unhindered satisfaction of these needs, rather than, or 
beside ideological proselytism. Military occupation coupled with the ideologi-
cally motivated loyalty and voluntary obedience of the Hungarian leadership were 
the key factors in the maintenance of Soviet rule. Practice and ideology sustained 
each other. It seems that as many times before mundane imperial purposes were 
disguised under the mantle of ideological salvation, which is not to deny the mes-
sianic pretenses of powers like the Ottoman Empire, the United States or Soviet 
Russia. Moscow paid little attention to the projection of soft power, i.e., the inter-
nalization of its ideology or the dissemination of its culture. Cultural exchanges 
were kept on a minimum. Indeed, Soviet participants of cultural exchange pro-
grams sometimes did not show up in Hungary because they did not receive their 
exit permits in time. Poorly trained Hungarian cadres instructed Marxism-Lenin-
ism. The ubiquitous nature of Communist symbols underlined the weakness of the 
official ideology. 
Eastern Europe was never integrated into the USSR. As far as we can tell this 
prospect was never seriously considered. But even from the Soviet perspective 
such a move would have been counterproductive. Hence Moscow got the best of 
all worlds: obedient sources economic and military power for a minimal outlay of 
economic and political capital. 
These structural aspects of Soviet policies may explain not only why Eastern 
Europe was Bolshevized in the first place, but also the reason for surrendering it in 
1989/1990. By then Eastern Europe was a political, economic and military liabil-
i ty-no longer an asset. Although I attempted to provide a framework of interpre-
tation, lacking crucial Soviet sources much cannot be understood. But it seems 
from the evidence above that in 1956 even slight modifications in the status of 
bloc countries within the Soviet international system were barely conceivable. 
This gives meaning to Khrushchev's statement to Tito in 1956 that the USSR 
would go to any lengths to keep Hungary. 
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This paper will look at the East-West military balance in 1956 and at each side's 
(i.e., Moscow's and Washington's) understanding of the balance. It will look also at 
the way in which each side regarded the danger of nuclear war, and at how each side 
regarded the other's approach to nuclear war. Finally, the paper will address Mos-
cow and Washington's views of the danger that the Hungarian revolution might es-
calate to general war, and at the communication between the two sides on that score 
during the revolution. 
Keywords: Hungarian revolution, Cold War, nuclear weapons, general war, 
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Introduction 
The United States and its NATO allies took no military action in 1956 to help 
the Hungarian revolution. Many participants in the revolution felt betrayed by this 
lack of help, especially because the Eisenhower Administration had espoused the 
language of liberation for the countries of Eastern Europe. Not only did the United 
States not attempt to provide military support to the revolution; President Eisen-
hower and his top advisors did not even think of providing such support. They did 
not ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the question of employing military 
force to aid the revolution. ' The Soviet leaders, for their part, did not expect the 
West to intervene with military force. The Soviet leaders mentioned the possibil-
ity of a wider war only to dismiss it, according to the notes we now have of their 
deliberations in the Central Committee Presidium. 
Eisenhower in his memoirs recalls that the Soviet military operation in Hun-
gary "almost automatically had posed to us the question of employing force to op-
pose this barbaric invasion", but geographical and political factors made a mili-
tary response impracticable. Hungary was a landlocked state that could be reached 
only by crossing the territory of neutral Austria, Titoist Yugoslavia, or communist 
Czechoslovakia. Britain and France could not have joined in such an operation, 
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because they were preoccupied with the Suez crisis, and it would have been un-
thinkable to use Italian or West German forces. "I still wonder", Eisenhower 
wrote, 
what would have been my recommendation to the Congress and the 
American people had Hungary been accessible by sea or through the 
territory of allies who might have agreed to react positively to the 
tragic fate of the Hungarian people ... Sending United States troops 
alone into Hungary through hostile or neutral territory would have 
involved us in general war.~ 
Khrushchev's son, Sergei Khrushchev, recalls that on November 4, 1956 he 
asked his father why the Americans had not intervened with military force in Hun-
gary. Khrushchev's reply was: 
Everything happened so quickly that possibly they simply did not 
have time to do so. The Americans cannot, of course, be taken at their 
word, they respect only force, but unofficially they told us that they 
would not interfere in Hungarian affairs with their armed forces or 
with direct deliveries of arms. They consider Hungary to be in our 
sphere of interests. 
The absence of any serious discussion of Western military intervention in ei-
ther Washington or Moscow is an important aspect of the Hungarian revolution. 
In this paper we explore the military-political context of the revolution and how it 
may have shaped the responses of both the Soviet Union and the United States to 
the revolution. 
The Military-Political Context 
Significant changes were taking place in the East-West military balance in the 
mid-1950s. First and foremost, a relationship of mutual deterrence was beginning 
to emerge between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States had 
lost its atomic monopoly in 1949. In 1956 it still enjoyed considerable numerical 
superiority in nuclear weapons - about 4,600 to an estimated 400 for the Soviet 
Union. (Besides, Britain had tested a fission bomb in 1952 and was acquiring a 
nuclear arsenal of its own.) Nevertheless, the Soviet nuclear arsenal was growing, 
and with it the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in the 
United States and Western Europe. 
The US capacity to strike the Soviet Union was much greater than the Soviet 
ability to strike the United States. US Strategic Air Command had more and better 
bombers than the Soviet Long Range Air Force. Besides, the United States had 
bases in Europe, North Africa, and Asia from which bombers could take off on 
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bombing raids against the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union had no equivalent bases 
close to the United States. Nevertheless, by 1956 the Soviet Union did have a sub-
stantial force of medium bombers, which could strike targets in Europe, including 
US air bases, and in that year the Miasishchev M-4 intercontinental bomber en-
tered service with the Long-Range Air Force. 
The Eisenhower Administration took the view that Soviet capabilities were al-
ready sufficient to inflict considerable damage on the United States and its Euro-
pean allies. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", adopted on 7 January 
1955 by the National Security Council, concluded: "Soviet air-atomic capabilities 
are rapidly increasing. Already the USSR has the capacity to inflict widespread 
devastion [sic] on major free world countries allied to the U.S. and serious damage 
to the U.S. itself."4 
A second development of great importance took place in the mid-1950s, rein-
forcing the emergence of mutual deterrence. The United States and the Soviet Un-
ion tested thermonuclear weapons with explosive yields very much greater than 
those of the fission bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In November 
1952 the United States tested (in the "Mike" shot) a device that showed it had 
mastered the design of a "superbomb" that could produce almost infinite explo-
sive yields. In the spring of 1954 it conducted a series of tests in the South Pacific. 
One of those tests produced a yield of 15 megatons - more than 1,000 times 
greater than the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In November 1955 the 
Soviet Union tested a bomb that showed that it too had mastered the design of the 
superbomb. Each side could now inflict enormous damage on the other by drop-
ping a small number of bombs.5 
These tests shocked public opinion around the world. They also shook the po-
litical leaders of the three nuclear powers. After his election as president, Eisen-
hower received a report on the US Mike shot. He was troubled by the report and in 
his inaugural address declared: "science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final 
gift, the power to erase human life from this planet."6 On March 9, 1954 Churchill 
wrote to Eisenhower after reading an account of that same Mike shot: "You can 
imagine what my thoughts are about London. I am told that several million people 
would certainly be obliterated by four or five of the latest H Bombs." On March 
12, 1954 the Soviet Premier, G. M. Malenkov, made a speech in which he said that 
"a new world war ... with modern weapons means the end of world civilization".8 
Khrushchev too had been briefed about nuclear weapons when he was appointed 
First Secretary of the CPSU in September 1953. "When I . . . learned all the facts 
about nuclear power", he recalled some years later, "I couldn't sleep for several 
days. Then I became convinced that we could never possibly use these weapons, 
and when I realized that I was able to sleep again."9 
The third important development followed from the first two: the emergence of 
"common knowledge" about the unacceptability of nuclear war. Eisenhower was 
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convinced that the Soviet leaders did not want war, because war would put at risk 
their hold on power, but the prospect of growing Soviet nuclear strength impelled 
him to make sure that the Soviet leaders understood just how destructive a nuclear 
war would be. At the Geneva Summit in July 1955 - the first since Potsdam - he 
made a special effort to impress upon them the terrible consequences of a nuclear 
war, pointing in particular to the danger of nuclear fallout. At dinner one evening 
he explained with great earnestness that the development of modern weapons was 
such that the country that used them "genuinely risked destroying itself. Because 
of the prevailing winds, he added, a major war would destroy the Northern Hemi-
sphere.10 
The Geneva Summit did not yield any major agreements, but Eisenhower re-
turned to Washington believing, as he put it in a television broadcast, "there seems 
to be a growing realization by all that nuclear warfare, pursued to the ultimate, 
could be practically race suicide"." Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, 
drew very much the same conclusion: "Each country present learnt that no coun-
try attending wanted war and each understood why. The Russians realized, as we 
did, that this situation had been created by the deterrent power of thermo-nuclear 
weapons."1 Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that he returned from Geneva 
"encouraged, realizing that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared 
them".13 Khrushchev apparently saw Eisenhower's homily on nuclear war as evi-
dence that the United States was as anxious as the Soviet Union to avoid such a 
war. 
By the mid-1950s the political leaders of each of the nuclear states understood 
that nuclear war was unacceptable in some profound, if ill-defined, way. Each of 
them knew that the others understood this too, and each of them knew that each 
knew that the others understood it, and so on. The unacceptability of nuclear war 
had thus become "common knowledge" among those who had the authority to use 
nuclear weapons.14 Khrushchev summed this up neatly in a conversation with 
Harold Stassen, Eisenhower's special assistant on disarmament, during his visit to 
London in April 1956. Stassen said to Khrushchev "it was evident, as President 
Eisenhower had pointed out, that a war would be very adverse to both systems, to 
both nations, and to a great portion of the world. Khrushchev said he agreed, that 
he knew that there was only a small percentage of madmen in both countries who 
think otherwise. Nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that coex-
istence was elementary."15 
The American and Soviet leaders converged upon this common knowledge 
from different points of departure. For Washington it meant accepting the loss of 
an atomic monopoly and recognizing that the Soviet Union could now inflict nu-
clear devastation on the United States. Eisenhower rejected the option of preven-
tive war against the Soviet Union. In doing so, he was making the judgment that it 
would be possible for the United States to live with a Soviet Union that possessed 
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thermonuclear weapons. His basic national security document, NSC 162/2, 
adopted in October 1953, emphasized the need to be ready for rivalry "over the 
long pull".16 
For Moscow the common knowledge about nuclear war meant that Washing-
ton recognized growing Soviet nuclear might. Khrushchev returned from Geneva 
in July 1955 "encouraged" because the United States and Britain now recognized 
the Soviet capacity to inflict devastation on the United States and its allies. He re-
ceived new boost to his confidence in November, when the Soviet Union tested its 
first "superbomb", and in February 1956, when the R-5 missile, which had a range 
of 1,200 km, was flight-tested with a nuclear warhead.17 
At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 Khrushchev rejected the Leninist 
thesis that war was inevitable as long as imperialism existed. In an obvious refer-
ence to nuclear weapons, he declared that "today there are mighty social and polit-
ical forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleash-
ing war and, if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggres-
sors and frustrate their adventurist plans". "Either peaceful coexistence or the 
most destructive war in history", he told the Congress, "There is no third way."18 
The Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence" was Khrushchev's counterpart to 
Eisenhower's idea of rivalry "over the long pull". 
The changing strategic balance had important consequences for military rela-
tionships in Europe. In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the NATO had 
committed itself to a large buildup of ground and air forces to match what it saw as 
conventional superiority on the part of the Soviet Union and the East European 
states. Eisenhower decided that such a policy was not feasible in economic terms, 
and in 1953 he adopted a policy that placed a heavy reliance on nuclear retaliation 
to deter Soviet aggression wherever it might occur. In line with this policy, the 
NATO adopted MC 48 in December 1954; this was a new strategy that placed pri-
mary reliance on nuclear weapons and on combat forces in being. The aim of the 
strategy was to convince the Soviet Union that "in the event of aggression [it] will 
be subjected immediately to devastating counter-attack employing atomic weap-
ons".19 West Germany was admitted into the NATO in 1955 and had begun to or-
ganize the Bundeswehr helping to offset Soviet conventional superiority. Never-
theless, US and the NATO strategy continued to rely heavily on nuclear weapons, 
including tactical nuclear weapons, which the United States had begun to deploy 
in Europe in the mid 1950s. 
Eisenhower did not believe that war in Europe could be limited. He told the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1956 that "any war in which Russian troops were 
involved directly against United States forces or the United States" would be gen-
eral war, and any Soviet attack would be met by launching SAC [Strategic Air 
Command] "as soon as he found out that Russian troops were on the move". The 
aim of his national security doctrine was to use the threat of nuclear war to deter 
36 DAVID HOLLOWAY - VICTOR MCFARLAND 
aggression on a local scale. In other words, he aimed to deter the Soviet Union by 
threatening rapid escalation from local conventional war to general nuclear war in 
the event of a Soviet attack. 
Similar, though less far-reaching, changes were taking place in Eastern Eu-
rope. Soviet military doctrine was adapting to the nuclear age. The Soviet Union 
had begun to train its forces for operations on the "nuclear battlefield". In Septem-
ber 1954 it conducted an exercise at Totskoe, in the province of Orenburg in the 
South Urals Military District, in which an atomic bomb was detonated. The 1955 
Field Regulations of the Soviet Army assumed that nuclear weapons would be 
used on the battlefield as well as against strategic targets. Soviet military thinking 
now stressed the importance of surprise and envisaged the possible use of weap-
ons of all kinds from the very beginning of a war.21 The Warsaw Treaty was 
signed in May 1955, the same month as the Austrian State Treaty, but the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization had as yet no real substance as a military alliance. Soviet con-
trol over the armed forces of Eastern Europe was still bilateral, exercised through 
Soviet military "advisors".22 
By 1956 the military balance in Europe had attained a certain kind of stability, 
but - notwithstanding the withdrawal of forces following the Austrian State 
Treaty the year before - that stability rested on a confrontation in which large 
numbers of Soviet and US forces, along with those of their allies, faced one an-
other across the central front, equipped not only with conventional anus but with 
nuclear weapons too. Any military clash in Europe would run the risk of escala-
tion to general war, which neither side wanted and each understood the other did 
not want, and each understood that the other understood it did not want it either. 
There remained, however, the danger of war by miscalculation. NSC 5501 
pointed out in January 1955 that, in the context of emerging mutual deterrence, 
the one remaining possible cause of general war (besides the highly unlikely pos-
sibility of a dramatic technological breakthrough by the Soviet Union) was the 
possibility of war by miscalculation: "war would remain a possibility, if only be-
cause of the element of miscalculation by either side or because of a technological 
break-through by the Soviets leading them to believe they could destroy the U.S. 
without effective retaliation".23 The same document made the argument that the 
Soviet leaders would risk war only if the United States posed a fundamental threat 
to Soviet security: "they probably would not be deterred by the risk of general war 
from taking military counter-action against Western actions considered to be an 
imminent threat to their security". It warned: "general war might occur as the cli-
max of a series of actions and counter-actions which neither side originally in-
tended to lead to that result".24 
"Common knowledge" that nuclear war was unacceptable did not completely 
rule out the possibility of such a war. Other conventions, understandings, or rules 
of the game were needed if the two sides were not to stumble into war by accident 
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or miscalculation. That was particularly true of Central Europe where the two alli-
ances confronted each other with huge forces equipped with nuclear weapons. 
The discussions in the National Security Council in 1955 and 1956 point to an ap-
preciation by the Eisenhower Administration of two important "rules of the 
game:" neither side should try to pose an "imminent threat" to the other's security; 
and US and Soviet forces should not fight each other directly. To cross either of 
those barriers would be to run the risk of escalation to general war. 
The Soviet Decision to Use Force 
In 1956 Soviet forces in Hungary comprised two mechanized divisions and 
two air divisions (one fighter division and one bomber division) as well as air de-
fense artillery, a bridging regiment, and logistics groups. This group of forces was 
known as the "Special Corps". Its mission was to cooperate with units of the Hun-
garian People's Army to cover the border with Austria and to secure the most im-
portant communications in case Soviet forces should need to advance from the 
territory of the Soviet Union. 
In July 1956, shortly after the large protests in Poznan, the Special Corps was 
instructed to develop a plan of action for maintaining and restoring public order in 
Budapest. The Special Corps was subordinated to the Soviet Ministry of Defense 
through the General Staff, and Lieutenant-General P. Lashchenko was appointed 
commander. The plan was approved on July 20. It was given the codename 
"Volna" (wave) and was to be initiated with the codeword "Kompass". 
At 11 p.m. on October 23 the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal V.D. 
Sokolovskii, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to move troops into Bu-
dapest, where they were to take control of key buildings and locations in the city 
and restore public order. A small number of troops was sent to the border with 
Austria. The Soviet forces began to move at midnight. At the same time one So-
viet mechanized division deployed in Romania, and two divisions (one rifle and 
one mechanized) in the Carpathian Military District of the Soviet Union, began to 
move to the Hungarian border; these forces crossed into Hungary on the 24th. 
Fighter and bomber divisions were made combat ready, as well as an anti-air divi-
sion from the Carpathian Military District. The total number of troops involved in 
the operation was 31,550, with about 6,000 entering Budapest. 5 
There is no mention of the possibility of military intervention by the Western 
powers in any of the discussions among Soviet leaders - in the Central Committee 
Presidium meeting on the evening of October 23, in the situation report from Bu-
dapest by A. I. Mikoian and M. A. Suslov on October 24, or in the meeting on Oc-
tober 24 in which Khrushchev informed East European leaders about the situation 
in Poland and Hungary.26 The Soviet leaders clearly regarded the revolution in 
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Hungary as an internal affair of the socialist camp, and they evidently believed 
that that was how Western leaders regarded it too. One interesting aspect of the 
Soviet deployment is that the number of troops sent to border with Austria was too 
small to seal the border. Opening of the border had begun in the spring of 1956, 
and it was this that made it possible for 190,000 people to flee to the West when 
the Revolution failed.27 
Operation "Volna" proved to be counterproductive. Opposition to the Hungar­
ian government increased. On October 24 Ernő Gerő, first secretary of the Hun­
garian Party, told the Soviet leaders by telephone that the "arrival of Soviet troops 
into the city has had a negative effect on the mood of the residents".28 The situa­
tion grew worse, with hundreds of Hungarians and Soviet soldiers killed in the 
fighting. Splits emerged in the Soviet leadership, which was uncertain how to act. 
The tensions were especially apparent in the Central Committee Presidium dis­
cussion on October 28.29 Two days later, on October 30, Khrushchev noted at the 
conclusion of the Presidium meeting that there were two courses of action: "the 
military - the path of occupation; the peaceful - withdrawal of forces, negotia­
tions".30 The Soviet leadership opted for the latter. Orders were sent to withdraw 
Soviet forces from Budapest, and this was done on October 31. Those forces then 
concentrated about 15-20 kilometers from the capital.31 
On the following day, October 31, the Presidium changed its mind. Khrush­
chev stated his position as follows, after reporting on a telephone conversation 
with Wladislaw Gomulka: "Reexamine our assessment, do not withdraw troops 
from Hungary and Budapest, and take the initiative in restoring order in Hun­
gary." The reasons he gave for this decision are worth quoting: 
If we leave Hungary, that will encourage the Americans, the British, 
and the French, the imperialists. They will see it as our weakness and 
they will take the offensive. We would then expose the weakness of 
our positions. 
He went on to say that the Party would not understand if that happened. "We 
would then add Hungary to Egypt for them", he said. After proposing that a provi­
sional revolutionary government be formed under János Kádár, he returned to the 
international dimensions of the crisis: they would have to talk it over with Tito and 
inform the Chinese, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians. "There will 
not be a big war", he concluded.32 Khrushchev's proposal was approved by the 
Presidium. 
Soviet forces were continuing to enter Hungary, mainly from the Carpathian 
Military District, though one mechanized division came through Romania from 
the Odessa Military District. Between October 27 and November 4 five mecha­
nized divisions, one tank division, and two airborne divisions crossed the border 
into Hungary.33 On the morning of November 4 Soviet forces launched Operation 
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"Vikhr"' (Whirlwind), under the overall command of Marshal I. Konev, com-
mander-in-chief of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact. This time the military op-
eration was more successful. Open armed resistance ended within a week, and a 
new government, under János Kádár, was imposed on Hungary. 
Our aim in this paper is not to explain the shifts in Soviet policy or the ultimate 
decision to suppress the Hungarian revolution by force. It was clear to the Soviet 
leaders that the revolution posed a profound challenge to Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe and to the Soviet model of socialism. There was no disagreement 
among the Soviet leaders about the need to keep Hungary in the socialist camp. 
Even Anastas Mikoian, who consistently opposed the use of force throughout the 
crisis, told the Central Committee Presidium on November 1 : "Hungary cannot be 
permitted to leave the camp."34 The disagreements and hesitations in the Soviet 
leadership centered on the means to be employed, not on the ultimate goal to be at-
tained. 
When Khrushchev presented to the Central Committee Presidium, on October 
31, his decision to use military force to restore order, he drew attention to the in-
ternational dimensions of the crisis. If Hungary quit the socialist camp, that would 
be a huge loss for the Soviet Union. The Western powers would gain new heart 
and would pursue a more aggressive strategy against the Soviet Union. Britain 
and France had just begun military operations against Egypt, and Khrushchev evi-
dently thought that they would succeed in regaining control over the Suez Canal. 
If the Soviet Union lost Hungary and the Western powers defeated Egypt, it would 
be a double blow, and Soviet policy would be very much on the defensive. 
Khrushchev's comment that there would not be a "big war" indicates that he 
was not concerned about the possibility of Western military intervention in re-
sponse to Soviet action to "restore order". Charles Bohlen, the US Ambassador to 
Moscow during the crisis was asked in an oral history project in 1970: "Was there 
ever any genuine fear on the part of the Russians that you could determine that the 
US might intervene in Hungary?" Bohlen replied: "You never saw any sign of 
that. As an American I knew perfectly well that it would have been impossible for 
us really. The Russians must have known this." 
Any thought of military intervention by the United States or the NATO would 
have had to face the fact of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, and more 
specifically the presence of Soviet forces in Hungary, Romania, and in the adjoin-
ing parts of the Soviet Union. Intervention would have involved direct clashes be-
tween Soviet and NATO forces, thereby risking escalation to general war. Nor, as 
Bohlen later pointed out, was there any thought of trying to deter Soviet military 
action by making nuclear threats: "Nothing would have deterred them from going 
in there. We didn't have any force in Europe to do it. Nobody was thinking of 
atomic weapons, for God's sake. But the Russians would pour in any number of 
divisions right from a common border with the Soviet Union."36 
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked to consider military options for inter-
vening in Hungary. Eisenhower did, however, ask them in November to study 
whether the United States should support the United Nations in using force to pre-
vent the Soviet Union from suppressing the Gomulka regime in Poland. The Joint 
Chiefs concluded that military intervention in Poland was feasible, but that it ran 
the risk of leading to general war.37 US policy during the Hungarian crisis was 
shaped not only by the military balance in and around Hungary, but also by the 
fear that a local conflict could lead to general war. 
On November 12 Khrushchev told the Yugoslav ambassador, Veljko Micu-
novic: 
The Russians knew there had been real fear in the NATO about the 
more serious steps the Soviet Army might take in Europe. The Soviet 
armed forces in Eastern Germany alone were stronger than what 
NATO had at its disposal at the moment in Europe. This had been 
stated to a group of NATO experts, Khrushchev said. 
The Americans had forbidden any movement of the NATO forces in 
Europe during the latest armed intervention by the Soviet Union in 
Hungary so as not to provoke the Russians, Khrushchev said.38 
Khrushchev understood that the combination of local Soviet military superior-
ity and the risk of nuclear war would restrain the West from military intervention. 
The American Reaction 
When word of the Hungarian revolution reached Washington, it caught the Ei-
senhower Administration by surprise.39 The events of October 1956 contradicted 
previous American assumptions about the durability of Communist rule in the sat-
ellites and the ability of Soviet forces to suppress immediately any outbreak of re-
sistance. In January 1956 a National Intelligence Estimate had concluded: "the 
military, political, and economic significance of the Satellites to the USSR is so 
great that Moscow almost certainly regards the maintenance of control over the 
area as an essential element of the power position". The Soviet Union, it argued, 
was unlikely to allow any East European state to exit the Warsaw Pact or assume a 
non-Communist form of government.40 An NSC report of July 1956 argued that 
"Soviet political domination of the satellites remains a basic fact", unaffected by 
the opening in Soviet policy following Stalin's death and the 201 Party Congress. 
These conclusions applied as much to Hungary as to the Warsaw Pact in general. 
"The Kremlin will take all measures necessary to keep Hungary within the Bloc", 
a 1955 intelligence report concluded. If an open revolt did break out, the combina-
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tion of Hungarian Communist and Soviet forces would be "sufficient to cope with 
any active resistance" and would assure that there was "little likelihood that Com-
munist control over Hungary will be jeopardized" at any time during the 
mid-to-late-1950s.41 
Washington understood at once the seriousness of the crisis in Hungary. At a 
meeting of the National Security Council on the morning of October 26, Allen 
Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, asserted that "the revolt in Hungary 
constituted the most serious threat yet to be posed to continued Soviet control of 
the satellites". The Soviet leadership had been thrown on the defensive, and 
Khrushchev's position as leader in Moscow might even be threatened. Rather 
than viewing Allen Dulles' report as an opportunity to put the rhetoric of libera-
tion into action, Eisenhower's response was to worry about the possibility of gen-
eral war. Faced with the prospect of losing their satellites in Eastern Europe, he 
worried, might the Soviets not "be tempted to resort to very extreme measures and 
even to precipitate global war?"42 Eisenhower's diary for October 26 records that 
he "warned both the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to be unusually watchful and alert during the crisis occa-
sioned by the Hungarian revolt". A central consideration in Eisenhower's mind 
during the Hungarian crisis was the necessity of preventing nuclear war between 
the US and the USSR. It would be dangerous, he believed, to press the Soviet 
leaders while they felt threatened by developments in Eastern Europe. 
Harold Stassen, special assistant to the President for disarmament, spoke up in 
response to Eisenhower's warning about inadvertent war. Stassen argued that the 
Soviet leadership would soon have to make a choice between allowing liberaliza-
tion in Hungary, and suppressing the rebellion by force. He also suggested that the 
US might influence this decision by contacting the Soviet military leadership: 
Stassen wondered if it would not be prudent to try to get some mes-
sage to Marshal Zhukov indicating that the achievement of freedom 
in the Soviet satellites should not be considered by the Soviet Union 
as posing any real threat to the national security of the USSR. We 
should make it clear that this development would not impel the West-
ern powers to make any warlike move against the Soviet Union. 
Stassen's proposal carried with it a certain degree of ambiguity. It may have 
been intended to convince the Soviet leaders that an independent Hungary would 
not pose any threat to the security of the Soviet Union. If successful, such a reas-
surance might convince the Soviet leadership not to suppress the revolution. The 
circumstances of the proposal, however, suggest an alternative explanation, more 
in keeping with Eisenhower's fear that the Hungarian crisis might develop into 
general war. The Stassen proposal may have been intended as a reassurance to 
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Moscow that the US would not intervene in the Hungarian conflict. This US mes-
sage to Moscow would prevent the Soviet leaders from overreacting to an imag-
ined American threat, and thus forestall the danger of nuclear war. 
Stassen's proposal initially did not meet with an enthusiastic reception from 
Eisenhower. The President declared "that he did not believe such a move would 
be worthwhile. He doubted if the Soviet leaders genuinely feared an invasion by 
the Western powers".44 Eisenhower's statement is an illustration of "common 
knowledge" during the Hungarian crisis. Not only did the US never plan to inter-
vene; the Soviet leaders knew they did not plan to intervene; and US leaders knew 
that the Soviet leaders understood that there was no possibility of US intervention 
- hence no message of reassurance to Moscow was needed. What we now know 
about decision-making on the Soviet side shows that Eisenhower was right in his 
evaluation of the Soviet leaders' assessment of the possibility of Western inter-
vention. 
Stassen revised his proposal in a conversation with Secretary of State John Fos-
ter Dulles on the afternoon of October 26. He suggested that the US "let the Rus-
sians know that we would accept for the satellites some neutralized status like that 
of Austria". Stassen apparently hoped to convince Moscow that Hungary should 
be allowed to become an independent and neutral state that would pose no mili-
tary threat to the USSR. Eisenhower also spoke with Dulles later that afternoon, 
and made it known that he favored Hungarian neutralization. If the Soviet leaders 
feared that an independent Hungary would be incorporated into NATO, the Presi-
dent thought, they would be forced to crush the uprising quickly and completely. 
Allaying this Soviet fear might ensure that the Hungarian people might not "get 
such a hard time of it". Self-determination for Hungary and neutralization on the 
Austrian model, Eisenhower thought, might be acceptable to the Soviet Union, 
and would help to reduce tensions between the Communist bloc and the West. If 
the Hungarians could "choose their own government", the President told Dulles, 
"this would be of far greater effect than any alliance".45 
Dulles responded unenthusiastically to the idea of neutrality for Hungary and 
the other states of Eastern Europe. He told Eisenhower that he doubted that "we 
should go so far as to seem to commit these countries to an Austria-style neutral-
ization". The US should not place itself in a position of appearing to conduct 
"backstage talks" with the Soviets, he said to Eisenhower.46 Dulles may have 
feared that negotiating with Moscow during the crisis would give the appearance 
that the US was deciding the future of Hungary without reference to the wishes of 
the Hungarian people themselves. 
Dulles did include a version of the Stassen proposal in his speech in Dallas, 
Texas, on October 27. This speech is the source of the much-cited statement that 
the US did not regard the nations of Eastern Europe as potential allies. The Dallas 
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speech, however, did not propose the formal neutralization of Hungary, and its 
overall meaning was unclear. The relevant paragraph of the speech reads: 
The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independ-
ence of the satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that these 
peoples, from whom so much of our own national life derives, should 
have sovereignty restored to them and that they should have govern-
ments of their own free choosing. We do not look upon these nations 
as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a 
new and friendly and no longer divided Europe. We are confident 
that their independence, if promptly accorded, will contribute imme-
diately to stabilize peace throughout all of Europe, West and East.47 
It is not clear why Dulles failed to include the proposal of Austrian-style neu-
tralization, a proposal that was apparently supported by both Stassen and Presi-
dent Eisenhower himself. Dulles may have believed that it was more important to 
reassure the Soviet Union that no American intervention in Hungary was forth-
coming, a meaning that Moscow could read into the speech he delivered at Dallas. 
If Dulles' statement had been more explicit in proposing Hungarian neutrality, the 
Soviet leaders might have interpreted it as interference in the affairs of the War-
saw Pact rather than as a disavowal of American interest in Hungary. 
The idea of Hungarian neutrality also met opposition elsewhere in the US lead-
ership. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected immediately when the NSC Planning 
Board proposed, on October 31, 1956, that the US provide Moscow with assur-
ances that the United States did not view Hungary as a potential ally. The Joint 
Chiefs declared that such assurances would "tend to undermine such influence as 
the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary, 
and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage". They evidently be-
lieved that the US should not foreclose the option of incorporating Hungary into 
NATO at some point in the future. They may also have worried that a US proposal 
for Hungarian neutralization would be countered by a Soviet proposal for the neu-
tralization of Germany or the withdrawal of American troops from the NATO na-
tions. This fear may help account for the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs, Dulles, 
and others, to support Stassen's proposal for the formal neutralization of Hun-
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gary. 
Following Dulles's speech, the Administration decided to convey his assur-
ance privately to the Soviet leadership. On October 29 Dulles suggested to Eisen-
hower that Charles Bohlen should transmit a message to the Soviet leaders. He 
warned, however, that the US "would have to be very careful not to do anything 
that would look to the satellite world as though we were selling them out".49 Ei-
senhower agreed, and later that day Dulles cabled Bohlen, sending him the rele-
vant passage from the Dallas speech and telling him that "we would like this to 
come to attention of highest Soviet authorities, including Zhukov, and to know 
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that they appreciate it is a high level policy statement". Dulles warned, again, that 
the proposal needed to be kept confidential, telling Bohlen that "it is of course 
highly important that nothing done under this authorization should emerge pub-
licly as a demarche attributable to Washington".50 It is perhaps significant that 
Dulles specifically asked Bohlen to bring the matter to the attention of Marshal 
Zhukov, the Soviet Minister of Defense. This may indicate that Dulles believed 
the primary purpose of the proposal was to reassure the Soviet military leadership 
that the US would not exploit Hungary's independence for its own military advan-
tage. 
Bohlen transmitted Dulles' message to Zhukov and Molotov at a reception in 
Moscow on October 30. Bohlen reported to Dulles as follows: 
I told Zhukov and Molotov I wanted to direct their attention to your 
Dallas speech and paragraph in it concerning our policy in regard to 
Eastern European countries and gave them from memory translation 
text paragraph. 
Molotov listened and made no particular comment, but said he would 
look up speech in question, which he felt sure they had from press re-
ports. Zhukov, however, said that he found difficult to reconcile this 
statement with President's encouragement of ''rebels" in Hungary, 
which he thought represented interference Hungarian internal af-
fairs. I said President's statement was general and reflected feelings 
American people and in any case words were less of intervention 
than bullets, to which Zhukov made no reply.51 
Bohlen's telegram is revealing. It is clear that Zhukov interpreted the passage 
in Dulles' speech of October 27 not as a proposal for the neutralization of Hun-
gary, but as an American disclaimer of any intention to interfere in Hungarian af-
fairs. Bohlen did nothing to disabuse Zhukov of this notion, but instead implied 
that while Eisenhower and others in the US government might make rhetorical 
statements about freedom in Hungary, there would be no American military sup-
port ("bullets") for the revolutionaries. Klirushchev's comment to his son, quoted 
in the introduction to this paper, indicates that the Soviet leaders did indeed under-
stand Bohlen's communication in this way. That is also the interpretation of the 
Russian historians V. T. Sereda and A. S. Stykalin, who write that Bohlen "in-
formed the Soviet leaders that the United States had no particular interests in Hun-
gary".52 
A further indication that the Eisenhower Administration's policy during the 
Hungarian crisis was heavily influenced by a fear of sparking nuclear war is pro-
vided by an exchange between Eisenhower and CD. Jackson, his former Special 
Assistant on international affairs and psychological warfare. In a telegram to the 
President on November 8, Jackson wrote: "Under cover of United Nations total 
preoccupation with Middle Eastern problems and the new general war threat, the 
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Russians are getting away with murder in Hungary." He told Eisenhower that ac-
tion was urgently needed to protect the Hungarian people, and that much stronger 
international pressure should be put on Moscow. Eisenhower responded with a 
lecture on the evils of nuclear war. "To annihilate Hungary", Eisenhower argued, 
"should it become the scene of a bitter conflict, is in no way to help her." A general 
war triggered by the Hungarian crisis, he continued, would be "so terrible that the 
human mind cannot comprehend it".53 
Eisenhower's response is illuminating, because it reveals the degree to which 
the fear of nuclear war shaped his thinking during the Hungarian crisis. He appar-
ently believed that even pressuring Moscow through the UN would pose the risk 
of sparking general war between the US and the USSR. 
Conclusion 
The United States did not consider intervening with military force in the Hun-
garian revolution, and the Soviet leadership did not think that the United States 
would intervene. In this paper we have explored why that was so. This of course is 
only one of the international aspects of the crisis, but it is an important one, and the 
behavior of the two sides provides insight into the way in which they understood 
the military confrontation at the time. 
The most obvious explanation lies in the military balance in Europe - and spe-
cifically in and around Hungary - which greatly restricted Western military op-
tions and made it very likely that any military intervention would escalate, per-
haps to the use of nuclear weapons. Each side wanted to avoid general war, each 
side understood that the other wanted to avoid it, and so on; and, as a consequence, 
each side wanted to avoid a local conflict that might escalate to general war, and 
each side understood that the other wanted to avoid it, and so on. That seems to 
provide a sufficient explanation for the US non-intervention. It is true that the 
West was in disarray over the Suez crisis, but it is not at all clear that the West 
would have taken military action over Hungary even if it had not been divided 
over Suez. It seems therefore disingenuous of Eisenhower, in his memoirs, to 
place part of the blame on Britain and France for US inaction - though there are of 
course other reasons to criticize Britain and France for the Suez crisis. 
Common knowledge about the unacceptability of nuclear war became an im-
portant element in the US-Soviet relationship in the mid-1950s. It needed to be 
complemented, however, by other conventions and guidelines if the two super-
powers were not to stumble into war by accident or miscalculation. It was already 
clear before the Hungarian crisis that the Eisenhower Administration regarded 
domination of Eastern Europe as a vital Soviet interest, which it would do every-
thing to defend; to challenge it by military means would therefore create a risk of 
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general war. The Soviet leaders took the same view. The recognition by both sides 
of spheres of interest in Europe was all the easier to accept because powerful mili-
tary forces demarcated the borders of those spheres. 
During the Hungarian crisis Washington and Moscow showed a reasonably 
clear understanding of each other's policies and of the dangers that would arise if 
the conflict were to escalate. The Stassen proposal is particularly interesting in 
that regard. It appears to have meant different things to different people at differ-
ent times, but was the product of two main impulses: 
1. To reassure the Soviet Union that the US would not intervene in Hungary. This 
reassurance would reduce the danger of general war arising from the crisis. 
2. To propose a compromise over Hungary's status, denying any American desire 
to incorporate Hungary into NATO, and establishing Hungary as a neutral na-
tion similar to Austria. 
These two impulses do not appear as distinct formulations in the FRUS docu-
ments or Eisenhower's papers, but were instead blended together in the minds of 
US decision-makers (or at least, do not appear ever to have been debated as com-
peting proposals). The message that was eventually delivered to Soviet leaders 
was much closer to a military reassurance than a political proposal for Hungarian 
neutralization. Did Khrushchev have Bohlen's message in mind when he told the 
Presidium on October 31 that "there will not be a big war?" Did that message 
make a difference? Probably not, because the Soviet leaders seem to have been se-
cure in their minds already that the West would not intervene militarily. 
The Hungarian crisis is a revealing illustration of the effect that fear of inadver-
tent war had on US policymakers. The national security framework they had 
erected as a way of deterring Soviet aggression also deterred them from taking ag-
gressive action to support the Hungarian revolution. Deterrence was balanced by 
self-deterrence. The fear of escalation was supposed to deter Soviet aggression in 
Europe, but it also served to inhibit the United States. The Eisenhower Adminis-
tration was self-deterred, not only by the lack of good military options for US in-
tervention in Hungary, but also by the fear that a larger war could result from the 
crisis. Even though the Soviets never issued an explicit warning to Washington, 
the implicit threat of nuclear war was enough to prevent any thought of interven-
tion on the US side. 
We have focused in this paper on the United States and the Soviet Union rather 
than on Hungary itself, even though the revolution was above all about the future 
of Hungary. This was not the first time - nor the last - that the independence of a 
small state was sacrificed on the altar of an international order defined by the great 
powers. Knowing that does not, however, make it any more agreeable to contem-
plate. 
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This paper will analyze Eisenhower's policy towards Eastern Europe in general and 
towards Hungary in particular from the perspective of the gaping gulf between 
high-minded rhetoric and the political realities of the Cold War and the nuclear arms 
race. While the Eisenhower Administration sounded the high-faluting rhetoric of 
"liberation of captive peoples" from communism and engaged in the short-lived ef-
fort to launch a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" to undermine communism in Eastern 
Europe, the political reality was that uprisings against communism were not sup-
ported in East Germany in 1953, neither in Poland and Hungary in 1956. 
The Cold War regimes in Central Europe, along with the establishment of deter-
rence strategy, made the cautious Eisenhower administration not dare actively sup-
port rebellions in Eastern Europe. The price of an escalation of conflict towards nu-
clear war was deemed too dangerous; no direct interventions were launched in the 
Soviet sphere of influence. The price the Eisenhower administration also had to pay 
was a loss of trust among the "captive peoples". Eisenhower's rhetoric was revealed 
to be only propaganda. 
Keywords: Hungary, 1956, Eisenhower's foreign policy, Cold War, Eastern Eu-
rope, propaganda 
I. Introduction 
Let me make it clear from the beginning - 1 am a "post-revisionist" when it co-
mes to Eisenhower historiography (Introduction in Bischof/Ambrose 1995/1). I 
consider the Eisenhower administration's failure to support the Hungarian revolu-
tion in the fall of 1956 after three years of crusading rhetoric and propaganda 
promises of "liberating captive peoples" as one of its biggest policy breakdowns. 
It was also a huge moral failure in terms of the promises of democracy by the 
Western world to be extended to the Soviet block. One cannot, however, speak of 
a "missed opportunity" in Hungary, as post-revisionists aver in cases of Eisen-
hower's failures to react more positively towards initiating an era of détente with 
the new Kremlin leadership after Stalin's death in 1953, or improving relations 
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with Mao's China instead of constant pinpricks directed against Beijing over the 
offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu, or by supporting nationalist regimes in the 
decolonizing "Third World" (e.g., Vietnam, Egypt). The Eisenhower administra-
tion could have been bolder and recognized Hungarian neutrality, once Imre Nagy 
announced it on November 1, and pushed for other nations to recognize it. The Ei-
senhower Administration could also have kept its "propaganda attack dogs" in the 
Munich studios of "Radio Free Europe" on a tighter leash and insisted that they 
not incite revolution in the Soviet block and not encourage the insurrectionists in 
Hungary by intimating U.S. military help. Eisenhower was prudent, however, in 
not directly intervening in the Hungarian Revolution with military force, or on a 
lower scale augmenting CIA covert operations. The danger of escalation up the 
nuclear ladder was too big in the new age of limited nuclear and/or thermonuclear 
war, especially as the Suez crisis provided another flashpoint of growing 
East-West tensions and potential escalation towards nuclear war. 
Overall, the rather harsh judgment by the fine Hungarian-bom Cold War 
scholar John Lukacs seems not far off the mark when it comes to Ike's contain-
ment policies in general and his Hungarian policy in particular: "Eisenhower was 
devious rather than straightforward, ideology-ridden rather than pragmatic, gov-
erned by calculation rather by convictions " [emphasis added] (quoted in Bischof 
2003, 104). 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' 
policy towards the Revolution in Hungary in late October 1956 grew out of long-
standing frustrations and resentments in the right wing of the Republican Party 
with the twenty-year tenure of Democrats in the White House in general and Pres-
ident Harry S. Truman's "passive" Cold War containment strategy in particular. 
White House reactions to the uprising in Hungary reflected unresolved policies 
and ambiguous feelings between a public policy of "liberation of captive nations" 
and a private behind-the-scenes realization that military challenges to Soviet he-
gemony in its Eastern European sphere of influence might trigger a larger nuclear 
conflict. While Eisenhower "psychological warfare" (Osgood) and "rhetorical di-
plomacy" (Tudda) remained truculent until 1956, his actual Eastern European 
policy had come to the conclusion by as early as late 1953 that the United States 
would not "incite uprisings" behind the iron curtain, since military interventions 
in Soviet controlled territory were out of the question for fear of a larger conflict 
and the unleashing of "World War III". Eisenhower opted for a policy of libera-
tion "by peaceful means", which was equal to "waiting for Godot", as people sus-
pected then and know much better now. This inherent ambiguity between tough 
crusading rhetoric and cautious policy was not as clearly discernible at the time as 
it is today recognized by "post-revisionist" scholars of the Eisenhower Presi-
dency. The Hungarian insurrectionists have never forgiven Eisenhower his failure 
to support them militarily against the Soviet intervention in early November 1956. 
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They took the drum beat of pronouncements and promises of "liberation" and 
"rollback" emanating from Ike's "spy warriors" out of Radio Free Europe and Ra-
dio Liberty as a firm promise rather than crusading propaganda. 
This paper will address two themes: first, the dilemma of forging an unambigu-
ous and unified foreign policy in the sometimes seemingly anarchical domestic 
environment of American democracy, where numerous constituencies fight for 
influence in Washington and need to be pleased; secondly, the use of psychologi-
cal warfare and covert operations as integral parts of U.S. foreign policy making 
in the global struggle to contain Soviet communism in the early Cold War. The 
importance of psychological warfare to Eisenhower's Cold War policies has been 
the focus of the most recent literature on the Eisenhower presidency. 
II. Domestic Context of Eisenhower's Policy vis-à-vis Communism 
Mark Kramer has rightly stressed the importance of "internal-external link-
ages" with regard to Soviet foreign policy formulation after Stalin's death in 
March 1953 (Kramer, parts 1-3). The same holds even more true for American 
foreign policy making, where numerous domestic influences and public opinion 
always need to be addressed. One contextual element studies on both Eisen-
hower's Cold War policies in general and his policy vis-à-vis the Soviet block in 
Eastern Europe have not sufficiently taken into account is the volatile climate em-
anating from the domestic "politics of anti-communism" and the traumatization 
of American politics in the early 1950s by fears of a domestic "red scare". The 
pressure of McCarthyism pushed the Republican Party to the right after Dewey's 
loss against Truman in 1948. McCarthy's cowed Eisenhower during the 1952 
campaign with his attacks on his mentor George C. Marshall. The Republican 
stalwarts (among them Senators Robert Taft and William Knowland) castigated 
the Democrats by beating them over the head with the "sellout of Eastern Europe" 
in the Yalta agreements. Even though Dulles had personally detested communism 
for religious reasons for a long time, the domestic "politics of anti-communism" is 
the real backdrop to Dulles' promises of the "liberation of the captive peoples", 
written into the Republican campaign platform in 1952. On the campaign trail in 
August 1952 Dulles warned that the U.S. "must abandon the 'containment' policy 
... in addition to being immoral, [it] does not work. It snuffs out a resistance spirit 
within the captive peoples ..." (Tudda, 77). Such inflammatory rhetoric was not 
only an attack on Truman but also an appeal to the Polish voters of Chicago and 
Cleveland and Detroit to vote for "Ike". 
Eisenhower himself used crusading rhetoric in his own campaign speeches. In 
August 1952 he told the American Legion: 
54 GUNTER BISCHOF 
We must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every 
man and woman of those shackled lands who seeks refuge with us, 
any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of free-
dom or who is dedicated to the liberation of his fellows (quoted in 
Horváth, 7). 
Never, however, did Dulles or Eisenhower promise the use of force to liberate 
the captive peoples. They expected those peoples to liberate themselves, or hoped 
that one day the Soviet Union would relinquish them. 
But since Eisenhower's policy vis-à-vis the fellow Republican McCarthy was 
not to "get into a pissing contest with that skunk" and "giving him enough rope to 
hang himself, the junior Senator from Wisconsin stayed on the attack in 1953 
(Bischof, 1995/2). He tried to block Bohlen's appointment as ambassador to the 
Soviet Union and Conant's as high commissioner to West Germany in their hear-
ings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He sent the "junketeering 
gumshoes" Cohn and Shine to Europe to hunt for communist authors in America 
House libraries. He was searching for communists inside the State Department, 
the Army, and the CIA - which was like finding Belzebub inside the Vatican. Ei-
senhower also faced a right wing isolationist insurgency in his own party by those 
like McCarthy who wanted the Yalta Agreements officially repudiated, and by 
Senator Bricker who aimed at curbing executive authority with his amendment re-
quiring Congressional approval of all executive agreements. There were commu-
nist spies in the American government before and during World War II, as we now 
know from the "Venona" transcripts. But McCarthy's populist apoplectic reaction 
to the communist threat within the U.S. polity came late, and he never uncovered a 
single spy. He was the master of arousing fear and alarming the masses (Morgan, 
xiv). With his attack on the Army and the subsequent Army-McCarthy hearings 
the Senator from Wisconsin was censured and finally did "hang himself. 
But this is the context of a rabid Republican right wing putting enormous pres-
sure on the new president to reverse Truman's containment policies in which Ei-
senhower unleashed his rhetorical "liberation" crusade and his covert operations 
and propaganda initiatives to "roll back" the iron curtain in 1953. The high point 
of these policies were during the first two years of his presidency when McCarthy 
was still a power to be reckoned with and hovered over all of Eisenhower's Cold 
War foreign policy actions. Eisenhower himself was an ideologue and, at times, 
revealed some of McCarthy's unrelenting anti-communism as, for example, when 
he told Churchill at the Bermuda meeting in December 1953: 
... as regards the P.M.'s belief that there was a New Look in Soviet 
Policy, Russia was a woman of the streets and whether her dress was 
new, or just the old one patched up, it was certainly the same whore 
underneath. America intended to drive her off her present 'beat' into 
the back streets (Colville, 683 in Bischof/1995/1, 146). 
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Of course, he did not live up to this promise during the East German and Pilsen 
revolt in 1953, nor in the Polish labor strikes or the Hungarian uprising in 1956. 
Once McCarthy was censored, Eisenhower could slowly back off from such 
hardline anti-communist talk and embark on testing Soviet offers for peaceful co-
existence in 1955 and agree to a summit meeting at Geneva after the signing of the 
Austrian treaty. The pressure from the Republican stalwarts snapping at his heels, 
in other words, was less intense by late 1956 during the Hungarian crisis and that 
is why he may have been even less inclined to test Soviet resolve by supporting 
Hungarian insurrectionists. 
We should also keep in mind that in the midst of the dual Hungary/Suez crises 
in 1956 Eisenhower was running for reelection and therefore inclined to be even 
more cautious in his foreign policies (Ambrose, 347ff). The seasoned incumbent 
President did not need the Eastern European vote so badly anymore to win his re-
election as he did in 1952 as a newcomer to presidential politics. In a November 2, 
1956 letter to his friend "Swede" Hazlett, however, Eisenhower indicated that he 
was overwhelmed by the unfolding of the double crisis in Hungary and Suez in the 
final days of a presidential campaign: 
It became too difficult for me to keep in touch with the various items 
of information that pour constantly into Washington from Europe 
and the Mid East and at the same time carry on the hectic activities of 
actual campaigning (PDDE, XVII, 2354). 
III. The International Background to Eisenhower's Policy 
towards Hungary 
Recent studies by Peter Grose, Gregory Mitrovich, Scott Lucas, Kenneth 
Osgood and now the massive Habiliationsschrift by the young German scholar 
Bernd Stöver, make it abundantly clear that the "shadow war" of covert opera-
tions aiming at destabilizing Soviet influence in its Eastern European sphere al-
ready began under President Truman in 1947/48. Stöver has shown that the Amer-
icans took the template of undermining the Soviet sphere and "liberating" the 
populations enslaved under communism directly from Nazi policies against the 
Soviet Union. The genesis of postwar "rollback" of communism originates in the 
Nazi crusade against bolshevism (Stöver, 121 ff). Nobody else, but George F. 
Kennan, the Director of the State Department's influential Policy Planning Staff 
initiated an aggressive policy of "counterforce" - a revolutionary policy designed 
to undermine the Kremlin's hold over the satellites (written down in the basic 
memorandum NSC 20/4). The goal was to incite and support "Titoist heresies" in 
Eastern Europe. A "campaign of truth" was started by way of the new radio sta-
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tions "Radio Free Europe" and "Radio Liberty". In a massive "black propaganda" 
campaign, balloons were drifted across the iron curtain dropping millions of leaf-
lets aiming at undermining the communist regimes with their demands for free-
dom. The CIA secretly financed the "Congress of Cultural Freedom" and its cru-
sade among Western European intellectuals on the left, trying to inspire anti-com-
munism and reduce anti-Americanism (Berghahn). The CIA began to recruit a fu-
ture "foreign legion" type army from the displaced Eastern European refugees in 
Germany and Austria who hated communism. They were to be sent back into the 
Eastern European satellites as a guerilla force destined to incite rebellions. In 
1948 the highly secret "Office of Policy Coordination" (OPC) was established in 
the State Department (in 1950 transferred to the CIA) under the former OSS-oper-
ative Frank Wisner to launch a more aggressive policy of psychological warfare 
against the Soviet sphere. In 1952 the OPC had a budget of 206 million dollars and 
operated 4,000 agents in Europe, however, without any dramatic results. Opera-
tions in Albania, for example, were betrayed by the British spies Philby and 
Maclean. In fact, due to these moles the Kremlin seemed to be better informed 
about OPC guerilla activities in Eastern Europe than most members of the Truman 
administration. 
In 1951 Truman established the "Psychological Strategy Board" to coordinate 
the "psychological warfare" against the Kremlin. During a general review of these 
programs, the Truman administration came to the conclusion that all efforts to un-
dermine or topple Soviet regimes had failed. Charles Bohlen proposed a toned-
down future "strategy of rational hope" containing the Soviet Union, yet accept-
ing co-existence with it, and abandoning the dangerous aggressive subversive ac-
tions in the Soviet sphere of influence that might unleash a larger conflict 
(Mitrovich, 83-121). 
It is a supreme irony of history that at the moment in time when the Truman ad-
ministration had to admit that its subversive guerilla strategy in the Soviet block 
had not produced recognizable successes, the Republican candidate Eisenhower 
called for an even more aggressive psychological warfare strategy, abandoning 
containment and ultimately "rolling back" communism. Part of the problem was 
the Truman's "shadow war" programs had been so highly secret that the Repub-
lican opposition (Eisenhower and Dulles included) did not know the full extent 
of it. 
After his election victory, Eisenhower and Dulles unleashed their "liberation" 
strategy with reckless abandon. They revived the idea of a "Volunteer Freedom 
Corps" of Eastern European refugees to be sent into the Soviet bloc as guerillas. 
Again, the idea had originated during the Truman years. Republican Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge had pushed the idea of such a VFC soon after the end of the 
war. In 1952 Congress had passed 100 million dollars towards the establishment 
of it (a Republican congressman from Wisconsin pushed this under the "Kersten 
1956 AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION 57 
Amendement"). Eisenhower actively supported the VFC until 1955 (Carafano). 
Little did the Republicans realize what OPC operatives like William Sloan Coffin 
had come to recognize in the DP-camps of Germany and Austria - these divisive 
refugees were more interested in the American dollars doled under the CIA, Mar-
shall Plan and VFC programs than in actually putting their lives on the line fight-
ing communism behind the iron curtain. The "United States Information Agency" 
was created as an independent propaganda agency. Radio broadcasts were 
boosted and balloon programs into the Soviet sphere were stepped up. An ideo-
logical warfare "campaign of truth" was unleashed to discredit communist ideol-
ogy. The high level "Operations Coordinating Board" replaced Truman's "Psy-
chological Strategy Board" to coordinate all psychological warfare initiatives. Ei-
senhower appointed C. D. Jackson as his quasi-"psychological warfare czar". Ei-
senhower's definition was all-inclusive: "Psychological warfare can be anything 
from the singing of a beautiful hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of physical 
sabotage" (letter to Dulles quoted in Osgood, 413). In the basic National Security 
Council document NSC 162/2 (replacing Truman's key document NSC 68), psy-
chological warfare actually was added as an integral part of Eisenhower's "new 
look" national security policy (Osgood, 422ff). 
After a long, critical and intense review process of America's basic alternatives 
between containment and rollback in "Operation Solarium" throughout the sum-
mer of 1953, NSC 162/2 was passed in October (Dockrill, 1996, 33-47). The in-
herent dilemmas of an aggressive "rhetorical diplomacy" hobbling more cautious 
actual behind-the-scenes policies became clearly visible here. The new Eisen-
hower Administration had been caught unprepared for both Stalin's surprising 
death in March 1953 and the East German uprising on June 17. No plans for such 
exigencies of "captive people" taking action into their own hands existed in 
Washington. Eisenhower sent food to the East Germans insurgents but did not fur-
ther fire them up with propaganda, let alone American military support that might 
result in a shooting war with the Soviets. 
At a moment when anti-Soviet sentiment seemed to be boiling over in the So-
viet bloc, NSC 158 of late June 1953 advocated "rollback" with the provocation of 
insurrections against the communist regimes. But the larger national security 
strategy review NSC 162/2 pulled back from such a dangerous course. While the 
military wanted to develop a more dynamic approach to undermining Soviet con-
trol in its bloc, including the "use of force", Eisenhower and Dulles pulled back 
from such escalation, fearing that nuclear war would result from it. The hard-won 
and sobering consensus in the NSC was: "The detachment of any major satellite 
from the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except by Soviet acquiescence 
or by war" [my emphasis] (quoted in Ostermann, 520). In the basic memorandum 
on U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet satellites NSC 174 of December 1953, rollback 
was duly abandoned. Psychological warfare undermining Soviet control and 
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"support the spirit of resistance" via propaganda initiatives were to be continued. 
But the "incitement of premature revolts" must be avoided, even though satellite 
regimes should be undermined and "conditions favorable to eventual liberation" 
should be promoted (Ostermann, 521; NSC 174 repr. in Békés et al., 34-53). Ei-
senhower still tried to square the circle. 
No false hopes for U.S. military intervention must be aroused among captive 
peoples. In a progress report on NSC 174, the Operations Coordinating Board 
made this crystal clear on July 17, 1954: 
The desire for liberation from Soviet domination is undoubtedly 
strong among the captive peoples, many of whom would welcome 
militant action to liberate them, even to the extent of resort to a war of 
liberation by the West. Neither the U.S. nor the free world countries 
are willing to take such extreme steps, nor is the U.S. prepared to un-
dertake or foster activities which it would not back up with military 
support in the event of ruthless Soviet suppression and reprisals. Fur-
thermore, our European allies are strongly against taking what they 
estimate to be provocative action. Consequently, the U.S. must limit 
its activities to a scope which is considered inadequate by at least the 
activists among the captive people and some of the émigrés [empha-
sis added] (quoted in Kovrig, 69). 
By mid-1954, then, right after McCarthy's implosion, all that was left of Eisen-
hower's "liberation" policy was "liberation rhetoric", which, of course, contin-
ued to raise hopes among captive peoples. The cautious policy of no military sup-
port of insurrections or direct interventions in the Soviet bloc was firmly laid 
down. As this citation indicates, Eisenhower's advisors fully anticipated the dis-
appointment of rebellious captive peoples and émigré communities as a result of 
its unwillingness to support "extreme steps" towards liberation. The President's 
special advisor Harold Stassen had observed in a discussion in the National Secu-
rity Council in December 1953: "There was no course of action or plan which the 
US would follow in the event of a successful revolt by one of these countries 
against their Soviet masters" (quoted in Horváth, 16). No detailed plans for sup-
porting liberation struggles, in a nutshell, foreshadowed the U.S. response to the 
Hungarian rebellion in 1956. 
Still, President Eisenhower would keep up the din of public rhetoric, calling for 
the unlikely liberation of Eastern Europe and German reunification in major pro-
paganda statements such as the "Atoms for Peace" speech in December 1953, and 
continued to do so during the Geneva Summit meeting of July 1955. Liberation-
ists condemned Geneva, which seemed to disguise containment as liberation 
(Tudda, 93). John Foster Dulles warmly praised the lucky Austrian settlement in a 
television appearance and speculated that Austrian freedom would be contagious 
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to her neighbors behind the iron curtain (Bischof/1995, 158). He grandiloquently 
predicted in Congressional hearings that Austrian neutrality "will open up a new 
frontier of freedom in Yugoslavia and also the first frontier of freedom with Hun-
gary, and one can anticipate that it is going to lead these countries to want for 
themselves that which they see given to Austria" (quoted in Horváth, 20). After 
the signing of the Austrian treaty Dulles strongly held up neutrality à l'Autriche as 
a model for captive peoples to follow in order to be lured away from Soviet con-
trol. 
These "schizophrenic policies" (Tudda, 93) of the Eisenhower administration 
continued into 1956. In his January "state of the union" address Eisenhower con-
demned the Soviets for their "grave injustices" in Eastern Europe, yet behind the 
scenes he continued to reject military liberation and continued to promote "peace-
ful" liberation with exile groups. Khrushchev's "secret speech" was "pure gold" 
(G. Kennan in Tudda, 95) for Eisenhower's propaganda crusade. Dulles resisted 
the temptation to encourage further revolts in Czechoslovakia and Poland after 
their suppression, tepidly insisting on "keeping alive the spirit of liberty in these 
people" but not wanting to instigate anything. The Dulles brothers vetoed a pro-
posed Nixon visit to Eastern Europe as being "crazy" and too provocative, the 
NATO's North Atlantic Council further cautioned the Eisenhower Administra-
tion not to "substitute hope for reason" in the "thaw" of Khrushchev's sensational 
critique of Stalin's policies. The captive peoples should not be encouraged to-
wards "futile rebellions", since the West was "not prepared to use force to liber-
ate" them (Tudda, 95f). 
In its basic review of Eastern European policy (NSC 5608) of early July 1956, 
the National Security Council continued its policy between active containment 
and passive liberation. A "deliberate policy of attempting to liberate satellite peo-
ples by military force must be rejected". But propaganda and covert operations 
should be continued "to maintain the morale of anti-Soviet elements, to foster de-
sired changes in Soviet-satellite relationships, and to maximize Soviet difficul-
ties". Yet the U.S. "should not encourage premature action on their part which 
will bring upon them reprisals involving further terror and suppression". The NSC 
was fully aware that there was a fine line between supporting "passive resistance" 
and an "invitation to suicide" (NSC 5608 repr. in Békés, 119-128, here 127f). 
The stage was set, then, for the U.S. and Western response to the Red Army's 
crushing of the Hungarian rebellion, particularly since it was further complicated 
by Western disunity over Suez (for the complex interplay between these two ma-
jor crises see the essays in Heinemann/Wiggershaus). After the first Soviet inter-
vention, Dulles in a telephone conversation with Ambassador to the United Na-
tions Henry Cabot Lodge, worried on October 24 "that it will be said that here are 
the great moments and when they came and these fellows were ready to stand up 
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and die, we were caught napping and doing nothing" [emphasis added] (FRUS, 
XXV, 273). CIA director Allen Dulles speculated in the National Security Coun-
cil meeting on October 26 that "Soviet intervention in Hungary may have been 
due to Soviet unwillingness to submit to a second humiliation after Poland" 
(FRUS, 1955-57, XXV, 296). After Moscow did not intervene in Poland after a 
summer of unrest, they may well have feared satellite dominoes beginning to fall 
in Hungary. 
John Foster Dulles assured the Kremlin in a speech delivered to the Dallas 
World Affairs Council the next day that the U.S. did not look upon the satellites as 
"potential allies" (FRUS, 1955-57, XXV, 317f). He insisted that Ambassador 
Bohlen hand the relevant passage of this speech to the Kremlin bosses a couple of 
days later (FRUS, XXV, 1955-57, 328). Eisenhower, upon disarmament advisor 
Harold Stassen's suggestion, had urged Dulles in a telephone conversation the 
night before his Dallas speech to give such an assurance. The President's desire 
that if the satellites had a free choice, they would choose neutrality, was wishful 
thinking: "All we hope is that they have the same likes as Austria'''' [emphasis 
added] (Ostermann, 527f). 
The lack of consensus behind the President's passive and restrained course of 
action in the face of the Red Army's gunning down Hungarian freedom fighters 
continued throughout the crisis. Voices in the CIA and the Pentagon advocated 
active support of the rebels (Ostermann, 528f). OPC's Frank Wisner was ready to 
launch his CIA operatives from Vienna and was in total despair over Washing-
ton's refusal to aid the rebels directly. His "Red Sox/Red Cap" program encourag-
ing unrest apparently was ready to go. Some American airborne forces were mo-
bilized outside of Munich for deployment in Budapest (Granville, 193), and there 
is oral history evidence that some American units got as far as the Vienna area (Vi-
enna conference 2002). Eisenhower rejected two proposals to air drop arms to the 
Hungarians (Granville, 193). There would not be an American military interven-
tion for which the rebels in Hungary fervently hoped. 
Some émigré broadcasters from "Radio Free Europe" in Munich, whose scripts 
were not sufficiently vetted by their American superiors, overstepped their tightly 
controlled boundaries and incited the Hungarian rebels by arousing false hopes of 
Western military aid. As Johanna Granville has concluded after reviewing the 
RFE scripts: 
While some broadcasts raised hopes of military aid, others discred-
ited Nagy, praised Mindszenty, fomented hatred of ?VH men, gave 
misleading information about the U.N., created a false picture of the 
political situation (siding with Hungary and ostracizing the Soviet 
union), and otherwise distorted the news (Granville, 171). 
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RFE seems the only American organization that did not tightly abide by the 
strictures of Eisenhower's passive response to the Hungarian rebellion. Hungar-
ian rebels losing their lives as a result of their continued resistance against all odds 
due to such RFE encouragement was the real tragedy. 
IV. Conclusion 
With new documents becoming available and with more distance from the 
Hungarian events of 1956, scholars have only become more critical of the Eisen-
hower administration's passivity during the Hungarian insurrection in spite of its 
continued liberation rhetoric. Washington "lacked a concrete plan of response 
should a satellite try to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and appeal to U.S. aid", 
charges Johanna Granville (Granville, 194), following a critique that Harold 
Stassen had already made in the National Security Council in 1953. Hungary 
clearly revealed the inconsistencies of the Eisenhower/Dulles liberation policy 
between the poles of emphasizing caution and encouraging Titoism. Concludes 
British intelligence scholar Richard Aldrich: "The pathetic efforts of the Hungar-
ian underground against the invading Soviet forces also exposed the stupidity of 
any marginal policy of stirring up trouble somewhere short of liberation" 
(Aldrich, 337). Berndt Stöver has observed that the 1953 redefinition of contain-
ment by the Eisenhower Administration made the transition from offensive con-
tainment to liberation policy fluid (Stöver, 187). Ever since 1953 the public per-
ception in the United States and in Europe was that Eisenhower was committed to 
actively supporting liberation of the captive peoples. Both the caution in not com-
mitting to active support of liberation and the lack of a plan for how to respond to 
liberation struggles in the Soviet sphere once they erupted, gave the Eisenhower 
White House an aura of indecisiveness. In Hungary, Dulles and Eisenhower in-
deed were caught "napping". During the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, Ei-
senhower's continued his "bland wait-and-see policy" that had characterized his 
entire stance vis-à-vis Eastern Europe (Horváth, 32). 
Chris Tudda relishes the ultimate irony: 
In reality, when revolution came to Eastern Europe, liberation reaf-
firmed Truman's containment policy. The Eisenhower administra-
tion never intended to risk a war against the Soviet Union in order to 
free the captive peoples (Tudda, 101). 
Truman's psychological warriors had already concluded correctly in 1952 that 
peaceful liberation of the Soviet bloc would take a long time, maybe a generation 
or more. An embarrassed Eisenhower had to learn the hard way again during the 
Hungarian crisis and henceforth toned back his empty liberation rhetoric. The out-
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come of this policy for the Hungarian rebels was tragic, as László Borhi has ob-
served, for "the unwillingness of the United States to counter Soviet military ac-
tion meant that the Hungarian quest for liberation was suicidal" (Borhi, 1999, 
109). 
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In the paper we seek to trace and better understand the surprising sociological com-
ponents of the '56 revolution. The paradox lying in the heart of the revolutionary 
events concerns the fact that the social groups most closely involved in the political 
mobilization included the formerly faithful communist, later "revisionist" intellec-
tuals, the university students and the industrial working class. They had previously 
been considered as the primary social basis and legitimation force of the communist 
political regime. Still, they were to become the main motor of initiating the disobe-
dience almost before 23rd of October and, in addition, "did the revolution" thereaf-
ter. What could be the reason of their discontent causing the first "revolutionary" 
schock to a political regime which regularly defined and declared itself to embody 
the social(ist) revolution? The explanation is based on a sociological consideration 
(the mobility trap) combined with a psychological reasoning (the sense of guilt, the 
bitter feeling of being deceived, and the unfulfilled expectations) and the whole ar-
gument will be placed into the specific historical context specified either by Hun-
gary's road from '53 to '56, and the global developments of the communist world in 
the course of 1956. 
Keywords: class politics of reprisals, status insecurity, mobility trap, youth subcul-
ture, working class anxiety 
Barrington Moore Jr., in his seminal and pioneering book Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, argues that his contribution "is an attempt to dis-
cover the range of historical conditions under which either or both of these rural 
groups [the landed upper classes and the peasantry] have become important forces 
behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy, and the 
dictatorships of the right and the left, that is, fascist and communist regimes." 
Unlike Moore, I am now going to try to shed some light on the question of which 
social groups and for what reasons became important forces behind the revolt 
against Stalinism in a single small country. 
It is almost impossible to discuss the social history of 1956 adequately without 
a clear picture of the social groups that not only supported or sympathized with the 
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revolutionary movements but were committed to them and made up the revolu-
tionary bodies. Without relying on impressionistic images available as revolu-
tionary legends or the post-revolutionary propaganda of the Kádár regime, one is 
left only with the data produced and provided by the subsequent processes of judi-
cial retaliation. The lists of those interned, imprisoned, or sentenced to death after 
the revolutionary events provide some knowledge of who was actively involved 
in them. The main problem, however, is that such empirical evidence was con-
structed some time later, during the reprisal process. Findings taken from judicial 
proceedings become the basis for identifying and defining what counts as revolu-
tionary behavior, what can be placed in the revolutionary category (or the coun-
ter-revolutionary category as the Kádári te persecutors labeled it). This ignores 
what their immediate inducements to such behavior were. So the bias in the acces-
sible data, coupled with the absence of some 200,000 people who fled westward 
in late 1956 and early 1957, distorts any picture of the social basis on which the 
revolution rested. Historians frequently remark that a "fairly wide circle of partic-
ipants in the incidents was not brought to trial".'" And this is strengthened by data 
revealing the behavior of the authorities involved in the reprisal. According to an 
instruction of December 4, 1957, issued by the deputy Minister of Interior, more 
exact definition of the social origins both of the persons under arrest and those be-
ing suspected is needed to match the correct "class politics". The erroneous data 
provided on them demonstrates that 
in many cases the 'politicals' and the ordinary criminals are recruited 
primarily not from the 'class alien', the depraved proletariat and the 
hooligan elements. [...] It occurs that the previously convicted hooli-
gan elements, class alien persons are assessed as manual laborers on 
the basis of their nominal occupation, recent work-place or origin. 
Therefore, to get a "more exact" definition of who could be considered worker 
at all, "It is not allowed to register the ones being convicted twice, not even the 
class alien persons, displaced by the proletarian dictatorship from their [original 
social] position and doomed to become manual laborers etc. as workers or peas-
ants." So "both the original and the recent occupation has to be taken as a basis" in 
determining the class position of the persons concerned. 
Some further invaluable data about the incentives behind revolutionary action 
can be gathered from oral history, although the difficulties of applying them are 
no less considerable. Recollections many years or decades later seem to provide 
decisive evidence about events whose "true story" cannot be learned from official 
written sources, which are silent on the subject. Oral history sheds light on facts 
that are personal, unrepeatable and accidental, but the historical evidence it pro-
vides is not flawless either. For the record of oral history is an intellectual or rather 
discursive construct that has more to do with the present than the past. 
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On examining earlier a collection of oral history interviews with '56 émigrés, 
I found that the "framework-story" type of account was shaped primarily by cer-
tain time, narrative strategies. Less was revealed about the experienced events 
of historical value because the account was a subsequent story with a ideological 
basis.5 
The first point to be addressed is the social composition of the revolutionaries. 
It is possible to identify three liberally defined macro-social groups that distin-
guished themselves in inciting and managing the revolutionary processes: the 
left-wing, communist-oriented intellectuals (mainly of revisionist writers and 
scholars); the university students, and the industrial working classes. However, 
they cannot be considered exclusively. There is no denying of the possibility that a 
big role as potential revolutionaries was played by several members of the peas-
antry or other strata. The landowning peasantry clearly had a strong influence 
over local events in the villages. According to one case study, the first public dem-
onstration in the settlement surveyed, on October 26, mobilized a high proportion 
of such people - nearly a quarter of the local population - while everybody else 
stood out at their gates to see what was happening. Altogether a tenth of the male 
residents of the village, 78 persons out of 797, could be said to have taken an ac-
tive part in the revolution. 
Villagers personally concerned in local events (some of whom even held lead-
ing positions in revolutionary organizations) came partly from the young workers 
under thirty-five years of age (mainly descendants of landholding peasants), and 
partly from the highest-status smallholders, who belonged to an older generation. 
With minor exceptions, the workers included were commuters in close touch with 
the town, so that they could mediate between the revolutionized urban centers and 
their home villages.6 
Other case studies relating to far less industrialized villages have also revealed 
feverish activity by first-generation workers of peasant origin.7 This had a lot to 
do with their upward mobility - they, unlike pre-war traditional peasants, had 
managed to rise socially by becoming unskilled industrial workers.8 In the inter-
war period, however, the main channel accessible for the landowning peasantry to 
rise was either the accumulation of land property or becoming a master artisan, 
merchant and/or clerical worker.9 
For the peasantry, traditionally and instinctively, would distance itself from 
modern collective social protest. The "rational peasant", as Samuel L. Popkin 
calls him in his analysis, regularly refuses to act for any common or group interest, 
preferring individual methods of resistance. Individual peasants frequently leave 
the task of concerted protest to others. 
Among the main social forces contributing to the '56 Revolution were the cre-
ative intellectuals (poets, novelists and journalists). They had been espousing and 
popularizing revisionist political ideas as early as 1953, and paradoxically, the 
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ones who had worked hardest to represent and spread the official culture of the 
communist regime would become the most voluble fomenters of the uprising. 
Another crucial social group behind the political mobilization in October 1956 
consisted of university students. Their revolt also takes some explaining, for the 
restrictive admission criteria for university places in the years leading up to 1956 
and the ideological rigor imposed upon students in their studies meant that the 
children of poor peasant and worker families came to form a very large group 
among the students: 67 per cent in 1954/5 at the Budapest University of Econom-
ics.11 Furthermore, a scaled-down szakérettségi (specialized school-leaving cer-
tificate) had been established to make it easier for children of socially disadvan-
taged families to gain university places. As a result, children from such groups ac-
counted foras many as 21 per cent of all students in 1952-1953, although this had 
eased to 13 per cent by October 1956.12 The reason for the drop in the ratio may be 
accounted for by the cessation of those kinds of courses in 1955. -
Ultimately, the urban industrial proletariat also played a dominant role in the 
revolutionary events. This question deserves attention because official commu-
nist ideology claimed to be an embodiment of true dictatorship of the proletariat; 
the working class was to be the social basis and main beneficiary of communist 
rule. Upward social mobility was indeed assured by the regime for many members 
ofthat class, but the average working-class standard of living was little different 
from that of other sections of society, though it was higher than that of agricultural 
villagers.14 
Meanwhile the social meaning of the expression "industrial working class" had 
undergone some changes since the inter-war period. The great increase in their 
numbers and the structural alterations within the class that occurred in the 1950s 
created quite a new class formation, consisting of many elements representative of 
the peasant, the lower middle, the middle or even the upper classes. (This social 
mixture was reflected by the official wording cited before in connection with the 
official demand of how to categorize the persecuted persons.) Just to mention one 
aspect: almost 400,000 rural people - one-sixth of the 1949 rural population -
streamed into urban industry between 1949 and 1953.15 
Also in flux at that time were the structure of material interests and the contours 
of the prestige hierarchy. Young skilled workers with privileged positions on and 
off the shop floor were approaching middle management in their status, as the tra-
ditional wage gap between them perceptibly decreased. This and the concomitant 
drastic deterioration in the status of non-manual employees in industry finally led 
to concerted action between them during the revolution under the aegis of the 
workers' councils. Their convergence, however, was to some extent counterbal-
anced by an increasing homogenization within the working class itself either in 
terms of the wages or the diverse prestige of the various branches of industry.16 
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The last problem is how to explain sociologically and psychologically the dis-
content manifest in the 1956 revolution. The first factor to emphasize is the im-
mense physical and social turnover and mobility in previous years. This had had a 
deep and lasting impact on the stratification and mental outlook of Hungarian so-
ciety and had caused almost universal uncertainty and insecurity about personal 
and group identity. Such enhanced status insecurity was felt equally by those who 
moved up and down the social ladder. No social group was able any more to see it-
self as a stable entity, equipped with a specific identity coinciding with a cher-
ished image. 7 Such generally shared social experience is thought to be one of the 
fundamental sociological roots of revolutionary potential, which will be identi-
fied here under the notion of a mobility trap. This term seeks to express a paradox: 
Stalinist power was digging its own grave when it facilitated the social mobility 
that was supposed to hasten the industrialization and restructuring of the social 
body that would lend social legitimacy to its repressive authority. The special im-
portance ascribed to obtaining social approval in that form followed from the in-
ability of the communist rulers to employ the institutional forms of political legiti-
macy found in a liberal democracy. This inability had much do with the "program 
ideologies" embodied in Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and elsewhere, in 
which political aims and interests were justified by radical transformation of the 
inherited social and political conditions.18 
The question remaining is why the social forces just mentioned should have 
been the ones to revolt. The hitherto faithful, revisionist communist intellectuals 
are commonly thought to have been moved by disappointment and disillusion-
ment with the communist Utopias. This argument looks plausible, although it 
needs stating more precisely. The heightened political awareness and responsibil-
ity for public issues typically felt by Hungarian intellectuals, writers and creative 
artists, especially from the first half of the nineteenth century onwards, continued 
to apply when they started to show disloyalty to the regime. Furthermore, the 
communist elite laid surprising emphasis on gaining outside support from emi-
nent intellectuals, who had stood apart from the regime, but without showing hos-
tility towards it. The role assigned to these intellectuals, under circumstances in 
which public opinion did not exist, was to represent and even proxy the absent so-
cial consent to communist rule. This role in turn increased the self-esteem of these 
intellectuals and made them particularly suited to articulating subversive ideas 
leveled at the political system they had been serving.19 
The question of why the university students were stirred up so easily has to be 
placed in a wider context of an emerging youth sub-culture, which could be ob-
served throughout post-war Europe and in America. This revolt against the adult 
world usually took the form either of lifestyle reform (a change in mass-consump-
tion habits), or of political action. The first striking manifestation of the latter hap-
pened in the autumn of 1956 in Hungary. It was followed a decade later by the 
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youth upheavals in Paris and on American university campuses.20 The reason why 
political action came to the fore in Hungary as early as 1956 could possibly be the 
total lack of personal and public freedom, so that the youth rebellion under such 
circumstances became channeled into the political movement. 
For the working class, the decisive motive seems to have been the anxiety and 
frustration felt by the lower segment of urban industrial workers, whose poverty 
was not offset by opportunities for upward mobility. Some analysts even dared to 
suggest that Durkheimian anomie was behind the prominent part young unskilled 
laborers played in the armed fighting groups. The social status and mentality of 
these 'Pest kids' seem to be influenced or even determined mainly by social im-
mobility or downward mobility, low levels of schooling, deviance, marginality, 
lack of a normal family background, general frustration, a conflict-oriented world 
view, etc.21 But one has to add, skilled, as well as young unskilled manual workers 
were also involved in the armed rebel groups, a fact lessening the feasibility of the 
aforementioned argument.22 
Workers, who created and filled in the structures of the workers' councils, co-
operated closely with the technicians and engineers above them in the factory hi-
erarchy. On the whole, they were also assisted in their self-organization in the 
workers' councils by the communist party and its close ally, the trade-union 
movement; see, for instance, the order of October 26, and the subsequent orders 
under the Kádárite leadership of November 16 and 22, after the Soviet occupa-
tion. This in itself, and not least, the precise way the workers' councils operated in 
the last months of 1956, contradicts in part the theory put forward first by Hannah 
Arendt. She contended, the workers' councils "have always emerged during the 
revolution itself, [as] they sprang from the people as spontaneous organs of action 
and of order". This proves that 
nothing indeed contradicts more sharply the old adage of the anar-
chistic and lawless 'natural' inclinations of a people left without the 
constraint of its government than the emergence of the councils that, 
wherever they appeared, and most pronouncedly during the Hungar-
ian Revolution, were concerned with the reorganization of the politi-
cal and economic life of the country and the establishment of a new 
order}11 (My italics) 
This highly special meaning attributed to the notion, workers' council was also 
accepted later on by some historians. Bill Lomax, to mention the most important 
of them firmly stated that the workers' councils were established with the specific 
aim of setting up a new social and political order.24 Also ripe for revision is the 
equally mythical notion that these organizations represented the will and political 
credo of the skilled workers - the labor aristocracy of the day, consciously contin-
uing and developing the spiritual legacy of social democracy. Taking seriously 
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into account the available data on the social composition of the armed rebel 
groups and the workers' councils, the argument that they expressed an organiza­
tional split between two divergent levels of workers seems not to be well founded. 
It is contradicted by the evidence that many, maybe the most active participants in 
the workers' councils were recruited from the younger generation, under 30 years 
of age and very often of poor peasant and agricultural-worker background."5 Their 
aspirations to the upward mobility enjoyed by the urban proletariat seems to have 
been decisive, indeed to have given them the main impetus to identify themselves 
with the cause of the revolution. 
* 
This brief overview of the social forces behind the events of 1956 and the prob­
able motives that moved the participants in their revolutionary behavior demon­
strates that there is unlikely to have been a single "text" of the Hungarian revolu­
tion, any simple, uniform interpretation of the causes behind the explosion in 
1956. And that may also account for the many, even contradictory interpretations 
of the '56 revolution preserved and maintained to this day. 
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My intention is to reexamine some of the documents of the Hungarian revolution 
that contain statements by Hungarian writers. On October 26 a two-page pamphlet 
appeared. Its title - 'Immovably' - referred to Vörösmarty's 'Appeal'. The poems 
by István Sinka and Ferenc Jankovich, as well as the short essay by the Transyl-
vanian-born author Áron Tamási represented the values of the 'Populist' movement 
of the interwar period. The texts of the November issue of 'Literary Newsletter' 
were by a wider range of writers. While most of the poems had been composed in 
the early 1950s, including 'One Sentence on Tyranny' by Gyula Illyés and 'The 
Dictator' by Lajos Kassák, the essays by Tibor Déry, László Németh, and Lőrinc 
Szabó were inspired by the uprising. The third document I wish to examine is the 
collective statement issued by the Writers' Association on December 28th. Since 
my paper will focus not on aesthetic values but on political views, I will not exclude 
texts by mediocre writers. The question I wish to ask is whether any difference can 
be seen between the positions taken by former communists and those who expressed 
anti-communist views before 1945. 
Keywords: totalitarianism, political resistance, intellectual opposition, literary in­
stitutions, (self-)censorship 
"In the course of their struggle against Soviet and communist tyranny, Hungar­
ian writers and poets composed works that came to represent an everlasting con­
tribution to Hungarian and world literature", wrote István Csicsery-Rónai in May 
1957, in his Introduction to an anthology published in Washington, D. C. 
(Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 3). Today no serious literary scholar would accept this 
value judgement. In Éva Standeisky's chapter 'Literature in the Revolution', writ­
ten in 2005 for a new history of Hungarian literature, the reader cannot find a sin­
gle reference to a text written in the last three months of 1956 that could be charac­
terized as a work of art. My point concerns not so much what these texts are as 
what they are not. Let there be no mistake about that. What Hungarian authors 
wrote in or around 1956 has political, historical, or documentary but no aesthetic 
value. 
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Once this has been admitted, the question arises to what extent Hungarian writ-
ers influenced the course of events. Beyond any doubt, the visual arts, music, and 
literature were given extraordinary significance in twentieth-century totalitarian 
régimes. Still, generalizations are dangerous and some distinctions are needed. As 
the fates of Richard Strauss, Hans Pfitzner, or Wilhelm Furtwaengler suggest, 
Nazi Germany gave exceptional power to outstanding musicians. It would be dif-
ficult to prove that music making suffered because of this. The same cannot be 
said about communist régimes; Otto Klemperer was forced to leave the Hungarian 
State Opera after the introduction of the one-party system. Literature became seri-
ously distorted not only in the Third Reich but also in the communist states. No 
writer could preserve his/her independence from the dangerous influence of poli-
tics. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Hungarian literature published in the 1950s 
is virtually unreadable today. The courage of those who expressed their loss of be-
lief in communism can be appreciated but the works marked by disillusionment 
are of negligible artistic value. A case in point is the poem called Pamphlet, writ-
ten in January 1953 and published in Irodalmi Újság on August 1 of the same 
year. 
Hopeful I was, and now Í look around 
full of hesitation. (Something is wrong.) 
Such words may indicate that Sándor Csoóri, a poet of peasant origin who be-
longed to the second generation of the Populist movement that had started in the 
1920s, was one of the first to lose faith in Mátyás Rákosi as 'the wise leader of the 
Hungarian people'. Painful as it still is to point to the naivete of the new intellectu-
als manipulated by the communists, such a confession of uncertainty can be given 
more credit than the change of attitude of those educated communists who in 1953 
decided to side with Imre Nagy and later claimed to play a decisive role in the rev-
olution. Péter Kuczka, for instance, still lamented the disintegration of collective 
farms and the cult of private property, and continued to speak of class struggle in 
Nyírség Diary, published in Irodalmi Újság on November 7, 1953. "Comrades, 
we have made mistakes'", he wrote with considerable cynicism. Middle-aged writ-
ers who had started their careers as non-communists before World War II, were 
either silenced or afraid to make any declaration that could lead to punishment. On 
21 November 1954, the Transylvanian-born Áron Tamási published an "Open 
Letter" in Magyar Nemzet, the daily that pretended to represent the Patriotic Front 
and not the Hungarian Workers' Party. On the one hand, he reminded his readers 
that he had never joined any political party, on the other, he affirmed his belief in 
socialism. 
It was not until the second half of 1955 that the signs of a conflict between the 
political establishment and the Hungarian Writers' Association became manifest. 
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One of the issues of Irodalmi Újság was banned because it contained a poem by 
the provincial and disillusioned communist László Benjámin that ridiculed József 
Darvas, Minister of Culture. Today the works of both of these two writers are 
justly forgotten. On October 14 a poem entitled Bartók appeared in the popular 
magazine Színház és Mozi. In this text Gyula Illyés associated Picasso's distorted 
women and horses with human suffering. The December issue of Új Hang, con­
taining another piece by the same poet, was banned, and the production of Gali­
leo, a play by Illyés's close friend László Németh, was not permitted since this 
play was thought to be a parable about the current situation, and a similar ban was 
put on The Tragedy of Man, a lyrical drama composed in 1860-1861, because of a 
scene that presented a phalanstery. 
Some communists decided to criticize their leaders. On March 30, 1956, at a 
meeting of the party members of the Writers' Association, Sándor Lukácsy, 
known as the organiser of the destruction of books after the introduction of the 
one-party system, compared Rákosi to Judas, and on June 27, in a speech at the 
meeting of the Petőfi Circle the prose writer Tibor Déry blamed József Darvas, 
Márton Horváth, and József Révai for their cultural policy {írók lázadása 1990, 
32-33, 156-161). On August 11 another poem by Illyés appeared in Irodalmi 
Újság. Hunyadi 's Hand represented a way of writing characteristic of the commu­
nist period. It seemed to speak of the past but in fact gave an interpretation of the 
present. The archaic style was meant to conceal the message. The statue of János 
Hunyadi, the warrior who fought in the battles with the Ottoman Turks in the 15th 
century, was given a voice, and the spirit of the past referred to "the nation's 
tomb". On August 18 Trust in Freedom, a poem by Lajos Kassák appeared in the 
same weekly. "Besides peaceful resignation, brave opposition can also be a merit 
of human beings." These words explicitly urged people to organize resistance. 
The message of these two poems was supplemented by the arguments made in 
articles. On July 28, the president of the Writers' Association, the Populist writer 
Péter Veres defended the general mood of the population against the charge of na­
tionalism formulated by the political leaders, and in the September 8 issue of 
Irodalmi Újság two communist writers published articles that contained critical 
remarks. Déry dismissed the Hungarian literature of the period that started with 
1948 as the manifestation of a 'Stalinist era', and Gyula Háy condemned self-cen­
sorship (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 59-62). On September 17 Veres opened the ses­
sion of the Writers' Association by making the point that 'writers always walk in 
front of society' (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 65). This assumption clearly shows that in 
1956 Hungarian writers modelled their role on the activity of their predecessors in 
1848. 
Characteristically, the circle in which the most radical criticism of the régime 
was articulated was named after Petőfi, the Peasant Party led by Veres was 
rebaptised Petőfi Party, and Appeal, a poem by the nineteenth-century Romantic 
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poet Mihály Vörösmarty set to music by Béni Egressy, became so closely associ­
ated with the uprising that after 1956 people were not allowed to sing it. Relent­
lessly, one of the most important documents of the revolution brought out on Oc­
tober 26 by Sándor Püski, the publisher of the Populists, also borrowed its title 
from the opening line of Vörösmarty's poem. 
1956 is often compared to 1848. Of course, history never repeats itself. From 
the perspective of literary or even cultural history, the differences are striking, 
even ifit is granted that what happened at the end of October 1956 was the result 
of processes that had started several years before. The unimaginative fiction and 
even the somewhat unsophisticated essays of Veres are largely forgotten today, 
and except for Kassák, who is chiefly remembered for the works he composed be­
tween the outbreak of World War I and the 1930s, no one among the poets, not 
even Illyés has left a poetic legacy as significant as those of Vörösmarty, Petőfi, 
and János Arany. It cannot be claimed that any member of Imre Nagy's two cabi­
nets, not even the political scientist István Bibó, had written works that could 
compete in complexity with the output of István Széchenyi or Lajos Kossuth, and 
no fiction writer of the stature of József Eötvös, Zsigmond Kemény, or Mór Jókai 
was involved in the fight against totalitarianism. 
In 1956 literary institutions played a more important role than individuals. On 
September 18 the Presidential Council of the Hungarian Writers' Association was 
reshuffled. The election was by secret ballot, and although the political pressure 
made it impossible to have a poll that could be called free and fair, the procedure 
was unprecedented and set an example for later events. Such non-communists as 
the poets Kassák, Illyés, and Lőrinc Szabó were elected, together with Áron 
Tamási and even László Németh, whose Galileo had its first rehearsal on Septem­
ber 23. Several communist authors exercised self-criticism, although it is possible 
to sense some ambiguity in their declarations. "Tragic experience, fatal mistakes, 
and self-torture have forced communist writers to decide not to lie under any cir­
cumstances." This statement by Gyula Háy at the meeting of the Writers' Associa­
tion may sound more credible than the claim Tamás Aczél made in his highly rhe­
torical Ode to Europe, published in Irodalmi Újság on October 6, that "we should 
open the frontier and look around in the world, (...) then adopt what is good and 
leave behind what we don't like" (Csicsery-Rónai 1996, 65, 68). Áron Tamási's 
articled Hungarian Exhortation and László Németh's short essay A Nation on the 
Rise belong to the documents that make it difficult to decide whether the caution 
that characterized numerous writers' position was necessitated by fear or could be 
explained in terms of the illusion that Hungary could remain independent of both 
the United States and the Soviet Union and develop a political system that repre­
sented a third road between Western capitalism and Eastern socialism, mar­
ket-oriented and planned economy. Tamási's article was published first m Relent­
less, whereas Németh's text was read on Free Kossuth Radio on November 1. 
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Both were also published in the only issue of Irodalmi Újság published during the 
revolution, on November 2. 
The two important poems that appeared in what must be seen as the most sig­
nificant literary manifestation of the revolution were composed years before 
1956. One Sentence on Tyranny has become so fully institutionalized that few can 
read it as a work of art. It is a text with an explicit message, and its relative popu­
larity when compared with other poems of Illyés, would seem to bear this out. As 
far as I know, the date of its composition is uncertain. According to its author, it 
was composed in the early 1950s, so it may highlight the assumption that litera­
ture had paved the way for the revolution. According to the poet, the manuscript 
was so effectively hidden that no one could find it, but both he and his wife knew it 
by heart. At the time of the outbreak of the 1956 revolution he was visiting the 
poet Lőrinc Szabó in Miskolc. After his return to Budapest, the Petőfi Party asked 
him to give them some text for publication, so he wrote down the poem. 
It follows from the historical nature of art that the reputation of every work may 
change. It would be a mistake to deny that currently the poetry of Illyés is, to put it 
mildly, rather unpopular in Hungary, especially among younger people. One Sen­
tence on Tyranny is usually regarded as his most memorable poem. It was pub­
lished first on November 2, 1956, in the only revolutionary issue of Irodalmi 
Újság, the organ of the Hungarian Writers' Association started in 1950. Until 
1986 it could not appear legally in Hungary but was known from Western and ille­
gal publications as well as from cassettes containing the author's reading his 
works and made in the 1960s in the USA. On this occasion it cannot be my task to 
give a detailed textual analysis of this work. Let it suffice to say that it can be read 
as a distorted version or parody of Liberté, the first piece in Paul Éluard's collec­
tion Poésie et vérité, published in 1942. Illyés became acquainted with this French 
poet during his stay in Paris, in the 1920s, and Liberté was translated into Hungar­
ian by György Somlyó in the 1950s. This version was re-published in the Buda­
pest daily Népszava on October 30, 1956, and in the provincial newspaper 
Várpalotai Napló on November 3. Some readers may have realized that the struc­
ture of the Hungarian poem was modelled on that of the French poem. 
Éluard's 85-line text was composed at the time of the German occupation of 
France. It appears to consist of a single sentence. Its four-line stanzas end with the 
words "J'écris ton nom", with the exception of the last stanza, which is followed 
by the word that is also the title of the poem: 
Et pour le pouvoir d'un mot 
Je recommence ma vie 
Je suis né pour te connaître 
Pour te nommer 
Liberté. 
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Both poems are based on the structural principle of gradation. 
One Sentence on Tyranny was not the only text published in the November 2 is-
sue ofIrodalmi Újság that reminded the public of the writers' role in the prepara-
tion of what happened on and after October 23, 1956. The Dictator, a free-verse 
poem by Lajos Kassák, the leader of the Hungarian avant-garde of the second and 
third decades of the twentieth century, was composed in 1952. The year is signifi-
cant, since it indicates that in contrast to most of his contemporaries, Kassák ex-
pressed his hatred of totalitarianism before the death of Stalin. The poem acquired 
a special significance at the time of its appearance, since it much less commented 
on the actual than forecast the inevitable; it was possible to read it as a prediction 
about the dismantling of the Soviet leader's Budapest statue, the work of the 
sculptor Sándor Mikus. In addition, it could be mentioned that it was Kassák who 
at a meeting of the Writers' Association, after Stalin's death, the Berlin uprising, 
and the Soviet leaders' decision to replace Mátyás Rákosi with Imre Nagy as 
prime minister, demanded the implementation of the reforms planned by the new 
cabinet in the summer of 1953. In consequence, Kassák lost his membership in the 
Hungarian Workers' Party. Contrary to widely held beliefs, Kassák played a 
much more significant role in the intellectual opposition to totalitarianism than 
such renegades as Tibor Méray, Tamás Aczél, Gyula Háy, or even Tibor Déry. Let 
us remember that Kassák openly disapproved of the dictatorship of the working 
class as early as 1919. After his attack on Béla Kun appeared in Ma, that journal 
was banned by the Hungarian communists. It is also symptomatic that in the later 
1920s, after several years spent in exile, Kassák decided to return to Hungary 
rather than to live in Moscow, in sharp contrast to Béla Balázs, György Lukács, 
and others. The last two parts of his autobiography The Life of a Man, the sections 
about 1918 and 1919, were banned in interwar Hungary after a fairly large number 
of copies had been sold. Characteristically, they were not published between 1945 
and the 1980s. 
Instead of discussing the activity of those communists who in late 1956 fled to 
the West and in their highly biased interpretations overstressed their part in the 
revolution, I wish to mention two components of literary activity in October and 
November 1956. One of these was the response of the Hungarian writers who had 
lived abroad since the late 1940s. The most important among these was Sándor 
Márai, who flew from North America to Munich to interview those who had fled 
because of the Soviet invasion that started on November 4. On his return to New 
York, he composed the poem Angel, Coming from Heaven. Although Márai was 
not a good verse writer, this piece, inspired by a popular Christmas song, is a mov-
ing testimony to the revolution, comparing the suffering of the Hungarians to that 
of Christ and condemning the Western decision not to interfere. Another writer 
who tried to interpret the revolution in the West was László Cs. Szabó, who on 
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October 30 in a BBC program spoke hopefully of the resurrection of his home-
land. 
As far as the texts composed in Hungary are concerned, it could be argued that 
the revolution had left its mark on popular rather than on high culture. Much anon-
ymous verse and oral history can be associated with October 1956. As is 
well-known, several writers were imprisoned in 1957. It is less often mentioned 
that even amateurs were persecuted. To give a random example, János Abrud-
bányai, the Unitarian priest of Kocsord, a small village in Eastern Hungary, got 
seven years of imprisonment because at Christmas 1956 schoolboys recited two 
of his poems condemning the foreign occupation (Dikán 1993, 217-219). 
It has been demonstrated that János Kádár could not tolerate allusions to the ex-
ecution of Imre Nagy. That may be a partial reason for the scarcity of references to 
the revolution in the Hungarian literature of the 1960s and 1970s. Those writers 
who departed from the official interpretation were punished even in the 1980s. 
When An Everlasting Summer: I Am Older than 9, a poem composed by Gáspár 
Nagy in 1983, appeared in the Tatabánya monthly Új Forrás, in October 1984, its 
author ceased to be the secretary of the Hungarian Writers' Association. My very 
rough translation of the final stanza: 
once there will be a funeral 
we must not forget 
and have to name the murderers. 
One cannot do justice to the original in which the last word of each of these 
lines is an infinitive, a form that in Hungarian has the ending NI, the initials of 
Imre Nagy. 
There are very few comparable works that date from the decades prior to 1989. 
Sad as it may seem, the compromise most Hungarian writers made with Kádár's 
régime was successful in removing the revolution from the memory of the genera-
tions that emerged in the two or even three decades after 1956. György Aczél, 
Kádár's cultural advisor did his best to gain the support of the leading intellectu-
als, including not only Illyés but those who were silenced after 1948. When I 
was working on my book on Géza Ottlik, I found drafts of letters by this non-
communist writer addressed to Aczél on the birthday of this political leader 
(Szegedy-Maszák 1994). Self-censorship led to a corruption with consequences 
that will not disappear in the foreseeable future. Márai may have been right in be-
lieving that Hungary paid a very high price. Kádár's régime was arguably more 
liberal than that of the rest of the Eastern bloc, but the loss may have been irrepara-
ble. Péter Esterházy's book called Revised Edition about his father's work as a spy 
for the communists after 1956 may remind us that today there are many Hungarian 
citizens who could be blamed for what they had done before 1989. To be more 
specific, it would be difficult to find any text by any historian published in Hun-
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gary in the period between 1957 and 1989 with no trace of political concessions. 
On a personal note, I could mention that nowadays I participate in the monthly 
meetings of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences with an old colleague who cen-
sored my publications in the 1960s, 70s, and even 80s. The latent, "deep down" 
thing is our mutual wonderment as to what we may remember. I may give him 
rope and yet at the same time remain tied. On one occasion, Péter Esterházy, 
whose works I admire, seemed to thank me that I never made him aware that I 
knew that his father was a spy, although he sent reports about my family that I did 
not care to read after the documents had been released. The words "you are both 
the prison-keeper and the prisoner" and "every one is a link in the chain" may 
strike us as prophetic for a long period. This prophecy about the inevitable conse-
quences of everyone's active function as a wheel in the machine of the totalitarian 
system distinguishes One Sentence on Tyranny from the pseudo-confessional 
and/or bombastic declarations of second-rate versifiers and journalists who have 
done an excellent job in exploiting and manipulating the memory of the 1956 rev-
olution. Illyés's French culture, his initiations of intelligence and experience, if 
one will, to say nothing of his work as a translator, make for me a sort of figure 
who wished to avoid both provincialism and superficial internationalism. It is im-
portant that what we may learn from One Sentence on Tyranny, we learn less 
about the early 1950s than about the years that followed the date of its composi-
tion. I seem to run here the risk of a bit of exposure to the charge of more or less re-
peating what Márai wrote in exile, but it may be important to state that, whether 
designedly or not, the bulk of the Hungarian population betrayed the revolution in 
the decades that followed 1956. Of course, the blame should be put on the West-
ern reluctance to help rather than on the lethargy of those who survived those de-
cades as citizens of a Warsaw-Pact country. In any case, 1956 promotes infinite 
reflection, makes a hundred queer and ugly things glare at us right and left. 
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ANXIETY OF IDEOLOGY: RESISTANCE TO ALLEGORY 
IN THE LITERARY NARRATION OF HISTORY 
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USA 
The efforts of the communist regime, following the Revolution of 1956, to channel 
discussion of the events of the Revolution into a simplistic ideological opposition 
exerted (and arguably continue to exert) a powerful influence on political discourse 
in Hungary, in spite of numerous challenges issued against the validity of this oppo-
sition by historians and political scientists. It is possible that literature may offer 
new perspectives from which the terms that have exercised such a constrictive influ-
ence on this discourse can be reevaluated. This discussion of works of poetry by 
French, German, and American poets on the events of 1956 in Hungary examines 
the ways in which not only these events, but also the terms in which they were cast 
were perceived and thrown into question by writers living outside Hungary, several 
of whom also wrote influential essays on politics. Moreover, it considers how liter-
ary theory, specifically because it makes language and the creation of meaning the 
object of its inquiry, provides critical strategies through which the terms of this dis-
course can be deconstructed and deflated, creating opportunities for new (recon-
structions of our understanding of these events. 
Keywords: Hungary, 1956, poetical reception, Jean-Paul Sartre, E. E. Cummings, 
Albert Camus, Marguerite Duras 
In the months and years following the uprising against Russian occupation in 
Hungary in 1956 numerous poets and authors from the United States and several 
countries of Western Europe composed works memorializing the events of the up-
rising and its aftemiath. For several of these writers, especially those who at some 
time in their lives had sympathies with communism, the uprising and particularly 
its suppression represented a challenge to communist ideology. In this context the 
events in Hungary of late October and early November 1956 acquire the character 
of an abstraction. Their relevance becomes a function of the place they assume in 
an ideological framework of constructed oppositions (the most obvious example 
being the frequently invoked opposition of revolution and counter-revolution in 
the rhetoric of Marxist ideology). In contrast to this, however, the writings of sev-
eral other poets seem to evince an uneasiness with and desire to avoid abstraction. 
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In their attempts to transform these historical events into language these writers 
sought rhetorical strategies that, far tending towards allegory, strive to resist para-
bolic readings. These two approaches to the depiction in poetry of the events of 
the uprising in 1956 can be thought of as emblematic of two divergent aspirations 
of literary (and arguably historical) discourse: the desire to assert and ascribe 
meaning and the desire to insist on the purely representational function of dis-
course that figures independently of any mediating, interpreting presence. 
In the following analyses of several poems written on the events of the uprising 
in Hungary I attempt to isolate rhetorical strategies that are instrumental in the 
construction of allegory on the one hand and the resistance to allegorical readings 
on the other. I seek in particular to illustrate how specific critical techniques de-
veloped in the study of literature can reveal the rhetorical processes through which 
allegorical readings are encouraged and discouraged. I offer reflections concern-
ing the different functions of these contrasting approaches to the literary depiction 
of historical events in the process of shaping historical memory. In conclusion, 
I make tentative suggestions concerning the potential uses of such critical tech-
niques in the study of historical and political discourse, suggesting how they may 
allow more sensitive understandings of the textual artifacts (be they literary, his-
torical, political, etc.) through which these events are memorialized by fore-
grounding the processes through which they are constructed. 
There are any number of rhetorical approaches to the construction of allegory 
that merit attention. These include the personification of abstract concepts such as 
in the poem To Hungary, that American Might Explain by American Neil Brad-
ford Olson, in which freedom is referred as a loving woman: 
... freedom never loved best 
Those that bled the less for loving her.1 
Similarly, in the poem Hautes Saisons (High Seasons) by Paul Chaulot one finds 
the personification of Budapest as a metonym for Hungary coupled with a meta-
phorical assertion of the emblematic significance of the struggle: 
Sang de Budapest, affiche de chair 
Aux murs de Paris. 
(Blood of Budapest, placard of flesh 
On the walls of Paris.) 
However, rather than enumerate such techniques and examples I'd like to focus 
on one of the more salient approaches to the abstraction of the events of 1956 and 
examine the implications of this approach, namely the allusion to historical events 
that have themselves acquired an iconic status. Such allusions are particularly sig-
nificant in the poetic depiction of historical events specifically because they at-
tempt to confer onto the events they allegorize the same historical significance, 
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implying that in time they too will become iconic. Moreover, they ascribe to these 
events a transnational significance by linking them to moments in national histo-
ries that have taken on the stature of global history and become métonymie in 
world historical narratives. An example of this invocation of an iconic moment in 
European history is the poem Politische Drucksache (Political Pamphlet) by Ger-
man poet Heinz Winfried Sabais. Each of the first two stanzas of this six stanza 
poem begins with an explicit reference to the French Revolution of 1789: 
Seid getrost, ihr Unterdrückten, Verzweifelten: 
Jede Bastille ist noch abgebrochen worden. 
Seid getrost, irgendein Morgen wird wieder 
Der vierzehnte Juli sein. 
(Be consoled, you oppressed, you desperate, 
Every Bastille will eventually be torn down. 
Be consoled, eventually some tomorrow 
Will be the 14th of July.) 
Noticeable in this poem is the fact that although it was composed as a tribute to the 
uprising of 1956, it makes no explicit mention either of Hungary and Hungarians 
or of Russia or Russians, referring instead to "the oppressed", "the agents of op-
pression", and "the dictators". Thus the events in Hungary serve as an occasion for 
abstraction, as an example of an inexorable historical truth, as a human tragedy 
but not as a national tragedy. 
A similar example is found in the poem Aux poètes hongrois (To the Hungarian 
Poets) by French poet Georges-Emmanuel Clancier. This poem, which contains 
references to Hungary and more specifically Budapest, compares the Hungarian 
capital to other cities devastated in conflicts of the not distant past: 
Jeunesse, sang de la liberté, 
Ta lumière est celle de l'amour 
Et leur hideuse nuit est la même 
A Budapest que l'ombre d'Oradour 
Et la ténèbre de Guernica. 
Youth, blood of liberty, 
Your glow is the same as that of love 
And their hideous night the same 
In Budapest as the shadow of Oradour 
And the obscurity of Guernica. 
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Perhaps less iconic than the Bastille or July 14n, these allusions to the bombing of 
the city of Guernica in 1937 and the massacre by German soldiers of 642 inhabit-
ants of the Limousin town of Oradour-sur-Glane in the Haute-Vienne department 
of France in June of 1944 constitute not only an attempt to ascribe the significance 
of historical allegory to the events in Hungary. They also represent a challenge, 
more explicit than that in the poem by Heinz Winfried Sabais, to the ascription of 
the term counter-revolution by the Kádár regime to the events of 1956. They situ-
ate 1956 in the context of recent conflicts that themselves had been appropriated 
by the Communist party as emblematic, inverting, however, the opposition. Thus, 
the poem implicitly affirms the ideological opposition explicit in the Marxist con-
ception of revolution and counter-revolution, locating 1956, however, on the 
other side of the antithesis. 
These comparisons of the events in Hungary to other events in European his-
tory can be interpreted as gestures of consecration that confer upon 1956 not only 
historical significance but also a stable meaning that defies réévaluation. By 
equating 1956 to moments in history that have assumed the stature of icons they 
sever it from a specific historical context and assign it a mythic value. In doing so, 
however, they aggressively depersonalize 1956. By situating it in a mythologized 
past these comparisons (and the poems in which they figure) reduce 1956 to an 
ideological opposition. Rather than constitute a set of events the meanings of 
which remain open to interpretation, it becomes one of two antithetical signposts 
on an abstract ideological spectrum. The poetic text, far from attempting to render 
through its metaphors a distinctive vision of particular events, deprives 1956 of 
any historical specificity, reducing it to a sign that implicitly affirms the value of 
the opposition central to Marxist ideology of revolution and counter-revolution. 
An interesting critique of the functions of historical allegory as exemplified in 
these poems can be found in the writings of French dramatist, novelist, and philos-
opher Jean-Paul Sartre. In an essay entitled Search for a Method, published along 
with the longer essay Critique of Dialectical Reason in 1960, Sartre expresses his 
frustration with the tendency among French communists to insist in their analyses 
of the events in Hungary on what Sartre thought of as an adherence to a dogmatic 
interpretation of Marxist ideology. Writing dismissively of the contention made 
by communists in France that "world imperialism" lay "at the origin of the events 
in Hungary" in 1956, Sartre contends that for these Marxists analysis 
consists solely in getting rid of detail, in forcing the signification of 
certain events, in denaturing facts or even in inventing a nature for 
them in order to discover it later underneath them, as their sub-
stancef]2 
Sartre notes that the portrayal of reactionaries alleged to have had a role in the up-
rising attempts to transform these figures into allegorical characters in a reenact-
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ment of a parable of Marxist dogma. "These reactionaries", he writes, "pass over 
into eternal Reaction; they are brothers of the counter-revolutionaries of 1793, 
and their only distinctive trait is the will to injure."3 This objection invites ques-
tions concerning the implications of the comparison drawn by Heinz Winfried 
Sabais between the events in Hungary in 1956 and the events of the French Revo-
lution. While for the German poet 1956 falls at the other end of the ideological 
spectrum, he nevertheless tacitly affirms the validity of the opposition invoked by 
the French communists whom Sartre criticizes. Both viewpoints insist on the 
purely ideological rather than on the historical relevance of 1956 and both encour-
age one to ignore the contexts of these events in order to facilitate an alleged simi-
larity that is meaningful only as an abstraction. 
For Sartre himself, however, 1956 represented the first persuasive challenge to 
Marxist doctrine as he and other Western intellectuals had interpreted it. Far from 
reifying his conception of the politically engaged Marxist intellectual expressed 
in earlier writings such as the 1948 play Les Main Sales, 1956 radically altered 
Sartre's attitudes towards the Soviet Union and communism. Although he never 
abandoned his Marxist sympathies, he fundamentally rejected in his later writings 
what he thought of as the simplistic oppositions that sought to ignore or even ef-
face historical specificities. 
Sartre was by no means the only prominent Western writer-intellectual for 
whom the events in Hungary of 1956 constituted a challenge to Marxist ideology. 
Prominent poets and authors such as Albert Camus, Marguerite Duras, E. E. 
Cummings, and Archibald Macleish wrote in contemporary periodicals express-
ing their outrage at the Soviet occupation of Hungary and the suppression of the 
uprising. Some of these writers, for instance Cummings, had what could be de-
scribed as socialist leanings. Others, Camus and Duras, had at some point been 
members of the communist party. By the early 1950s, however, none of them had 
any illusions about the Soviet Union. For these authors the events in Hungary 
were not a cause for surprise. They merely further discredited communism and the 
Soviet Union. There were however other prominent writers who, like Sartre, 
maintained their faith both in communist ideology and in the Soviet Union as a 
liberating, democratizing force in Central Europe up until October 1956. Marti-
nique poet, dramatist and political essayist Aimé Césaire, who had been elected as 
mayor of Fort-de-France in 1945 running on the communist party ticket, tendered 
his resignation from the party in 1956, making specific reference in his letter to the 
Secretary General of the French Communist party to events in Hungary. British 
novelist, poet, and essayist Kingsley Amis, who was a member of the Communist 
Party up until the suppression of the uprising in Hungary and later went on to be-
come a staunch political conservative, wrote in a letter to the communist periodi-
cal The Daily Worker dated February 14th 1957, "I used to say that some of my 
best friends are communists. I can't after Hungary."5 
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If one of the meanings of 1956 is the inadequacy of abstraction, this raises diffi-
cult questions for the poet seeking to craft a textual monument. He/she is immedi-
ately confronted with the essentially abstract nature of language itself. The poet 
seeking to discourage allegorical readings must adopt rhetorical strategies 
through which the figurative nature of language does not obscure its alleged rep-
resentational function. Far from serving as a tool through which events can be 
metaphorically represented, discourse becomes an obstacle that interposes itself 
between the text and the reality to which it attempts to refer. The poet must devise 
means of overcoming this obstacle. 
One such strategy that has had a long history in the literatures of Western Eu-
rope is the insistence, explicit or implicit, on the inadequacy of literary figuration 
itself. Paradigmatic examples include the opening lines to Shakespeare's sonnet 
130, in which the poet insists "My love's eyes are nothing like the sun", or the 
prefatory passages to Balzac's Père Goriot, in which the narrator insists "this 
drama is neither fiction nor romance". This emphasis on the insufficiency of liter-
ary representation becomes a trope itself. It expresses the poet's thwarted yearn-
ing to transcend the limits of sedimented literary language and devise new ap-
proaches to poetic representation that do not transform a unique event into a liter-
ary platitude. 
Numerous poems written on the events of the uprising in 1956 deploy this 
strategy in forms more and less explicit. French poet Gerard Prevot insists in his 
poem Aux poètes hongrois that "Nous ne vous donnerons rien qui puisse être 
appelé Littérature" ("We will give you nothing that might be called Literature") 
spelling literature, in the original French, with a capital L, as if to denote an insti-
tution as much as a form of art. In a poem entitled Tract pour les insurgés 
hongrois and dedicated to Géza Képes Alain Bosquet writes, 
Nous vous jurons de ne rien dire qui soit beau; 
Nous vous jurons de ne rien faire qui soit grand. 
(We swear to you not to say anything that might be beautiful; 
We swear to you not to do anything that might be noble.) 
In the opening lines of his poem Hungary English poet C. S. Fraser adopts a more 
ironic approach, using a simple declarative sentence to subvert the famous saying 
attributed to Patrick Henry: '"But give me liberty or give me death! ' / They gave 
them death." The poem continues, an ironic mix of literary figuration and the ex-
plicit rejection of figuration: 
Come, look at the rubbish of a season. 
Cracked leaves and crumpled newspapers 
On the patchy scruff of a back green! 
Why should we cut rhetorical capers? 
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Last week's courage is this week's treason: 
That is what moving armies mean. 
Yet if the rejection of formulae constitutes an expression of the poet's perception 
of the uniqueness of the event depicted, it nevertheless fails to stage (literariiy) the 
event itself, for doing so would be to imply that the event can be reduced to lan-
guage. This raises the question what rhetorical strategies are available to the poet 
who wishes to stage the event with language without reducing the event to a mere 
literary phantasm? In an essay entitled The Reality Effect French literary theorist 
Roland Barthes offers an answer to this question. In a discussion of so-called real-
ist narratives of the nineteenth century Barthes identifies the enumeration in a 
novel of descriptive details that bear no relevance to plot or theme as a device de-
ployed to impress upon the reader the reality of the object described. While details 
which seem to have thematic or metaphorical significance may appear as the fan-
tastic creation of the imaginative poet, details which defy integration into a larger 
thematic whole suggest - specifically because they defy this integration - that 
they figure in the text simply because they are true. They are the elements of real-
ity that exist outside of the structuring activities of the poet. As such, they are an 
assertion both of the reality and of the uniqueness of the event, a uniqueness that 
resists reduction to allegory. 
An example of a text that incorporates such details is the poem Chanson pour 
la Hongrie by Janine Mitaud. This poem, rich in abstraction, also includes mo-
ments of description that seem to bear little or no thematic significance. The open-
ing stanza of the poem recalls the poet's acquaintances among members of a 
Roma community in Hungary: 
Mes frères d'une fête 
Mes amis d'un été[.] 
(My brothers of a fête 
My friends of a summerf] 
These lines can be read literally or figuratively, words like "fête" and "summer" 
bearing numerous metaphorical and even allegorical connotations. Yet alongside 
such descriptions the poet also mentions that her Roma friends had laughed upon 
learning that she had gotten lost: 
Un soir vous avez ri 
Que je me perde dans la ville 
Pour avoir confondu 
Syllabes-sœurs en votre langue. 
(One evening you laughed 
That I had gotten lost in the town 
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Having confused 
Sister-syllables in your language.) 
Apart perhaps from suggesting the poet's foreignness, this passage serves no 
function other than to render real this experience. While the opening lines might 
invite the reader to interpret the poem as a parabolic idealization, this passage de-
fies such a reading or rather supplements it, preventing the reader from reducing 
the characters of the poem to the figures of an abstraction or allegory. 
Similarly, Jerome Mazzaro's poem In Praise of the Generation After World 
War II uses what Barthes refers to as "futile" details to preclude the reduction of 
the central figure of the poem to a literary personification of an abstraction. The 
poem describes the despair of a woman who had fought in the underground 
against the occupying German forces and later boasted of her bravery. Now, 
caught in the machinegun fire of a different struggle, she feels ashamed to have 
served as a "banner" of an alleged "freedom". The poem is explicitly about this 
woman's frustration to have been depersonalized in the conflicts between differ-
ent occupying powers. Note how, in the opening paragraph, the precision of a de-
tail irrelevant to the struggles that form the context of the poem asserts the reality 
and the individuality of this woman: 
In the machinegunfire 
Waking from hope as if 
From sinking, 
She cuts through the cobbled streets 
Alone, her dress waved in 
The brisk... 
Windsf] 
Neither the woman's dress nor the brisk winds in which it waves appear again in 
the poem. They figure a single time, lavish in their irrelevance, serving in the text 
only as a confirmation of the reality of the scene described. By suspending for a 
moment the metaphorical activity of the text exemplified in such images as "wak-
ing from hope", this insertion of an extraneous detail suggests that the poem, how-
ever personal a vision it may be, nevertheless follows reality submissively. It thus 
forestalls any attempt to reduce the poem entirely to the product of the structuring 
activity of the subjective imagination of the poet, insisting on the descriptive, 
rather than interpretive, value of the text. Ironically, far from being irrelevant, 
these details are crucial to the theme of the poem, which is the inadequacy of ideo-
logical abstraction as a means to describe the fates of individuals. 
This discussion of several poems written in Western Europe and the United 
States following the uprising in 1956 has attempted to identity two divergent ten-
dencies in the structuring of literary monuments to historical events: commemora-
tion through the creation out of specific events of allegorical meanings and com-
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memoration that attempts to preserve these events from the oversimplifications 
inherent in allegory. In doing so it has sought to give precise description of rhetor­
ical techniques through which allegory is both constructed and resisted. The ques­
tion with which I would conclude is to what extent an analysis of the use of such 
rhetorical techniques in historical and political accounts might yield insights into 
the tendencies underlying these accounts. Arguably historical texts must also 
grapple with these contradictory demands to assign meaning, while at the same 
time rendering objective descriptions. Such an analysis of accounts of 1956 might 
be of particular interest specifically because these events, the subject of dogmatic 
categorization under communism, have undergone and continue to undergo such 
radical evaluations since the fall of the Kádár regime. 
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"The Impact of 1956 on the Hungarians of Transylvania", provides a 50-year retro-
spective analysis of the political consequences of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 
on the Hungarians in neighboring Romania. It focuses on the inter-ethnic knock-on 
effects in the Romanian Workers Party, the "Hungarian/Mures-Hungarian Autono-
mous Region" of Transylvania, and the cultural institutions of the Hungarian minor-
ity. It links these developments to present-day Romanian-Hungarian relations, both 
on the interstate and the intrastate levels. 
Keywords: Transylvania, 1956, Hungarian minority, Bolyai University, Romania, 
Romanian Workers' Party 
The Hungarian "Fight for Freedom of 1956" had dramatic consequences not 
only for the people of Hungary but for the Hungarians in neighboring states. It is 
the concern of this paper to focus on the consequences of 1956 on the lives of 
Hungarians in Transylvania, within the Peoples' Republic of Romania. 
I have chosen this topic because very little has appeared about it in English or 
other "world" languages. Since 1989 many studies and documents have been pub-
lished in Hungarian on this subject, but very little of this awareness has been trans-
mitted beyond the Carpathian Basin. Thus, even among policymakers and acade-
micians there is confusion and outright ignorance about 1956 and its cross-border 
effects in East-Central Europe. 
I have selected Transylvania for my focus, because it is the area that witnessed 
the most far-reaching consequences, but which still has a wealth of literature and 
documentation in Hungarian. My objective at present is simply to provide a syn-
thesis of these findings, an overview which will guide others to focus on this issue 
with the attention that it truly deserves. The subject deserves such attention be-
cause 1956 was the catalyst and the catharsis that has defined Hungarian-Roma-
nian relations ever since on both intra-state and interstate levels. 
The Hungarian literature and documentation has appeared in the publications 
of the Teleki László Foundation and the 1956 Institute, as well as a few maverick 
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sources in the West. The most ambitious compilations have been those of Zoltán 
Tófalvi, Ágoston Székelyhidi, Ádám Szesztay, László Diószegi, Andrea R. Sülé, 
Kálmán Csiha, András Bodor, István Fehér, Ildikó Lipcsey, and Anna P. Sebők. ' 
It is particularly important to link 1956 to Romanian-Hungarian relations, be­
cause like the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 the history of twentieth-century 
Transylvania is defined by these two events. 1920 witnessed the transfer of sover­
eignty over Transylvania to the Romanian state, which came out of World War I 
as the major recipient of Entente, particularly French, largesse. The context of this 
decision reflected the will and perceptions of the victorious powers then. In 1947 
the post-World War II decisions simply reinforced this earlier decision. As op­
posed to this, 1956, more than any other event, rehabilitated the Hungarians in the 
eyes of the Western world. Yet, while 1956 was a peak event for Hungarians as a 
whole, it was followed by devastating consequences for the Hungarians of 
Transylvania. 1956 provided both the pretext and the opportunity to dismantle 
Hungarian cultural institutions and communal solidarity in Romania. 
Antecedents 
Before we turn to an analysis of these developments, it is important to remind 
ourselves of the nature of the Transylvanian situation in the decade preceding 
1956. The urban scene was still overwhelmingly Hungarian in most of Northern 
Transylvania. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century Kolozsvár/Cluj 
was a predominantly Hungarian city. Even on the eve of the revolution, this city 
was still 50.3% Hungarian and only 48.2% Romanian.2 Furthermore, its institu­
tional profile still included the independent Bolyai University, which provided an 
organized framework for Hungarian higher education. This provided the Hungar­
ian minority with a self-conscious and properly trained elite. 
While Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the Romanian Worker's Party, 
was committed to breaking/undermining the major strongholds of the Transylva­
nian Hungarian community, he could do so only after the consolidation of ethnic 
Romanian control over the Romanian Communist Party (at this point called the 
Romanian Worker's Party). This was accomplished through a patient application 
of Lenin's "two steps forward, one step back" tactical advice. After all, the Party -
the Soviet "control-system" - needed the nationalities in the first stages of captur­
ing and consolidating their power in Romania. 
The communist seizure of power in Romania was complete with Petru Groza's 
ascendancy on March 5, 1945, but it was technically confirmed only with the ab­
dication of King Michael in December 1947. In these years Romania was trans­
formed into a "People's Democracy". One of the most important tactics utilized to 
attain this end was the nationalities policy of the Party, dedicated to the tenets of 
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"proletarian internationalism" and the eradication of the abuses and persecutions 
suffered by the country's national minorities in the days of "bourgeois chauvin-
ism".3 But while this policy - the eradication of nationalism - was being carried to 
fulfillment, the growth of the RWP, its changing ethnic composition and organi-
zation, was foreboding for future developments for these same national minorities 
and revealed developments that were far from promising. 
The most dramatic development having long-range affects on the position of 
the country's ethnic minorities and on the resurgence of nationalism was the rapid 
growth of the RWP following the seizure of power. From a minuscule Party of 
around 1,000 members in April 1944, the Party grew to 217,000 members by Sep-
tember 1945. This growth accelerated and by June 1947 there were 710,000 mem-
bers. In this early phase of its development it reached a total of 937,846 members 
by the September of 1948 with the absorption of the Social Democrats. This was 
followed by a series of purges (to be discussed below), which consolidated the 
Party membership at 580,000 in June 1956, just a few months before the Revolu-
tion erupted in Hungary.4 The rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the years 
up to 1948 drastically altered its ethnic make-up. This growth relegated the ethnic 
minority Party members - who in the past composed the bulk of the RWP - into a 
secondary position, as Party ranks were swelled by ethnic Romanians who had 
seen "the handwriting on the wall".5 
This rapid post-war growth of the Party was the first major step toward its "na-
tionalization". After 1948, however, the RWP stabilized its membership and car-
ried out purges among elements that it regarded as "unhealthy". Even these 
purges, however, caused the greatest damage not in the ranks of the newly re-
cruited ethnic Romanians, but in the ranks of the veteran ethnic minority Commu-
nists.6 Thus, both the growth and the purges of the Party contributed to the 
strengthening of the ethnic Romanian sectors of the RWP. The increases in Party 
membership accentuated this trend.7 The regime's search for popularity among 
the masses allowed it to lower its standards for membership. This enabled many to 
join who were ignorant of, if not hostile to, the tenets of "proletarian international-
ism" and the traditional policies of "minority tolerance", which had prevailed 
prior to this growth in Party membership. 
The resurgence of nationalism can be partly explained by the decimation of the 
de-nationalized elements, which had composed the bulk of the RWP before 1944. 
Membership in the Party prior to the seizure of power was predominantly "inter-
nationalist", composed of individuals who were for the most part non-Romanians 
ethnically.8 Historical reasons determined this adhesion of minorities to the RWP, 
some of which have already been touched on above. It is the purpose of this study 
to examine briefly the composition of the RWP prior to the seizure of power, as 
well as after its "nationalization". 
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Before the seizure of power the growth and composition of the Party can be di-
vided by the historic Fifth Party Congress of 1932.9 Up to this Congress, the na-
tional minorities dominated the RWP. Jews and Ukrainians from Bessarabia, Bul-
garians from Dobrogea, and Jews and Hungarians from Transylvania outnum-
bered at this stage the ethnic Romanians in the positions of leadership as well as in 
the number of Party members.10 From 1932 onwards, however, the ethnic Ro-
manians began to play a prominent part in the Party's leadership although they 
were still not the dominant sector of the Party membership. 
The Party of the inter-war years was made up of roughly two groups. One 
group was composed of national minority intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals. 
The other group was composed of ethnic Romanian laborers.1 ' Of the two groups 
the former seems to have been more important until the Party Congress of 1932. 
They were a heterogeneous lot made up of a variety of nationalities drawn from all 
classes and practically all professions. As opposed to this, the ethnic Romanian 
sector of the Party was in all ways more homogeneous. Not only were they similar 
in national origin, but their class and labor background gave them more social sol-
idarity and political cohesion. Their role became more important following the 
Fifth Party Congress, the Grivita Strike of 1933, and the emergence of Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej as secretary-general of the RWP.12 
The RWP after the Seizure of Power 
After August 1944 the RWP underwent a vast change in composition. This 
change took place on all levels of the Party hierarchy from the Politburo down to 
the local cell organizations. This change has brought about a real "nationaliza-
tion" of the Party along ethnic lines.13 To understand this nationalization it will be 
necessary to examine not only all levels of the Party hierarchy, but also the frag-
mentation of the Party leadership following the seizure of power. This fragmenta-
tion of the leadership followed the general pattern of other East European satel-
lites, and reflects the division of the Party into "Muscovites", "westerners", and 
"home" communists. 
The "Muscovites" composed perhaps the most "alien" (i.e., non-Romanian) 
segment of the RWP not only because of their heterogeneous national back-
grounds, but also because their first loyalty was always to the Kremlin center and 
the international at the expense of Romanian needs or capabilities.14 This group 
was represented by such well-known individuals as Ana Pauker, Leonte Rautu, 
Vasile Luka, Dumitru Coliu, and Emil Bodnaras. They were a "rootless" group 
who were often at odds with one another as well as with the "home" and "western" 
communists. What gave them their uniting label was that they had spent most of 
World War II as well as some of the inter-war years in the Soviet Union under the 
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tutorship of Stalin. They returned to Romania on the coat-tails of the Red Army to 
assist and carry to fulfillment the communization of the country.15 
The "westerners" were the smallest of the three above mentioned groups and 
also the least significant. They resembled the "Muscovites" in a number of ways, 
yet they were distrusted by Stalin. Like the "Muscovites" they were also recruited 
predominantly from among the national minorities. Such individuals as Gheorghe 
Gaston-Marin and Petre Borila represent this group-16 
Their major - perhaps only - unifying characteristic is that they had spent the 
war years or part of the 1930's in the West, taking part in the Spanish Civil War or 
later in the resistance movement in France. Like the "Muscovites" they too re-
turned to Romania at the close of hostilities to take part in the communization of 
the country. 
Unlike the above two groups, the "home" communists in Romania were pre-
dominantly (on the leadership level) of Romanian ethnic stock. They had spent 
the war years as well as most of the inter-war years in Romanian prisons. Al-
though they were relatively a more homogeneous lot than the former two groups, 
they were by no means united in outlook. Individuals like Gheorghiu-Dej, 
Apostol, Patrascanu, Ceausescu, Maurer, Dalea, Moghioros, and Draghici made 
up this group.17 While most of them had similar social origins and "religious" 
backgrounds, their unifying characteristic was that they had spent the inhospitable 
inter-war years, as well as World War II, in the country.18 They were, in this sense, 
the group that was welded together most through a common past of travail and 
persecution at the hands of the "bourgeois" and "fascist" authorities. 
From these various elements - "Muscovites", "westerners", and "home" - the 
leadership of the RWP was forged in the immediate post-war years. However, the 
amalgamation of such diverse elements was bound not to last. Even during the 
lifetime of Stalin - who had imposed unity on these elements in the first place19 -
the instability of the Party's composition demanded internal alterations. These al-
terations were provided by a number of purges, of which the Patrascanu purge of 
1948 and the Pauker-Luka-Georgescu purge of 1952 stand out as the most impor-
tant.20 These early purges were later (1957) augmented by the Constantinescu-
Chisinevschi purge which followed close on the de-Stalinization policies of the 
bloc,21 though ideologically not directly related to them. 
The composition of the RWP reflected the change wrought by these purges. 
The change had "Romanianized" the Party in the true sense of the word at the top 
levels of power. It eliminated the most "foreign" members from the Party 
power-structure. Thus, the "aliens" (Pauker, Luka, Georgescu, Chisinevschi, 
Foris, Koffler and numerous lesser figures) received the ax together with a few 
"natives" like Patrascanu and Constantinescu. The net result has been to consoli-
date within the Politburo and the Secretariat the position of the ethnic Romanian 
Party leaders, who had grouped themselves around Gheorghiu-Dej."" 
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Homogenizáljon Begins 
This Romanianized RWP under Gheorghiu-Dej then undertook the task to be­
gin the homogenization of Romania's population. By 1956 he had achieved two 
goals that he had set for himself in 1945; he had broken the back of the old Roma­
nian elite, and he had eliminated his major opponents from the Party leadership. 
He could now undertake the challenge of assimilating the minority nationalities, 
particularly the Hungarians of Transylvania.23 Even before Stalin died, in January 
1953 he had declared that the "nationality question has been solved in Roma­
nia".24 In Romania Stalinism was institutionalized even without Stalin. Even in 
1956 after the Soviet XXth Party Congress, de-Stalinization did not take place. 
Gheorghiu-Dej categorically rejected the need to exercise self-criticism, which 
had been timidly broached by a minuscule minority of the Party's higher echelon, 
including Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevschi. Among the reform com­
munists, among the Hungarians of Romania, the XXth Party Congress and the 
program of the Imre Nagy government had a more far-reaching impact. In March, 
László Szabédi, instructor at the Bolyai University, already raised the question of 
equal opportunity for Hungarians.25 
Romanians needed to make concessions in a few concrete cases. In July 1956 a 
resolution was circulated about the need to raise standards of instruction. Other 
verbal commitments were made for additional instructional and cultural opportu­
nities. Plans were underway for reestablishing Hungarian museums in cities like 
Nagyszalonta. Articles appeared in Előre, the government run daily newspaper, 
promising that the Arad memorial for the martyred heroes of 1849 would finally 
be refurbished. (These had been taken down in 1925!) Some new minority period­
icals also began publication, and there were promises of additional book publish­
ing opportunities as well.26 All this, however, was simply the "one step back". The 
Revolution of 1956 provided Gheorghiu-Dej with the opportunity to take the next 
"two steps forward!" 
It is in this context that the Bolyai University now was targeted for elimination. 
It had survived World War II. It officially became the Universitatea Bolyai din 
Cluj (The Bolyai University of Cluj) in 1946. It survived because it was in the in­
terest of the Petru Groza administration to placate the Hungarian minority. In this 
way he could assure their support for his administration. At the same time it was 
useful to demonstrate to the outside world that Romania was pursuing a tolerant 
policy toward its minorities. The negotiations in Paris leading to the Peace Treaty 
were in part concerned about the future fate of Northern Transylvania.27 Would it 
remain with Romania or would part of it be returned to Hungary? Apparently, the 
retention of the Bolyai University was a convincing argument - used by Foreign 
Minister Tatarescu - to allow Romania to retain all of Transylvania. 
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Unfortunately, the Bolyai University did not long survive the signing of the 
Paris Peace Treaty. Within a decade it was divided, reduced and finally by 1959 
absorbed by the Romanian Babes University. This process was carried out in a se-
ries of campaigns, which culminated in the institution's Romanianization. 
One could argue that Romania under both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu per-
fected the "salami tactics" system of Mátyás Rákosi, at least in the way in which 
they systematically undermined Hungarian instruction at the university level. As 
we have shown above, the nationality policy of the 1944-1947 years responded 
primarily to Romania's desire to retain all of Transylvania. With this in mind all 
kinds of temporary concessions were made to the minorities. The nationality pol-
icy also responded to Soviet hegemóniái demands, to assure that a communist 
government would come to power in Romania. Playing on the insecurities of the 
minorities helped the Communists to power. This required concessions such as 
the "Nationality Statute" and the protection of minority-language institutions, in-
cluding the Bolyai University.28 
The relative enlightenment in minority-majority relations was also due to two 
other factors. One was the role of Petru Groza, the other was the over-representa-
tion of the minorities in the Party organization at higher levels of the hierarchy. At 
least this was the case in 1946-1947, and it also remained characteristic to a more 
limited extent from 1947 to 1952. While Groza was influential in policymaking, 
the minorities fared much better. His outlook was colored by tolerance for diver-
sity and respect for the cultural contributions of all nationalities. In relation to the 
Bolyai University this was clearly demonstrated by his support in 1945 of the re-
tention of thirty instructors, who had Hungarian rather than Romanian citizenship 
prior to 1940.29 However, as Groza lost his influence and the Party apparatchiks 
around Gheorghiu-Dej gained influence, he was less able to stem the tide of Ro-
manian ethnocentrism. 
The changed complexion of the leadership in the Romanian power-structure 
set the stage for the "salami tactics" that characterized the Romanianization of all 
aspects of minority life. This process of planned corrosion began almost at the 
moment that the regime issued the charter for the Bolyai University's right to ex-
ist. It could be argued, perhaps, that this first stage was not a consequence of Party 
planning, but the result of the passive resistance of the Romanian academicians, 
who did not want to see a Hungarian University in Cluj. The most direct result of 
this resistance is that the university buildings were not shared. The Hungarians 
had to move out, and they could not find facilities large enough to house their in-
stitution. This forced them to divide the institution, leaving the legal, humanistic, 
and social science sections in Cluj, while the Medical and Pharmaceutical sections 
moved to Marosvásárhely/Tírgu-Mures.30 This initial forced division of the Uni-
versity was made official in 1948 when the Medical and Pharmaceutical college 
was made independent of the Bolyai University by political decree.31 
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Parallel to this development, the university-level instruction of the institution 
was also undermined. Under the pretext of paying greater heed to ideological 
commitments, the instructors who did not have Romanian citizenship prior to 
1940, were now terminated by non-renewal of their contracts. This meant that 
some of the most well-known scholars could no longer teach at the Bolyai Univer-
sity. A similar process of "weeding" or "purging" also took its toll among the 
Hungarian instructors with Romanian citizenship. Some of the finest instructors 
were charged with being "clerical reactionaries". While most were purged in this 
fashion during the early 1950s, some had already suffered termination as early as 
1947.32 
It is true that the instructors of the Romanian Babes University also suffered 
during these Stalinist purges. However, a close comparison of the effects of these 
purges shows that the damage done to the Bolyai University was much more se-
vere. It disrupted continuity of instruction and undermined the quality of educa-
tion. It also instilled a constant sense of insecurity among the students, not just in 
terms of their personal existence, but in terms of the survival of the Bolyai Univer-
sity. This was accentuated by the recruitment of "politically reliable" replace-
ments, who were not competent in the areas or courses they were supposed to 
teach.33 
Of all the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, the Transylvanian 
Hungarians were perhaps most adversely affected by the 1956 Revolution, both 
immediately and in the long run.34 Until 1956-58 they had an extensive network of 
cultural and educational institutions. From this time on these institutions and asso-
ciated opportunities became the target of cutbacks, outright abolition, or gradual 
erosion. For the Transylvanian Hungarians 1956 was the beginning of extensive 
discrimination and even repression based on their national origin and sense of sol-
idarity with the Hungarians of Hungary. 
During the next two years the Romanian leadership undertook a systematic 
propaganda campaign to discredit the Revolution and its Transylvanian sympa-
thizers. The Revolution was presented as a throwback to the "Horthyist", "fascist" 
past that would have become a threat to the territorial integrity of Romania.35 
Again, the mood that was activated related more to the knee-jerk reactions of the 
Little Entente than to the quest for "socialist solidarity". This campaign came to a 
head a week before the first anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, when the 
Party held a meeting of intellectuals at Cluj.36 At this meeting the Hungarian intel-
lectuals, headed by Lajos Jordáky, engaged in self-criticism of their behavior dur-
ing the previous October. They admitted having succumbed to nationalism and 
having sympathized with the actions of Imre Nagy and other leaders of the "coun-
terrevolution".37 In effect, this meeting documented the "nationalism" and "isola-
tionism" of the Transylvanian Hungarians even at the highest levels. 
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The Romanian leaders began to move against this threat of "nationalism" at the 
first opportunity. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in the summer 
of 1958 meant that the last impediment to Romanian nationalist revival had been 
removed.38 Gheorghiu-Dej and his faction of the leadership immediately set about 
dismantling the Hungarians' remaining cultural institutions. The first major blow 
was aimed at the Bolyai University, which was merged with the Romanian Babes 
University.39 
Actually, the merger of the two institutions was already contemplated before 
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.40 However, the uprising provided it with a pre­
text, which would enable the Party leaders to speed up the process of "unifica­
tion". During the 1955-1956 academic year visits by important party leaders to 
Cluj and the Bolyai University, hinted that the Romanian leadership was thinking 
of "alternative options". Leonte Rautu of the Executive Committee and Miron 
Constantinescu visited with the university's administrators raising questions 
about the placement of graduates and the "excessive" time devoted to Hungarian 
literature in the curriculum.41 Also, during the summer of 1956 steps were taken to 
terminate the instruction of history in Hungarian. Although the university was 
able to stall implementation of this, it was not able to avoid the Party's directives 
to hold round table discussions with administrators and instructors from the Ro­
manian Babes University, which became regular weekly occurrences at the Conti­
nental Hotel.42 
After the Revolution in Hungary broke out during October 1956 everything ac­
celerated.43 Under trumped-up charges of sympathizing with the revolution they 
fired a number of instructors in the Social Studies fields (Géza Saszet, Edit Keszi 
Harmat, etc.) and arrested a group of students in the history department. Then a 
brief lull followed until March 1958, when more arrests and trials took place. The 
Dobai-Komáromi trial was followed by the arrest of talented young university in­
structors, including Gyula Dávid, Elemér Lakó and János Varró. They were ac­
cused of counter-revolutionary agitation for having visited the graves of the poets 
Sándor Reményik and Jenő Dsida during October 1956, singing and reciting their 
poems. The well-known professor Lajos Jordáky was also arrested at this time, as 
were many students in the Department of Hungarian Studies.44 
Then a meeting of the Bolyai student body was called, at which representatives 
of the Young Communist League from Bucharest also participated. Provocative 
questions were asked of the students, and emotions ran high. Eight students were 
arrested and one of them was given a twelve-year prison sentence. A few days 
later the University was visited by Virgil Trofin, the Central Committee member 
with responsibility for youth affairs. For "weakness and indecisiveness" he had 
both the Dean (András Bodor) and Assistant Dean (Zoltán Náhlik) removed from 
their positions.45 
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The next step was to go public with the "Hungarian problem". This took place 
on February 18-22, 1959 at the Bucharest Conference of the Romanian Student 
Association.46 A high-powered government delegation was present at the meeting 
including General Secretary of the Party Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the Minis-
ter of Education Athanasie Joja. Gheorghiu- Dej denounced "isolationism" and 
said that steps must be taken to eradicate the remnants of "national antagonisms". 
This could only be achieved by bringing all students of all nationalities together in 
one institution, where they can build Socialism together as a united and patriotic 
people. All the people who spoke up favored the unification of universities and 
schools. Minister of Education Joja added that even beyond the classroom, it was 
important to give students a sense of national unity via common dormitories and 
other common activities.47 
On February 23rd the Administration of the Bolyai University called a meeting 
of the University Council. The Rector presided and stated that the Assistant Rec-
tor would make a statement that could not be discussed or questioned. The Assis-
tant Rector then stated that the Party and the Ministry of Education had decided -
on the basis of the demands of students from both universities - to unite the two 
universities of Cluj. Pandemonium broke out in the chamber, but the Rector re-
fused to allow anyone to speak. He simply concluded the meeting by saying that 
this decision is in the best interest of all concerned, it will allow for teaching of all 
courses in Hungarian as well as Romanian and at half the cost because it will re-
duce administrative and other forms of duplication. He also called on everyone to 
support the Party and government decision with their active participation in the 
scheduled unification meetings.48 
These meetings began on February 26 and continued until March 5 almost in 
marathon fashion. The objective of these meetings was to build public support for 
the Party's decision and to isolate those who were opposed to it. For this reason 
the Party sent many of its influential leaders to these public sessions, including 
Nicolae Ceausescu, a member of the Presidium, the Minister of Education Joja, 
Ion Iliescu, the president of the Romanian Student Federation (and two-term Pres-
ident of Romania after Ceausescu's fall), and many others. Speakers followed one 
another in a steady stream applauding the Party's decision to "merge" the two uni-
versities. In this atmosphere only three members of the Bolyai staff dared to speak 
up against the unification: Edgár Balogh, István Nagy and László Szabédi.49 
The public meetings were than used to bring pressure on those who were still 
hesitant or noncommital about this decision. Nicolae Ceausescu personally 
guided the intimidation of the individuals who opposed the decision. He ha-
rangued those present by saying that no one should live under the illusion that a 
Swiss model was applicable to Romania. No such "medieval" model was accept-
able in sovereign Romania, where there was no room for Ghettos, and the "isola-
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tion of nationalities". In Romania there was room only for one culture, a culture 
devoted to the construction of Socialism.50 
László Szabédi was picked out for particular pressure, because of his stature in 
the community and at the University. He did not break! When called by 
Ceausescu to present his own views, he presented them in Hungarian as his col-
league Lajos Nagy translated them into Romanian. Ceausescu was livid and pub-
licly castigated him. During subsequent evenings Szabédi was called in for ques-
tioning by the Securitate. This harassment convinced him that he could not alter 
the decision, but he refused to become a party to it. He committed suicide. On May 
5 the Assistant Rector Zoltán Csendes and his wife followed his example.51 
"Unification" in this psychological sense, was then followed by joint commit-
tee discussions between the two universities for the actual implementation of this 
decision. While the "charter" of the Bolyai University was never annulled, no le-
gal document was drawn up to define the rights and obligations of the two institu-
tions in the newly created "Babes-Bolyai University". In this way no one could be 
held accountable for the failure to fulfill obligations. However, the joint commit-
tees did hammer out the future academic program in terms of language use in the 
classroom. Already in this "compromise" it became apparent that the Bolyai fac-
ulty and students would henceforth play second fiddle to the Babes faculty and 
student body. Of all the courses offered at the new unified institution, 137 would 
be offered in Romanian, while only 43 would be in Hungarian. In some areas 
Hungarian was totally excluded (law and economics), while in others it was re-
duced to a few insignificant sections, which were totally eliminated by the middle 
of the 1980s.5" By the time of Ceausescu's overthrow in December 1989 Hungar-
ian instruction survived only in the pedagogical section for Hungarian literature 
and Hungarian language. 
The fate of lower-level educational institutions followed the same pattern; they 
were not eliminated outright, but made subordinate parts of Romanian-language 
grade schools or high schools and subjected to administrative restrictions that un-
dercut their status and standards. These considerations led many Hungarian stu-
dents to take their classes in Romanian rather than in their mother tongue.53 Thus, 
after 1958 the educational system became an unabashed instrument of 
Romanianization. 
Parallel to the elimination of the most important Hungarian educational and 
cultural institutions, the RWP also began to isolate all those intellectuals who 
were too closely tied to their sense of national identity. On November 19, 1956 
Nicolae Ceausescu vehemently denounced "isolationism" and at the same time 
demanded that students fulfill their responsibilities as students, insisting that they 
should apply themselves to their studies rather than activism. The RWP, he said, 
was engaged in constructing factories, including cane processing plants, to which 
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all those students who do not fulfill their responsibilities were to be sent. This 
was a pointed reference to forced labor in the Danube delta region. 
Many, indeed, were sent to participate in such re-educational opportunities and 
many never returned from this experience. Already on December 5,1956 the Cen-
tral Committee received a report from Leonte Rautu and János Fazekas, which 
followed up on Ceausescu's demands. They had gone on a fact-finding trip to Cluj 
between November 23-26, 1956, focusing primarily on the activities of Hungar-
ian intellectuals and the students of the Bolyai University. Their report included 
the observation that many of the intellectuals were infected by the developments 
in Hungary and were skeptical about the "mass basis'" of the Kádár regime.55 Even 
more disturbing was the attitude expressed by Professor Gyula Márton that the 
Hungarians of the Romanian People's Republic are really a part of the Hungarian 
nation. This attitude is a threat to the unity of the state and contradicts Marx-
ism-Leninism. Furthermore, the students want independent student organizations 
unmonitored by the Party. They also want contact with international student orga-
nizations without restrictions. All these required a concerted response from the 
Party and the Securitate.56 
This response was not long in coming. In fact, some of the first arrests already 
preceded the Rautu-Fazekas Report on October 25 when Imre Balázs and 
Tirnován Arisztid Vid were taken into custody. A year later they were both con-
victed of incitement and were given seven-year jail terms. On November 17 
István Várhegyi was also arrested on the same charge and also given a seven-year 
term. These were merely the first of a long series of arrests and show trials that 
continued through the end of 1958. It is not coincidental that they were halted only 
with the merger of the Bolyai and Babes universities on February 22, 1959.57 
Conclusion 
While in the short-run 1956 led to retribution in Budapest as well as Kolozs-
vár/Cluj, in the long-run Hungarians tended to benefit from the glory and the 
global attention that went with heroic rebellion against the Soviet superpower. In 
Transylvania, on the other hand, the impact was negative in terms of both the short 
and long-run. It led to the reprisals of the Gheorghiu-Dcj and Ceausescu adminis-
trations. In the short-run long prison terms and forced labor for thousands fol-
lowed. According to some estimates out of the approximately 30,000 citizens of 
Romania affected, close to one-third were Hungarians. Besides the executions 
and imprisonments, the Hungarian part of the population also lost its most influ-
ential cultural institution, the Bolyai University. However, other cultural and edu-
cational institutions were also eliminated between 1956 and 1959. 
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These developments were a direct consequence of the Romanianization of the 
RWP and the nationalist agendas of leaders like Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu. 
They were also possible because Soviet hegemóniái interests were altered by 
1956. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev altered its policies, utilizing in­
direct control rather than just military occupation. Thus, in the summer of 1958 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romanian territory, enabled the leaders of 
the RWP to chart a more nationalistic course. They used 1956 as the pretext for 
their policies of Romanianization. The most devastating long-range consequences 
were the negative demographic and cultural inroads and the erosion of the Hun­
garian population's cultural institutions in Transylvania. 
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Armed teenagers who fought in the 1956 revolution are preserved in the nation's 
memory as "the kids from Pest", among them, there were several girls who did not 
get a separate designation, however several photographs of them survived and some 
appeared widely in the world press. 
My fellow researcher, a French journalist Phil Casoar, and I selected a captivat-
ing photograph of an armed young man and a young woman wearing a red-cross 
armband that might be described as the extraordinary starting point of our research. 
In November 1956, numerous prominent western weekly magazines published the 
photo; subsequently books, documentary films and exhibitions made it widely 
known. It first appeared as the opening image in a series of articles about the Hun-
garian revolution, entitled "Budapest Heroes", appearing in the magazine Paris 
Match. During the Cold War, the image became well-known in the west as well as 
the east, but it was placed on opposite poles. In the west, the characters were por-
trayed as heroes who defied the Soviet tanks; in socialist Hungary and in the east, 
they were officially considered to be criminals along with other armed rebels. Sub-
sequently, the Hungarian political police used the photos as conclusive evidence 
during trials. In my presentation I use approximately 35 photographs and documents 
related to the Paris Match picture to discuss our investigation since 1999, the fate of 
the young woman appearing in that picture, and the different usages of the Paris 
Match picture. 
Keywords: women in revolution, history of working class women, photographs and 
the 1956 Revolution, biography writing of humbles 
The armed teenagers who fought in the 1956 revolution have been preserved in 
the collective memory as "the kids from Pest". Despite the fact that there were 
several girls among them, and many photographs of them survived, some even 
circulated widely in the world press, they did not get a separate designation. The 
photograph, which is the subject of my analysis, is one of the most emblematic 
shots of the revolution and had the caption: "Les Héros de Budapest" (the Heroes 
of Budapest). This image first appeared as the opening picture for a series of re-
ports written by the newspaper's correspondents, who had been sent to Buda-
Hungarian Studies 20/1 (2006) 
0236-6568/2003/S20.00 © 2006 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
110 ESZTER BALÁZS 
According to the title of Paris Match "our reporters discover the spirit of the revolution in the 
eyes of the couple stopped on the street" 
pest, and appeared on November 10, 1956 m Paris Match. This photograph is cap-
tivating for several reasons: it is a frontal photograph, which is something of a rar-
ity in a war situation, and it depicts an armed young man and a young wounded 
woman wearing a red-cross armband in the foreground. Alongside the well-
known headlines of all revolutions (youth, heroism, romance), the photograph 
also shows a representation of what is very common, a female role in armed con-
flict with the woman providing care and a secure background. 
The lack of a separate designation can be mostly explained by the representa-
tions of women in armed conflicts. Various forms of armed conflict have to be dis-
tinguished when looking at women and their involvement in them. This may be 
due to the fact that for women, revolutions offer a completely different scope than 
a war situation might. In war, the individual does her best to remain silent in the 
interest of the community, whilst revolutions may disrupt existing political struc-
tures and traditional gender relations. Despite the fact that men are naturally better 
suited to getting the most out of the opportunities offered by "great vacations from 
life", nevertheless, revolutions offer women the opportunity to step out of their 
usual environment. This is true even if the majority of women are still allocated 
traditional reproductive roles." The academic literature addressing the role played 
by women during the armed conflicts of modern times cannot bypass stereotypes 
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of women's involvement at the time and subsequently.3 Coexisting stereotypes 
often contradict one another, for example, "while in one respect femininity is as-
sociated in military ideology with (desirable yet despicable) submission, in an-
other - and quite paradoxically - it is associated with a wholly undesirable and 
'dangerous' individualism".4 
In the context of the 1956 revolution - apart from a handful of known female 
figures (Anna Kéthly, Mária Wittner and Ilona Tóth)5 - up until recently there has 
been little academic interest in the role of women as either individuals or as mem-
bers of a group. For this reason, the assessment of their participation has been hin-
dered by general stereotypes of female roles during armed conflict, which are also 
part of the myth of the 1956 narratives.6 According to the first academic evalua-
tion of the role played by women in the 1956 revolution, women's recollections of 
1956 are fragmented and anecdotal in much the same way as the account of other 
participants are.7 At the same time, we should also add that some women became 
suddenly "visible" due to the marks left by the "opened social scope" in the wake 
of the revolution.8 For example, it is thanks to the uprising that those previously 
excluded from political opportunity - because they came from poor families, most 
of them young workers - were provided the opportunity (within certain bounds) 
for political action. Extensive documentation and recollections describe this ef-
fect; even so, we need to handle these with a critical eye, not taking them at face 
value. Several photographs of women survived and some travelled widely in the 
world press at the time and slightly later and subsequently, the Hungarian political 
police used them on occasion as conclusive evidence during trials.9 
Such a well-known photograph became the unusual starting point of the inves-
tigation.10 First of all, we managed to identify the photographer. The American 
who took the photographs, Russ Melcher, was only twenty-six years old and-as a 
freelance photographer for Paris Match - came across the couple on Múzeum 
körút in Budapest at half past seven in the morning of October 30. In the couple he 
discovered the spirit of the revolution. The photographer later recounted that: 
It was a glorious morning on a day of ceasefire and this young couple 
- the boy with the machine gun too large for him and the girl with the 
wound on her face, a red-cross armband and the first aid bag - half 
bohemian, half proletarian, in shabby, worn clothes captivated me; I 
was struck by the realism of the image. ' ' 
Despite the fact that this photograph, which first appeared in Paris Match, 
toured around the international press world,12 not only the fate of those appearing 
in the photograph was unknown but their names were not even known. When, 
along with my French colleague, we still decided to go on an "impossible mis-
sion" and follow the trail of those appearing in the photograph, we had no inkling 
that not only the name of the girl in the photograph would become known to us but 
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so would several important moments in her life.13 After one year of research, we 
eventually stumbled across the young girl's trail: she was called Julianna Sponga 
but everyone knew her simply as Jutka. When the photograph was taken, she was 
nineteen years old and worked in a textile factory. Later we also learned that she 
fled to Switzerland following the revolution and went on to start a family in Aus-
tralia. 4 We also managed to establish contact with her husband, Stephen Toth, 
also of Hungarian origin, and it was from him that we learned that Jutka died on 
May 27, 1990 of throat cancer and - in accordance with her own request - her 
ashes were scattered into the ocean. This meant that Jutka's biographer was forced 
to do without her interpretation of the "life story", the "ideology self-portrait".15 
The aim of the researcher is to thoroughly represent blocks of memory of the 
subject's life, which can only result in a "kaleidoscope-like" biography.16 The aim 
in writing this biography is identical to the democratic ambitions of writing 
women's history and historiography in general and that is to present an individual 
who once lived in the past about whom no specific historical record remains.17 
Similarly to the French historian, Alain Corbin, and who documents the life of the 
French clog maker, Louis-François Pinagot, who lived in the nineteenth century, 
Jutka's biographer has to aim to present the main character's world, surroundings, 
possible likes and dislikes, habits, use of language, network of connections, cir-
cumstances and concept of time and space as well as the determining events in her 
life.K Even though the work of the French academic did not instinctively affect 
the initiation of our research, and possibilities to become familiar with Jutka's life 
were more favourable than in the case of the French clog maker, the questions 
posed by Corbin in his biography were also useful when looking at our research. 
In the twentieth century and within the dictatorship under which Jutka lived, 
one which placed such great emphasis on recording information, there were natu-
rally more surviving documents - directly related to the individual - than in the 
case of Pinagot, who was born at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the 
out-of-the-way, little village of Origny-le-Butin.19 The starting point for our re-
search was a photograph rather than a name, the face was only joined by a name a 
year later.20 Beyond this, in Jutka's case, we have more than the notes that the sup-
pressive system had on her (in Pinagot's case this was local power) to rely on -
which only shed light on Jutka's personality very indirectly, and so we can add 
more questions to those basic ones asked by Corbin. Jutka's face, expression, 
stance and appearance were known to us."1 Further details would come from her 
husband and other individuals who knew her well at the time (colleagues and 
friends from her life in Switzerland and Australia, her comrade in arms - László 
Jánoky - who fled to Canada in 1956, as well as one of her sisters-in-law and her 
neighbours from Csepel). Our research was based on interviews with these figures 
from her past so that the personality and the fate of the nineteen-year-old tex-
tile-factory worker walking on Múzeum körút became accessible to us, albeit in a 
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limited form. In this study, in presenting information and sources on Jutka, we 
hope that, while sorting out the data, we will come closer to mapping out the prob-
lems of her biography. 
The Life Story Behind the Paris Match Photograph 
Julianna Sponga was born on October 29, 1937 in Tatárszentgyörgy, which 
lies only fifty kilometres from Budapest, as the only girl in a large humble fam-
ily. During the war, this family, which had lived from agricultural work in the 
area around the capital city - similar to many of their kind - came to settle in Bu-
dapest. Due to links with their earlier lifestyle and the work opportunities offered 
by the steelworks in Csepel, the family moved to 32 Jegenye street, in the garden 
suburb of Csepel, one of the most characteristic working-class areas of Buda-
pest.23 Jutka's father, István Sponga, was a worker in the Csepel steelworks. 
Jutka's sister-in-law and neighbours from Csepel said that he drank heavily and 
had a tendency for violence."4 Her mother, Erzsébet Tóth, was illiterate and 
worked as a domestic housewife. Jutka had three elder brothers and one younger. 
When she was seven Jutka started manual labour in agriculture. It was close to 
their home in a private vegetable growing settlement in Soroksár. Later, similarly 
to the mass of women who moved in from the villages, she also ended up in the 
textile works and in her case this was the Sortex factory in Soroksár. The photo-
graphs which depict her in the fields and standing next to machinery in the factory 
- the woman coming from agriculture into the factory - also offer a plastic image 
of the changes in her dress and hairstyle as well as her new working conditions 
and establish a starting point for the anthropology typical of a woman working in 
the textile industry at the beginning of the 1950s. These pictures also show that 
Jutka had a tattoo on her lower ann which was not very rare among workers from 
that period.25 She acquired the tattoo visible in the photographs between the ages 
of 17 and 18.26 It was perhaps because of her older male siblings (who, similarly to 
the younger brother, are no longer alive) or because of her strict parents (neigh-
bours from the time, the Taschlers, said that the Sponga couple were closer to their 
sons) that Jutka, who worked in the textile factory, happily sought the company of 
"street men" in Csepel.27 From the records surviving in the Hungarian Prison Ser-
vice Archives, we know that she was arrested three times between the ages of 15 
and 17 for "penal idleness" and "vagrancy".28 She was only detained for two days 
on a couple of occasions but the third incident led to a sentence of six months in 
prison of which she finally served only four months and fifteen days in the infa-
mous detention facility at Marko.29 In Jutka's case, it can be said that, prior to the 
1956 revolution, she came into serious conflict with the oppressive regime as a 
"recidivist". If we call on the identity-crisis definition of "psychohistory" for help, 
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Jutka in the vegetable growing settlement in the suburbs of Budapest 
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Jutka as a textile factory worker of the Sortex 
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we can state that in Jutka's case the "lifestyle-rebellion" of a young individual, 
with an immature identity against the adult world received a political content, 
which naturally expanded as the "opened social scope" offered opportunity for 
this in October 1956.30 
We do not know what exactly happened to Jutka in the days before the Paris 
Match photograph was taken and what it was that caused her to decide to join the 
armed uprising. The events leading up to this turning point in her life still remain 
unknown to us.31 Of her siblings, it is known that Károly took an active part in the 
fighting at Csepel.32 At the same time, her brother, who served in the ÁVH (Hun­
garian Secret Police), remained loyal to the system in the days of the revolution.33 
(As part of the "silent assimilation policy"34 of the Stalinist regime, Jutka's elder 
brothers Hungarianised their name from Sponga to Solymosi in around 1953.35 
This understandably hindered our research of the family.) According to Rózsa 
Solymosi, István's widow, one of Jutka's elder brothers, Jutka was involved in a 
tragic experience directly before the beginning of the revolution, which most defi­
nitely had a determining effect on her decision tojóin the struggle at the time of 
the first Soviet intervention. Her younger brother had thrown stones at the Soviet 
tanks approaching Hősök tere (Heroes' Square) in Soroksár and was shot dead.36 
The earliest data following the Paris Match photograph, which was succeeded 
by other photographs taken the same day of the Paris Match couple at Felsza­
badulás tér (Liberation square, today Ferenciek tere) by Italian photographer, 
Mario De Biasi and one photograph taken only of her as a member of a fighting 
group by Dutch photographer, Dominique Beretty on Múzeum körút37 comes 
from November 4. Jutka got caught up in the street fighting in the 8th District on 
the day of the second Soviet intervention. It was then that she joined the group 
from Vajdahunyad street38 of which, as well as many others, Mária Wittner was a 
member (it was then that Jutka sustained an injury to her shoulder and that is why 
she ended up in hospital).39 When several members of the group from 
Vajdahunyad street decided to flee, they took Jutka along with them from the hos­
pital. According to László Jánoky, who later emigrated to Canada and who was 
the brother of the group's second in command, they took the unconscious Jutka 
across the Danube in a row boat.41 Then they made their way on foot and later in a 
truck to the Austrian border. They reached Eisenstadt on November 9 and this is 
where reporters, Massimo Mauri and Maurizio de Biasi, from the Italian maga­
zine Epoca, discovered Jutka. In the interview carried by Epoca, they noted that 
the young man who appeared next to Jutka in the famous photograph was called 
György, and that he died in the fighting.42 The Hungarian refugees, fifteen people, 
first went from Eisenstadt to the refugee camp in Traiskirchen;43 they were then 
directed to Switzerland via Vienna. 
On November 13 the Swiss authorities granted the group of Hungarian refu­
gees permission to settle in the French-Swiss town of Neuchâtel. Their numbers 
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had eventually swollen to a total of seventy-two. They were provided with accom-
modation in what was referred to as the "Chanet House" on the side of the hill next 
to the lake. A local journalist interviewed several of them and made mention of 
Jutka's name in one of the two reports carried in the local newspaper called La 
Feuille d'Avis. In August 1957 she came to La Chaux-de-Fonds next to the 
French-Swiss border and took up a position as a worker in the local Steinmann 
textile works at the beginning of 1958 and was employed along with ten other 
Hungarians.45 She lived at 17 rue des Champs with the Etter family who also 
worked for Steinmann. René Hess, who was employed as a manager at the factory 
at the time, recalled that Jutka came to see him to help her find a doctor who would 
be willing to remove the tattoos that she had on her body. He directed her to a doc-
tor he knew who had previously been involved in cosmetic surgery and who car-
ried out the procedure. 
Jutka decided to leave Switzerland in 1961, and she sailed to Australia on the 
ocean liner, Oceania, on March 24. Her passage was financed by ICEM, an 
international organisation of help to refugees.46 It was in October of the same year 
that she met Steven Tóth (István Tóth) at the Hungarian club in Melbourne who 
later became her husband. He had also fled Hungary in 1956 but he did not take 
part in the revolution as he was a conscripted soldier at the time. After their two 
children were born, Jutka no longer worked and she remained a housewife for the 
rest of her life. She gained Australian citizenship in 1972 and lived in one of Mel-
bourne's suburbs. Jutka corresponded with her parents who - her husband claims 
- talked her out of returning home because they were frightened that the photo-
graph published in Match, which they had seen published in Hungary, would lead 
to her being recognised by the Hungarian police who would hold her to account.47 
We only know of one specific interpretation of the photograph from Match in 
Hungary before the political transition. It appeared in Ervin Hollos's infamous 
propaganda book, published in two editions in 1967,48 with the caption: "The un-
derworld in arms".49 Ervin Hollós - who, after 1957, headed the Political Police 
Inner Reaction-Prevention Department (Ministry of the Interior, II/5) - collected 
the photographic material for his book from the police archive known as the 
"1956 Separate Collection".50 This archive contains photographs and newspaper 
clipings, from Western magazines, related to the revolution, and in the prepara-
tions preceding the 1956 trials the police used these to try to ascertain who ap-
peared in them. Four clipings of Jutka repeatedly appear in the collection: the 
Paris Match picture (the photo of the third male figure was filed with a separate 
cliping) as well as the three other pictures carried in Epoca (one of these shows 
Jutka as a member of a rebel group on Múzeum körút and the other two were taken 
of her in Eisenstadt).51 Each photograph was given its own filing reference num-
ber and there was a note in pencil next to the Match photograph saying that the girl 
in the picture had "defected". 
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Both the fear of Jutka's parents and her own fears seem founded in light of the 
dossier started by the Hungarian Central Alien Control Office in 1976.52 At the 
same time, from her Ministry of the Interior registration, it appears that Jutka's 
name and the photograph taken of her in 1956 were not successfully linked either 
directly following the reprisals or afterwards. The fact that she had immigrated to 
Australia was unknown to them, as she was recorded as being "stateless". Accord-
ing to the Central Alien Control Office material - it is not clear why from July 
1978 - she was included in the list of prohibited persons and her data was trans-
ferred to the combined computerised records (EGPR) of the state security organi-
sations in 1985. Her inclusion in the list of prohibited persons was reconfirmed 
annually until June 26 1989, which is the day that registration was discontinued. It 
is a double tragedy that Jutka passed away less than a year after her name was re-
moved from the records. 
The Afterlife of the Paris Match Photograph 
The interpretations of the Paris Match photograph by the Hungarian Ministry 
of Interior were not unique. During the Cold War, the Paris Match photograph, 
with Jutka and György in the foreground, gained totally different meanings on the 
two sides of the Iron Curtain.53 In the West, they appeared as David's fighting the 
Goliath of the soviet oppressors and their tanks. In the East, mostly articulated by 
the Communist Kádár-regime of Hungary, they were described as toughs moti-
vated by Fascists, as representatives of counterrevolutionary movement opposing 
the Proletariat and the power of the people. The photograph appeared several 
times as an illustration in propaganda or reference books and even on a postcard. 
The cover of Andy Anderson's Hongrie 1956: la Commune de Budapest, les 
conseils ouvriers [Hungary 1956: Commune of Budapest, the Workers' Councils] 
published in 1975, was a publication in the West guided by an extreme leftist ide-
ology, emphasising the importance of Workers' Councils in the 1956 Revolu-
tion.54 Also the Match picture appears on a postcard with the motto "Souvenir de 
Budapest" which was possibly produced by a French situationist group in the 
1970s, who pointed towards the spontaneous and libertine aspects of the events in 
Hungary in 1956.55 Among works of authors of Hungarian origin we need to men-
tion: 23 octobre 1956. Budapest - Ce jour-là [23rd October 1956. That Day- Bu-
dapest] by the journalist Tibor Méray and Az elhagyott tömeg. Tanulmányok 
1950-1956-ról [The Abandoned Crowd. Studies on 1950-1956] by the historian 
László Varga.56 This latter was a book published in Hungary after the transition of 
1989 and showed the photograph on its cover. 
Moreover, one could also mention a rather artistic interpretation of the Paris 
Match photograph, which also appeared in a Jean-Luc Godard's film entitled Le 
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Petit Soldat (The Little Soldier) and was made in 1958 but only premiered in 1963 
for its unusual approach to politics: Godard's film tells the story of an ex-army ter­
rorist, not having any strong political feelings, who is hired to kill an Algerian 
journalist and symphatizer. In one of the most characteristic scenes of the film the 
Paris Match picture appears, but cut into two so that the word "hero" is missing, 
perhaps because The Little Soldier is an anti-hero's story. 
The Paris Match photograph is a fascinating historical subject for three rea­
sons: first because it helps us to have better knowledge about the stories of women 
and, in general, freedom fighters coming from poor families participating in the 
Hungarian revolution; second because it illuminates the role that foreign photog­
raphers played in shaping representations of the revolution; and third because it 
helps us to understand the various interpretations of the 1956 photographs during 
the Cold War. 
Notes 
The present paper is an extended version ofthat previously published in a women's history 
volume: "Sponga Julianna, az 'ismeretlen ismerős': egy világot járt 56-os fénykép női 
szereplőjének sorsa", in Palasik, Mária-Sipos, Balázs-Tóth, Eszter Zsófia. Házastárs, 
munkatárs, vetélytárs? A női szerepek változása a családban, a munkahelyen és a közéletben a 
20. századi Magyarországon (Wife, Colleague, Concurrence? Changing Roles of Women in 
Family Life, at Work and in Public Life in 20th Century Hungary) (Budapest: Napvilág, 2005), 
220-229. An English translation ofthat paper was also published: "Tracking Down the 'Girl 
from Pest' on an Emblematic Photo of the Revolution of 1956" in Regimes and Transforma­
tions. Hungary in the Twentieth Century, edited by István Feitl and Balázs Sipos (Budapest: 
Napvilág, 2005), 353-370. 
Perrot, Michelle. "Stepping Out", \x\A History of Women in the West. IV. Emerging Feminism 
from Revolution to World War, eds. Friesse, Geneviève-Michelle Perrot (Cambridge-Massa-
chusetts-London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993), 480-481. 
Macdonald, Sharon. "Drawing the Lines - Gender, Peace and War: An Introduction", in Im-
ages of Women in Peace and War, eds. Macdonald Sharon-Pat Holden-Shirley Ardener 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 3, 15-16. 
4
 Ibid., 16. 
5
 Anna Kéthly (1889-1976) Politician. As member of the Social Democratic Party, she was 
elected to Parliament after the First World War. By 1948, as opposition politician, she had 
been imprisoned by commmunist government. During the Revolution of 1956, she became a 
member of the coalition government of Imre Nagy, formed on November 3. Kéthly went into 
exile and in 1957 became head of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council in Strassbourg; Mária 
Wittner ( 1937-) Mária Wittner, of working class origins, was arrested in 1957 - tried and sen-
tenced to be hanged the following year - for having fought as an armed combatant in the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1958. She was re-
leased in 1970; Ilona Tóth (1933-1957) a graduating doctor who was healing the wounded of 
the 1956 Revolution at a Budapest hospital, was accused of the murder of a wounded member 
of the ÁVH (Hungarian Secret Police) and executed in 1957. The role of Ilona Tóth in the 1956 
Revolution is still object of controversy. 
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6
 Juhász, Borbála. The Memory of 1956. A Gendered Transcript (Budapest: CEU, 1998/50), 1 
and 29. The majority of women worked in kitchens or tended to the injured during the revolu­
tion. Some of them accepted the role of intermediary and helped in the distribution of food sup­
plies. We do not know how many of these women used weapons because very few of them 
make mention of this: See ibid., 47. 
7
 Ibid., 2-3. 
For more information on this topic see Pető, Andrea. Nöhistóriák: A politizáló magyar nők 
történetéből 1945-1951 (Women's Histories: From the History of Politicising Hungarian 
Women 1945-1951) (Budapest: Seneca, 1998), 11. 
It is primarily those pictures, which easily became condemning evidence that depicted women 
belonging to the insurgent groups with weapons in their hands: it is known from the trial of 
Mária Wittner and associates that the photograph taken of Mária Wittner and Katalin Havrila 
Sticker provided conclusive proof, although they insisted that they only posed for the photo­
graph. See Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (hereafter HAHSS), Trial of 
Mária Wittner and Associates, V-14 2941. 
The whole research is presented in a book prepared by Les Arènes Publishing: Phil 
Casoar-Eszter Balázs, Les Héros de Budapest (Paris: Les Arènes, 2006). In a shorter form -
primarily focusing on the photographer - in the October 2004 edition of National Geographic 
which carried the latest results of our research. See Balázs, Eszter. "Ő volt a pesti lány" (She 
Was the Girl from Pest), National Geographic Magyarország, No. 10 (2004), 126-133. 
Interview with Russ Melcher in May 2002. Melcher also recalls that, after nine in the morning, 
the news spread among the insurgents that they should not let photographs be taken of their 
faces. (The names of two other photographers, Franz Goëss and Jean-Pierre Pedrazzini, appear 
on the contact sheets in the Paris Match archive. It also took time to identify and discover the 
whereabouts of Melcher as the actual photographer.) 
This most definitely appeared in the world's press among photographs taken of Hungarian 
women and photographs with a political theme, the photograph that we selected being the most 
well-known after the photograph taken for the article on Júlia Rajk and her husband. Andrea 
Pető reminds us in her book that this latter photograph made the entire world's press. Pető, 
Andrea. Rajk Júlia. Feminizmus és történelem sorozat {Júlia Rajk. Women and History Se­
ries) (Budapest: Balassi, 2001), 8. 
We continued to research the boy in the picture holding a machine gun and the man holding the 
pistol. In October 2003, a report was shown as part of the television programme called Fókusz 
- one of the most popular shows on the Hungarian commercial television channel, RTL Klub-
which featured this photograph. There were no relatives among those who responded to our 
call made for family members and friends. In a report made with Jutka in 1956, the girl claims 
that the boy appearing in the picture was called Gyuri (shortname of György) and he was killed 
in the fighting. (We will return to this report later on.) The man with the pistol goes on to ap­
pear in a photograph taken on Köztársaság tér (Republic square) by the British photographer, 
John Sadovy, who had been exiled from Czechoslovakia in 1938, and was one of the photo­
graphs taken at the time of the siege of Party headquarters which were published by Life maga­
zine. (See Gadney, Reg. Cry Hungaiy! (New York: Atheneum, 1986).) 
The Australian journalist, Frank Bren, who helped to trace Jutka in Melbourne, discussed our 
research on Jutka in Memento, the journal of the Australian National Archives. See 
http://www.naa.gov.au/Publications/memento "Searching for Julia of Budapest" 
pdf/memento30.pdf. 
3
 Here I use Andrea Pető's expression. Pető. Rajk Júlia. 9-10. For the time being, chances are 
slim that at least an autobiography or even letters of her would have survived. Documents from 
the Sortex works, Jutka's former workplace - not including the material of the party commit-
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tee - have not survived either (based on information supplied by the Budapest Municipal Ar­
chive, its reference section in Óbuda and the Pest County archive). There is no sign of the fac­
tory's own newspaper. 
Andrea Pető quotes Liz Stanley. Pető. Rajk Júlia, 11. 
1
 In Hungarian historical writing looking at the period after 1945 - due to the generous and, in 
good cases, accessible resources - for the time being, it has only been the privilege of known 
politicians and the intelligentsia to have biographies written on them. 
The renowned French historian, Alain Corbin, undertook a special challenge: he picked a 
name from the register of a remote county in 19th-century France - the only criterion being 
that the life of the individual should not be too short - and he set about writing his biography. 
The only personal sign left by the illiterate Louis-François Pinagot was a shaky cross signed 
next to his name: Corbin took this as his starting point and tried to reconstruct for posterity the 
hidden and inaccessible life of Pinagot, whom he had selected and referred to as the "man 
without characteristics". This research was then published and is available in both French and 
English. Corbin, Alain. Le Monde retrouvé de Louis-François Pinagot. Sur les traces d'un 
inconnu (1798-1876) (Paris: Flammarion, 1998). 
19
 In his book, Corbin draws attention to the fact that, prior to the 20th century, written records on 
the "masses" largely survive related to poverty, catastrophes and wars and that is why research 
results which rely solely on these may be one-sided. 
The first more serious clue for us to explore was the interview with Jutka which appeared in the 
November 1956 of the Italian magazine Epoca. This tells us that the girl appearing in the pic­
ture was called Jutka, was 19 years old and textile worker. Reporters from Epoca discovered 
her in Eisenstadt in Austria based on the "notorious" photograph that appeared in Paris Match. 
21
 It transpired from the surviving records from the archives of the Hungarian Prison Service Ar­
chives (hereafter HPSA) - Jutka was taken into the Marko, one of the main prison three times 
before 1956 for penal idleness - that Jutka had brown eyes and brown hair; she was 158 cm 
tall. (See later analysis of her files.) 
Tatárszentgyörgy today is still one of the furthest points from Budapest within Pest County -
the railway and mainroad still avoid its boundaries - the village might just as well be in the 
centre of the country. The characteristics of the area - rough land covered in juniper bushes -
never favoured agriculture by the local population. 
23
 The father still enjoyed helping out with agricultural work while employed at the Csepel 
Works. Interview with the Taschler family, May 2003. 
24
 In May 2003 (based on the files created on Jutka in the 1950s by the HPSA) we went to visit 
Jegenye utca and, based on the old address, we knocked on the door of the neighbours (30 
Jegenye street), who were very happy to help us with our research. They introduced us to 
Jutka's sister-in-law, Rózsa Solymosi (widow of István Solymosi) living at 27 Jegenye street 
who only knew Jutka based on what she had been told by her husband. István Solymosi died in 
2002 and had not seen his sister since 1956 and he had not known of her death in 1990. 
25
 Tattoos forming part of "urban folklore" in the 1950s in Hungary affected a wide band of soci­
ety. See, for example: Kovács, Ákos-Sztrés, Erzsébet, Tetovált Sztálin. Szovjet elítéltek 
tetoválásai és karikatúrái (A Tattooed Stalin. The World and Art of Bandits in the Soviet Un­
ion) (Szeged: Sprint GMK-Népszava, 1989), 10. There is, however, no data on quite how 
widespread tattooing was, not only amongst workers but also female workers. We do not as yet 
have any information on what symbols were hidden in the tattoos visible in the photograph. 
René Hess, later Jutka's colleague in Switzerland recalls she had a snake on her right arm and 
two crossed fists on her left arm. Mária Soós, also Hungarian and a colleague living in Switzer­
land, recalls that Jutka had tattoos on her stomach as well as her arms. Interview with René 
Hess and Mária Soós, July 2002. 
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Only the last of the three files found in the HPSA (the one from 1955) mention that she had a 
tattoo and the one before (from 1954) does not. This means that the tattoos visible on her arm 
were acquired somewhere between 1954 and 1955. The chronological filing references of the 
files: 1. from 1952: 509-A-931; 2. from 1954: 32-A-679; 3. from 1955: 40-A-012 (HPSA). 
We know very little about Sortex for the present and even less from Jutka's perspective. Only a 
general picture is available from the Party committee material - also with the area we high-
lighted between 1950 and 1956 - of the work conditions in the factory, conflicts between the 
workers and the party leaders, the over-pushed work effort. The material from the Sortex Party 
committee is to be found among the materials for the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Bu-
dapest District Committee (Hungarian National Archive Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party 
Budapest District Committee, records from the Sortex factory). It is here that Jutka was most 
likely to have directly felt the interference by the state in her everyday life. For further back-
ground on the relationship between the youth and the state with reference to the Rákosi era and 
with special attention paid to Csepel, see Kürti, László. Youth and the State in Hungary, Capi-
talism, Communism and Class (London-Sterling: Pluto Press, 2002), 82-101. 
Under the employment section on the HPSA files, the following data is listed. In the 1952 file: 
completed school studies at the age of 14 and a year later was working as an apprentice "textile 
worker". Her class background was "working class". In the 1954 file she was merely described 
as a "casual worker" and was therefore no longer seen as being qualified. The following can be 
read in the 1955 file: "parasite", "unemployed". Inasmuch as we rely on the files, it transpires 
that between the ages of 15 and 18, Jutka's status as seen by the state continuously declined. 
Her husband claims that she was arrested in 1955 for fly-posting; this information has not been 
supported by another source. 
Even though mention is made in the file that sentence was passed, there is, as yet, no other ref-
erence made to this sentence. 
For background information on the identity-crisis term related to psychohistory adolescence, 
see Erikson, Erik H., A fiatal Luther és más írások (The Young Luther and Other Writings), 
(Budapest, 1991), 368. György Kövér refers to Erikson from this point of view in his book on 
Géza Losonczy, participant of the Revolution 1956: see Losonczy Géza (1917-1957) (Buda-
pest, 1956-os Intézet, 1998), 85-86. 
It would be fascinating to gain an answer to the question of how Jutka saw the 1956 Revolution 
and whether she saw it as being instrumental in her life and, if so, whether she also saw it as be-
ing instrumental for the country. Her husband recalls that, in the early days of his relationship 
with Jutka, she claimed that had taken up arms in the street fighting. Her colleagues from Swit-
zerland also claimed that Jutka told them that she had fought with a weapon during the revolu-
tion. One of them also recalled that there was a picture hanging on her wall showing her with a 
weapon in her hand. (Until now we could not find this photograph.) It is also true that Jutka 
only told her Swiss colleagues about the revolution and she did not readily speak about this in 
front of her fellow Hungarian émigrés. (Interview with Jutka's former, Swiss colleague, René 
Hess, July 2002.) It is also fascinating to know what makes part of her representation shaped 
by herself later, in Australia. Respective recollections of the husband, Steven Toth and the 
younger son, Steve about her fight against János Kádár just as a Russain general during the 
Revolution are telling much about how myths arise in exile. Interview with Steven Toth and 
Steve juinor in March 2005. 
The following is written in the file in the Ministry of the Interior records created in 1966 on 
Károly Sponga, born in 1935: "From November 4th, 1956, he fought as an actual artillery 
commander of the Hungarian army with the anti-revolutionaries from Csepel against the So-
viet troops. He fired at an armoured car and its military personnel were shot in the head by 
armed men. No proceedings were initiated against him." Based on the file, it also transpires 
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that he also used the Solymosi surname earlier (we will return to this point later on) and he 
worked as a knife-grinder in Nyíregyháza (Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 
(HAHSS) file on Károly Sponga). (Károly Sponga was summoned to appear at the trial of 
Sándor Körösi and associates and although he was not sentenced, a file was opened on him. 
HAHSS, Sándor Körösi and associates, Investigatory Section of II Department of Ministry of 
Defence, June 26th, 1957. V-143 818.) 
33
 Jutka's eldest brother, József- a qualified arms technician - served with the ÁVH (Hungarian 
Secret Police) between 1950 and 1959. As a member of the newly-formed armed force, which 
played an active role in the suppression of the 1956 revolution, he was entrusted with the col­
lection of ownerless weapons after the revolution, and their distribution to members of the 
armed force. That is why he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and also received the "For 
People's Power" decoration. He was forced to resign in 1959 because of his younger sister's 
defection, news of which had reached his superiors in the interim period. József Solymosi 
served in the special armed forces of the communist regime from the age of twenty and quickly 
built a military career for himself. When he was forced to resign, he was able to find work as an 
apprentice locksmith. As a former minion of the communist regime, he was never able to over­
come this sudden break in his career and he went on to commit crimes: he started with fraud, 
theft and robbery before finally committing murder for which he was tried in 1966 and exe­
cuted. In appeal against this severe sentence, mention made of his past in the AVH was not 
considered to provide alleviating circumstances. In the eyes of the regime, József Solymosi's 
crimes were probably seen as betrayal of earlier favouritism and ultimately the regime itself. 
See trail of József Solymosi, XVI. 2115/1966, Central Archives of the Budapest Municipal 
Court. 
Karády, Viktor-István Kozma. Név és nemzet. Családnév-változtatás, névpolitika és nem­
zetiségi erőviszonyok Magyarországon a feudalizmustól a kommunizmusig (Name and Nation. 
Surname Change, Name Politics and Nationality Power Relations in Hungary from Feudalism 
to Communism) (Budapest: Osiris, 2002), 340-341. "The Stalinist regime in Hungary created 
a type of silent-assimilation policy but not in the name of some form of nation state building 
concept but stemming from an indifference to the problems and needs of ethnic minorities, oc­
casionally as a result of distrust." 
The other reason for the name change may have been dissociation with their father's name 
who was a heavy drinker and had allegedly spent time in prison. See appeal worded by József 
Solymosi himself in the original copies of the criminal investigation documentation against 
József Solymosi II., Criminal Investigation Section of Investigative Department of Budapest 
Police Headquarters, B51055/1966, 4. Central Archives of Budapest Municipal Court. 
j 6
 Of her Swiss friends, Fritz Zaugg recalls Jutka telling him that she herself had witnessed the 
event. Interview with Fritz Zaugg, June 2003. On the contrary, according to Mrs Taschler, the 
neighbour, Jutka did not witness the death of her younger brother. Interview with Mrs 
Taschler, May 2003. 
This latter was published by the Italian magazine, Epoca (on November 11), but the previous 
ones - coming from the personal archives of Mario De Biasi - have been undeveloped until 
now. Since several members of this fighting group appearing on Beretty picture participated in 
the siege of the Communist Party headquarters, Köztársaság tér (Republic square) - they 
reappear on other pictures taken during the siege - there are some chances that Jutka and 
György also were at Köztársaság tér. 
38
 László Eörsi dedicates a whole chapter of his book, Corvinisták, 1956, on the Vajdahunyad 
street group and even though he considers Julianna Sponga as a member of the group, he does 
note that information on her is contradictory. It is important to note that Eörsi's information on 
Julianna Sponga relies solely on the Wittner trial material. As Jutka only joined the group on 
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November 4th, Eörsi - during his research into the group from Corvin köz - cannot have come 
across her name in any other way. See Eörsi, László, Corvinisták, 1956. A VIII. kerület 
fegyveres csoportjai (Corvinists, 1956. The Armed Gangs of the 8th District) (Budapest: 
1956-os Intézet, 2001 ), 239-255. 
In the trial of Mária Wittner and associates, Katalin Havrila Sticker and Mária Wittner make 
mention of her name but of the two of them, it transpires from Mrs. Havrila's account that she 
really did know Jutka. Katalin and Jutka went together to Switzerland from Austria from 
where Mrs. Havrila returned to her death. (She was executed for her role in the revolution: a 
photograph where she appears with a gun was conclusive evidence during her trial.) Mrs. 
Havrila said of Jutka that: "Julianna Sponga was about nineteen and as far as I know she 
worked in Soroksár at the market-garden and more recently at the Sortex textile works, she 
was a resident of Soroksár. [...] She didn't belong to our group, she joined us on the 4th when 
we were no longer fighting. As far as I know, she didn't fight in other groups either." (Minutes, 
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Two major structural designs characterize the cerebral cortex: the scalable, modular 
neocortex and the single-module hippocampus. Functions attributed to the hippo-
campal formation have varied over the past several decades and include episodic 
memory in human lesion studies, spatial mapping in single unit recordings and vol-
untary exploration of the environment in field recording studies in animals. I sug-
gest that the common thread across these parallel developments is that each captures 
the essence of episodic coding: items are organized in spatio-temporal context. I 
suggest that theta oscillations, studied extensively in the Grastyán school in Pécs, is 
the key temporal metric. Ordered sequences of items are encoded by the strict tem-
poral relations of hippocampal cell assemblies nesting within cycles of theta oscilla-
tion. Such a temporal compression mechanism brings neuronal assemblies together 
in the time window of synaptic plasticity and allows the linking of first order (neigh-
bor) and higher order relations. Seven to nine interleaving assemblies, representing 
overlapping past, present and future items, can be combined into an episode in a sin-
gle theta cycle. During recall, the entire hippocampal connection matrix can be 
searched in the time period of the theta cycle (120 -140 msec). I suggest that the hip-
pocampus is an efficient search engine for the reconstruction of complex episodes 
from fragmentary information. 
Keywords: memory, cell assemblies, random graph, autoassociator, unit activity, 
Pécs, Hungarian, hippocampus, brain oscillations, voluntary 
What Makes Us Individuals? 
When it comes to the complex organization of the brain, we tend to think of the 
large cerebral cortex. Its structure and the functions its anatomical organization 
supports are tuned mainly to detect orderly, species- and individual-invariant rela-
tionships in our environment. The perceptions of natural scenes, speech and mu-
sic, body image as well as our occasional illusions can be attributed largely to the 
unique organization of the isocortex. Brains with these features only would be 
useful as long as they are embedded in an unchanging environment. However, we 
Hungarian Studies 20/1 (2006) 
0236-6568/2003/S20.00 © 2006 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
128 GYÖRGY BUZSÁKI 
live in an ever-changing world and numerous events, relevant to our survival and 
happiness, occur independent of us in an idiosynchratic manner. Detecting and 
storing all random events and relations around us are virtually impossible by any 
imaginable hardware. Furthermore, perception and storage of all that junk does 
not have any personal significance, anyway. Except the ones that do. Our names, 
birthdates of loved ones, and other important family events are our unique experi-
ences, which do not simply unfold by some external rules. Such arbitrary associa-
tions must be first internalized in our brain for later retrieval to assist in future 
evaluations and decision-making. Forming and storing of individual experiences 
create a knowledge base, a unique brain-based context that modifies the way the 
neocortex processes future sensory experiences and contingencies. The accumu-
lation of past experiences, collectively called memory, is responsible for creating 
individual identity. The emergence of individuality and personal identity are 
therefore strongly linked to mechanisms that enable the animal to recollect the 
past and modify its future behavior on the basis of these recollections. There is 
nothing in the physical world that would tell us whether a face is pleasant or repel-
lent to us. The same face may be judged as beautiful or ugly on the basis of cumu-
lative past experiences of the different observers (Buzsáki, 2004). 
What are these experiences and where are they stored? Experiences stored in 
the brain are usually divided into two major categories: implicit and explicit. An 
engineer would call them automatic and supervised. For a psychologist, the term 
explicit or "declarative" means that such experiences have "conscious" recollec-
tions and can be declared verbally. They include life-time episodes unique to an 
individual, such as our first date, or the births of our children, or learning arbitrary 
facts related to the world we live in, such as the distinction between the brain 
structures neocortex and hippocampus. These latter factual or semantic memories 
lack a unique personal link. In contrast to these consciously experienced memo-
ries, the implicit experience of learning how to walk comfortably in high heel 
shoes or habituation to the annoying sound of the traffic when living next to the 
highway does not require that we are aware of the process (Squire, 1992). 
Forming and storing arbitrary associations requires a suitable structure with a 
large number of connections randomly organized. The six-layer neocortex with 
its regular modular architectonics and mostly local wiring is far from ideal for 
such a task. A large part of the modularly organized neocortex is tuned to extract 
statistical regularities of the world conveyed by our sensors. But there is another 
piece of cortex, the "other cortex," or, in our Hellenistic scientific jargon, the 
allocortex below and medial to the neocortical mantle. As I will argue, the hippo-
campus contains a large arbitrary synaptic "space," which is ideally built for the 
construction of episodes and temporal sequences from arbitrary relations. 
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Hypothesized Functions of the Hippocampal System 
Starting with the famous patient H. M. with bilateral surgical removal of the 
hippocampus, a consensus emerged among human psychologists that the hippo-
campus and associated structures are responsible for declarative (episodic and se-
mantic) memories (Scoville and Milner et al., 1957). However, the mechanism of 
encoding and retrieving information has remained a major challenge for future 
work. 
A major hurdle has to do with the definition. Episodic memory is claimed to be 
uniquely human, which endows the individual with the capacity to reference per-
sonal experiences in the context of both time and space (Tulving, 1987). It is these 
life-long experiences, representing unique events through space-time that give 
rise to the feeling of the self and are the source of individuality. Singular episodes 
can reemerge through the process of free recall. With such definition, how are we 
expected to work out physiological mechanisms of declarative memories in ani-
mals simpler than humans? Not surprisingly, hippocampal research on animals 
gave rise to different perspectives. Among these, the discovery of "place cells" 
provided the most important insights into hippocampal function (O'Keefe and 
Nadel, 1978). Place cells explicitly characterize positions in the environment, in-
dependent of animal's location. These landmark-controlled place-signaling neu-
rons are used by the brain to create navigational maps, a Cartesian space, of the 
environment. Allocentric, map-based navigation is essentially a geometric trian-
gulation process, which depends primarily on the perceptual (input) properties of 
the brain, a method that does not require motor output or a temporal context. Al-
though the original formulation of the cognitive map theory implied that addition 
of a temporal component to the basic spatial map in the human provides the basis 
for an episodic memory system, the relationship between the essentially egocen-
tric episodic memory and allocentric landmark navigation has remained a contro-
versial issue. What is the source of the temporal component that can serve such an 
important role? A third line of investigation may provide a clue here. The most 
prominent electrical pattern of the hippocampus is the rhythmic theta oscillation 
at 6-9 Hz (cf. Buzsáki, 2002), which may provide the necessary timing. 
Perhaps reformulating the definition of episodic memory might be instructive 
here. In its simplest possible formulation, episodic memory can be simply defined 
as: What happened where and when? From this perspective, the different lines of 
thoughts regarding the mechanisms of the hippocampus can be tied together, with 
the place cell and theta oscillations providing the spatio-temporal context, a criti-
cal aspect of episodes. Storing large number of arbitrary events requires special 
structure, for which the random wiring of the hippocampus is most suitable. Be-
130 GYÖRGY BUZSÁKI 
low we attempt to put these ingredients together. Because the ground work for this 
venture began in Hungary, a short digression for exploring the seeds of the ideas is 
justified. 
The Hippocampal Theta Link to Pécs: 
Grastyán's School of Neurophysiology 
My connection with brain rhythms began with attending a physiology lecture 
by Endre Grastyán in the beautiful small town, of Pécs on the sunny slopes of the 
Mecsek mountains in Hungary. University of Pécs, or Universitas Quinque 
Ecclesiensis, as it was called when it was founded in 1367, has produced a re-
markable set of neuroscientists, including János Szentágothai, a world-class 
neuroanatomist, Béla Flerkó and Béla Halász, pioneers of neuroendocrinology 
and Ferenc Gallyas, the creator of the widely used silver impregnation methods 
for neuronal labeling. 
Like many of us at a young age, Grastyán could not quite make up his mind in 
his twenties about his future. Finding nothing too interesting or challenging ini-
tially, he decided to train for the protestant priesthood and to get some orientation 
in philosophy. But his mind, filled with too much curiosity, prevented him from 
becoming a preacher. He ended up in medical school during those stormy years 
around World War II and became the assistant of Professor Kálmán Lissák. This 
was a good start. Lissák, a student of Otto Loewi in Graz, Austria, was a legendary 
surgeon-physiologist. I vividly remember one of his lectures, operating on a dog 
in front of a class of two hundred students, talking to us constantly about the vari-
ous neuronal regulating mechanism of blood circulation while effortlessly prepar-
ing all the nerves, cannulating veins and arteries and hooking up the instrumenta-
tion. At some later point in my early career, Lissák came into my physiology 
practician and saved me from a complete humiliation from my students. I was try-
ing to demonstrate the classic experiment of Loewi, the first proof that a chemical 
is released at the synapse. This most beautiful experiment requires two frog 
hearts. The demonstration, if done well, is simple, elegant and convincing. In the 
original experiment, Loewi placed the hearts into salt water and separated them by 
a membrane. He found that stimulation of the vagus nerve that innervates the heart 
slowed the rate of the stimulated heart but had no effect on the unstimulated one. 
After removal of the membrane, however, stimulation caused both hearts to slow 
down. His interpretation of these data was that nerve stimulation caused the re-
lease of a substance from the nerve endings, which he called "Vagusstoff', i. e., 
"stuff from the vagus." This chemical then acted on both hearts. Loewi described 
his observations in a short paper of only four pages in 1921, which laid down the 
chemical theory of synaptic transmission. For this breakthrough he was awarded 
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the Nobel Prize in physiology and medicine in 1936. His student Kálmán Lissák, 
in his best days, had the reputation of being able to perform Otto Loewi's experi-
ments even blindfolded. He was a tall, attention-demanding handsome man with 
white hair, who wore a bow-tie even in the worst days of the Bolshevik drama. 
Visiting my seminar that day, he promptly recognized my troubles. Without say-
ing a word, he took two new frogs, prepared the hearts and nerves in no time, 
placed them in front of me and left the room. With two great preparations in my 
hand, the demonstration worked well. My embarrassment notwithstanding, I 
proudly explained to the students how the chemical acetylcholine, released by the 
stimulated nerves, was responsible for the visible slowing of heartbeats. After the 
practicum, I prepared 6 heart pairs, and the last three worked just like the ones I 
got from Professor Lissák. From then on, Loewi's experiment on neurotransmitter 
release became one of my favorite demonstrations. 
Although Endre Grastyán was perhaps the closest friend of Lissák, the two 
men were as different as they could be. Apart from the surgery demonstrations, 
Lissák's lectures were scarcely attended. In contrast, Grastyán was a performing 
artist, his lectures were carefully composed and choreographed. The lecture room 
was always packed and even students from the neighboring Law School came to 
listen to his mesmerizing lectures. He generated so much enthusiasm that we stu-
dents became convinced that the issues he discussed every time were the most im-
portant ones in the universe. I often thought that Grastyán could have been a nov-
elist, a story-teller, an artist, and a musician, all in one person. There lay in him, 
beneath the surface of science, a lost Atlantis of philosophy, fine arts, musical tal-
ent and a unique human interaction that one thinks co-existed only in the long-ex-
tinct great men of the Renaissance era. On that particular lecture in April, 1970 he 
talked about the role of control, a topic that changed my life for good. My 
high-school plan to become an electric engineer had been vetoed by my parents, 
who offered me the choice between Medical School and Law School. While my 
friends were having fun at the School of Engineering in Budapest, learning excit-
ing stories about radio transmission and electronic oscillators, I spent most of my 
time studying the unending details of bones and ligaments. But in that spring time 
lecture, Grastyán was talking about some truly intriguing questions. His key idea 
was that control in living systems begins with the output. The first simple biologi-
cal systems did not have any inputs; they did not need them. Generating a motor 
output was sufficient when food was abundant in the sea environment. Rhythmic 
contraction of muscles guaranteed that some nutrients were obtained. Sensation 
of direction and distance developed only after the invention of movement across 
space. There is no need to perceive anything unless one can act upon the perceived 
input, Grastyán argued. He provided numerous and vivid examples of how sensa-
tion and perception are always subordinated to motor organization. The whole 
complicated brain web serves to supervise the output, which in his thinking in-
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eluded skeletal movement, autonomic responses, motivation, emotion and even 
thought. There is no use to hear without the ability to orient to the source. What is 
the point of the great smell of food if we cannot eat it? The idea of output control 
of sensation is a profound thought even today. Back then, when Pavlovian sen-
sory-sensory association was the dominant ideology in the East and stimulus-de-
cision-response paradigm dominated Western thinking, Grastyán's teachings 
were unusual, to say the least. After his lecture I rushed home to read the relevant 
chapters in our official textbook only to realize that there was not a single word 
there about what I heard that morning. Or in any other books, as I learned after fe-
verishly searching for sources and references in the university library. Neverthe-
less, beginning with Grastyán's lecture on the emotional organization in the brain, 
my life in medical school assumed a new meaning. I applied to become his ap-
prentice and spent most of my student life in his lab. Training in Grastyán's labo-
ratory meant mostly to be part of fascinating lunch discussions that often went on 
for several hours, where topics ranged randomly from homeostatic regulations of 
the brain to Johan Huizinga's "Homo Ludens". It was during these lunch lessons 
where I first learned about the hippocampal "theta" rhythm, the oscillation that 
became my obsession ever since. Before discussing the critical role of theta 
rhythm in providing a temporal context for episodic memories, we should over-
view the structural requirements of an effective coding-decoding device. 
A Large Random Graph for Storing Episodes 
The hippocampus is a one-layer cortex, a sort of a large appendage to the neo-
cortex. Its main input and outputs are the same: the neocortex, which communi-
cates with the hippocampus via the entorhinal cortex. Unlike the modular neocor-
tex, it is a single giant cortical column. The major entry point to the hippocampus 
is the granule cells of the dentate gyrus. The axon terminals of granule cells excite 
about half of the hippocampal pyramidal cells, which are clustered together in the 
CA3 region (Acsády et al., 1998). In turn, the CA3 neurons send their main 
collaterals to the CA1 pyramidal cells. These connecting axons are known as 
Schaffer collaterals, named after the Hungarian anatomist-neurologist Károly 
Schaffer, who discovered them. The remaining collaterals, form the largest recur-
rent collateral system in the brain, return the excitatory information to partner 
CA3 neurons. Due to this large recurrent and feed-forward system, 90% of all 
intrahippocampal synaptic contacts are formed by the CA3 neurons. The hippo-
campal information returns to the entorhinal-neocortex origin by the projecting 
axons of the CA3 pyramidal cells. This neocortex-hippocampus-neocortex loop is 
an epitome of the multiple, parallel organization of the cerebrum. Traffic in this 
excitatory system is under the strict control of a rich family of inhibitory neurons 
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(Freund and Buzsáki, 1996; Sik et al., 1994). This integration of information in 
the short and long loops depends on the available time windows. Such diverging 
and converging reverberating circuits can serve various functions, including error 
correction, pattern completion, amplification and temporary storage. This is what 
the hippocampus is about. Pennanent memories are then laid down in the neocor-
tex, due mostly to the sleep-related activity patterns of the hippocampus (Buzsáki, 
1989). 
To illustrate the physiological operations of the hippocampus, let us assume 
that the neocortex is a library and we have to search for a book in it. An ideal li-
brary not only contains most books ever written but it also allows speedy access to 
any volume accurately. Unfortunately, there is no ideal library, man-made or bio-
logical. The more books that are accumulated in the library the higher the overlap 
among authors' names, titles and content. Searching for an item in such a colossal 
library can become a nightmare. Finding Imre Madách's Tragedy of Man is 
straightforward because of the unique key words one can supply. But try to find 
the book that you remember is about honesty, courage, and involves a team of 
young boys fighting a "West Side Story" kind of turf battle over a derelict Buda-
pest building site and about honor. The main character dies for his idols and team 
because he acquires pneumonia after spying on the enemy team by hiding in the 
cold lake of a public garden. Even the best man-made search engine, the internet 
may fail in the search. After typing in multiple combinations of numerous key 
words about the story, the search engine Google may give you a million choices. 
However, if you ask your educated librarian, chances are that he or she can tell 
you right away that the book you are desperately looking for is "The Pál Street 
Boys" by Ferenc Molnár, who was perhaps the greatest playwright to come out of 
Hungary. The reason for such a huge difference in search efficiency is that your li-
brarian has a hippocampus, whereas Google does not. Thanks to the hippocam-
pus, humans are very efficient in storing and remembering episodes. We can 
search the huge space of the hippocampal index and construct a full story from 
fragments in a matter of a few theta oscillatory cycles. 
How big is the available abstract space in the hippocampus and how is it orga-
nized? Together with Peter Somogyi, from Oxford University we set out to study 
this important question by labeling single neurons in the intact rat brain and recon-
structing the entirety of their axon collaterals and synaptic contacts in three-di-
mensional space. The 200,000 CA3 pyramidal neurons in each hemisphere of the 
rat brain posses a total of 40 kilometers axon collaterals and an estimated 5 to 10 
billion synaptic contacts in each hemisphere (Fig. 1; Li et al., 1994). Unlike the 
mostly locally organized neocortical neurons, the distribution of the contacts in 
the recursive and feed-forward projections in the hippocampus is reminiscent of a 
random graph. The concept of random graph implies that one can walk from any 
neuron to any other neuron along the calculated shortest possible synaptic path, 
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Figure 1. Hippocampus: a randomly organized synaptic space. Shown is the axonal arbor of a single 
CA3 pyramidal cell. Cell body is indicated by the asterisk. A, anterior; P, posterior direction. Note 
extensive, non-local distribution of the axon collateral. An average CA3 neuron has about 300 mm 
of axon collaterals, which establish 30-60,000 synapses with other CA3 and CA1 neurons. Such 
strongly connected graph is an ideal autoassociator 
much as one can walk in an unobstructed field from any place to any other place 
(Erdős and Rényi, 1959; Barabási, 2002). Construction of a full random graph 
from 200,000 CA3 pyramidal cells would require only 15 to 20 divergent connec­
tions from each cell. This small figure is in stark contrast to the 10,000 to 20,000 
of synapses an average CA3 pyramidal cell establishes with its peers. The large 
divergence implies that the number of possible routes between any randomly cho­
sen start and goal cells is a truly galactic figure. Nevertheless, no matter how im­
pressive this figure is, we do not get far with such reasoning alone. This is because 
synapses between pyramidal cells are weak and the discharge of a single starter 
cell will not be able to fire any of its target peers. Only discharging neurons can be 
used for encoding and retrieving of memories. Without speculating further we can 
register that the CA3 autoassociator is a strongly connected, directed and 
weighted graph. This arrangement simplifies how activity can spread in the recur­
sive network. Instead of spreading excitation in any direction randomly, the tra­
jectory of activity is strictly determined by the synaptic weights so when activity 
arrives at a bifurcation choice, it will progress along the path with the stronger 
synapses. Importantly, the synaptic weights are set by experience during the 
learning of episodes. As discussed above, a library to be useful should contain not 
only all the books we will ever need but also an efficient search mechanism that 
allows the retrieval of books in a short time. This is where temporal packaging of 
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information becomes critical. I speculate that the packaging mechanism is hippo-
campal theta oscillations. 
The Short Story of Theta Oscillations 
The story of theta oscillations is an edifying chapter in the history of behav-
ioral-cognitive neuroscience. The controversy regarding the exact behavioral cor-
relate(s) of theta oscillation has raged for decades, generating numerous pub-
lished experiments and occasional strong feelings among the contestants. Virtu-
ally every conceivable overt and covert behavior has been associated with 
hippocampal theta activity, as summarized in Figure 2. The first experiments in 
behavior of animals were carried out by Grastyán et al. (1959). According to 
Grastyán's pioneering work in the cat, theta reflected an "orienting reflex, search-
ing for stimuli with significance to the subject". Although this relationship has 
been challenged many times, it has remained one of the dominant views about the 
function of theta. Many other concepts can be placed under the same general ru-
bric of "input processing". In contrast, a number of hypotheses argued in favor of 
the "output" or motor control role of hippocampal theta. The most influential of 
these hypotheses has been the "voluntary movement" hypothesis of Vanderwolf 
(1969). Cornelius (Case) Vanderwolf, my postdoctoral adviser, suggested that 
theta occurs only during intentional or voluntary movement, as opposed to immo-
bility and "involuntary", i.e., stereotypic activity. Despite seven decades of hard 
work on rabbits, rats, mice, gerbils, guinea pigs, sheep, cats, dogs, old world mon-
keys, chimpanzees and humans by outstanding colleagues, to date, there is no 
widely agreed term that would unequivocally describe behavioral correlate(s) of 
this prominent brain rhythm. By exclusion, the only firm message that can be 
safely concluded from this brief summary is that in an immobile animal no theta is 
present, provided that no changes occur in the environment, and the animal is not 
"thinking". 
Why is it so difficult to agree on the behavioral correlates of such simple mech-
anisms as a brain oscillation? Processing environmental inputs requires "atten-
tion", and so does intentional movement. With the introduction of the term "vol-
untary", theta oscillation research unintentionally entered the territory of "inten-
tionality," a label that refers to the "substance" of all subjective mental activity 
(Dennett, 1987). Thus, an inescapable deduction from the behavior-brain correla-
tion approach is that the "will" plays a critical role in theta generation. An alterna-
tive, and perhaps more sober, conclusion is that our behavioral-cognitive terms 
are simply working hypothetical constructs that do not necessarily correspond to 
any given brain mechanism. Although the true goal of neuroscience research is to 
reveal how the brain generates behavior and how particular mechanisms, such as 
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Figure 2. Hypothesized functions of hippocampal theta oscillations during the past several decades. 
Most correlates can be lumped as "sensory-attention" (input function) or motor output function. 
Endre Grastyán's (left) 'orienting response' hypothesis was the first, which was derived from obser-
vations in behaving animals (cat). The most influential hypothesis in the rat has remained the 'vol-
untary movement' correlate by Cornelius (Case) H. Vanderwolf (right). Note the large variety of the 
hypotheses and their culmination in the 1970s. The behavior (independent variable) - brain mecha-
nism (dependent correlate) approach failed to produce a consensus on the behavioral significance of 
theta oscillations 
theta, can categorize and define behaviors, most behavioral-cognitive research, to 
date, seems to work the other way around. We take a man-created word or phrase, 
such as one of those in the above list, and search for brain mechanisms that may be 
responsible for the generation of the conceived behavior. In my humble opinion, 
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such approach has limitations, despite the best intentions. For example, Vander-
wolf used sophisticated "ethological", fine-grain analysis of behavior. Ironically, 
it is through his work that theta became linked with free will. Grastyán objected 
passionately against the term "voluntary", yet he could not avoid its connotations. 
We never uttered Vanderwolfs name in Grastyán's lab without adding a curse, an 
"innocent" Hungarian custom. Grastyán dedicated the last decade of his life to the 
understanding of the neurophysiological substrates of play behavior and con-
cluded that theta is an invariant correlate of play in kittens and cats. Paradoxically, 
according to his favorite philosopher, Huizinga (1955), play is "a voluntary activ-
ity or occupation executed within certain limits of time and place". 
An alternative strategy to understand the role of theta oscillations in behavioral 
organization is to reveal its content. By content I mean the synaptic and cellular 
mechanisms that give rise to a population 'order parameter' measured by the 
mean field of theta waves. Through this process we can gain insight into the tem-
poral organization of population activity of single neurons (Buzsáki and Draguhn, 
2004). It is the time metric of hippocampal rhythms that determines the synaptic 
interactions within and among cell assemblies (cf. Buzsáki 2002). If the popula-
tion activity of the hippocampus provides a timing mechanism and single 
hippocampal neurons are active depending on the spatial position of the animal, 
how do we exploit these mechanisms in the service of episodic memory? 
Encoding of Episodes by Theta Oscillation-embedded Packages 
of Neuronal Assemblies 
My suggested solution to the above dilemma is the following. If episodic mem-
ory in humans provides some internal rules of its organization, we should be look-
ing for such rules in the physiological patterns of neurons in animals. Beginning 
with the seminal work of Pál Ranschburg from Pázmány (now Eötvös) University 
in Budapest before World War II, it has been clarified that episodes are not simple 
linear chains of events, such as A is followed by B, B is followed by C, etc. Ifit 
were the case, episodic memories would be extremely vulnerable and losing one 
item would terminate the episode. Instead, we know from experience that the es-
sence of episode telling is that the story can evolve in multiple directions. This is 
possible because in addition to the first order (immediate neighbor) relations, 
higher order connections are also coded (Kahana, 1996). In episodic learning, 
stronger associations are formed between stimuli that occur near each other in 
time compared to those that are separated by a greater interval. Furthermore, for-
ward serial associations are stronger than backward associations, meaning that 
once an item from a studied list is retrieved, the likelihood of retrieving the next 
item is twice as probable as retrieving the preceding item. Encoding is better for-
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ward in time. Looking ahead of the model, we hypothesize that neuronal mecha-
nism of episodic encoding is the tightly correlated timing of neuronal firing. This 
timing mechanism and the large arbitrary connection matrix of the hippocampus 
can insure that not only immediate neighbors but items with larger distances can 
also be connected. What we need for testing this hypothesis is to investigate the 
neuronal mechanisms in behaving animals in situations analogous to the learning 
of episodes in humans. Without attempting to prove each step of the logic with 
complicated experiments, here is a short synopsis of the events that might be oc-
curring in our hippocampus during the formation of episodic memories. (For a 
more detailed treatment of the topic, see Buzsaki, 2005; 2006.) 
Episodic learning of serially presented items, such a list of words, or in real life 
situation a story, is analogous to a rat's behavior running on a linear track for wa-
ter or food reward and encoding the sequentially observed places. Place encoding 
requires sequential activation of hippocampal place-encoding cells in a temporal 
context (Fig. 3). Sequential segments of the track are represented by unique sets 
of hippocampal place-coding cell assemblies (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978), which 
are bound together by synaptic interactions into an episode. The metric distances 
between adjacent place representations of two place-coding assemblies are re-
flected by the strength of their synaptic connections and can be studied experi-
mentally by measuring the time differences between the assemblies within the 
theta cycle. The way this coding occurs is a fascinating but complex process. 
Each assembly is active maximally only once on the track, signifying a given 
position. However, instead of coding each spot in a narrow time window only 
once, place representations of neurons have long "tails", reflected by the elon-
gated size of the place field, an average of 30-40 cm. As the rat enters the field, the 
firing rate of the neuron begins to increase, reaches a maximum in the middle of 
the field and then it decreases gradually as the rat leaves the place field of the neu-
ron. The firing rate of the neuron is controlled by two parameters: the distance 
from the place field center at a longer scale and periodically by the phase of the 
theta cycle (O'Keefe and Recce, 1993; Harris et al., 2002). Because each consecu-
tive part of the track is represented by an assembly of neurons, this results an inter-
esting scenario. First, each cell assembly represents one spot best but has some 
progressively weakening say in the representation of the previous and future 
places as well. At each theta cycle, the rat moves about 5 cm, so that each place 
field is re-represented 6 to 9 times. Second, although each spot is represented best 
by one cell assembly, another 5 to 8 assemblies also contribute. The result is that 
in each theta cycle 6 to 9 assemblies are packaged, representing the past and future 
positions on the track in a time-compressed manner (Fig. 4; Skaggs et ai., 1996). 
This temporal compression is the most critical aspect of the coding mechanism 
because it brings neurons representing distant places into the time-frame where 
synaptic plasticity operates. Single neurons or pairs of neurons cannot represent 
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Figure 3. Analogy between episodic learning and 1-dimensional navigation. (A) Learning and free 
recall of an episode. Arrows, higher order relationships, which facilitate recall of items with nearby 
positions (e. g., county spring, noise earth). (B) Conditional response probability of recall as a func-
tion of positional lag. Note advantage for recalls to nearby serial positions and an asymmetry favor-
ing forward recall. (C) Model of episodic encoding in the hippocampus. The width of the bars indi-
cates firing rates of the assemblies and the temporal differences between assemblies reflect dis-
tances of their spatial representations. EC, input from the entorhinal cortex (arrowheads) provides 
updated information about the external environment (places, PI to P5). In each theta cycle, 6 to 9 
cell assemblies are compressed in the order which the rat explores the subsequent places of those as-
sembly representations. In each cycle the most active assembly is associated with the through of the 
theta oscillation. The compression mechanism provides a context for the strongest assembly and its 
represented item. Each assembly is re-represented in 6 to 9 subsequent theta cycles, corresponding 
to approximately 1 sec of activity and 30-40 cm travel distance. The temporal distances within the 
theta cycle determine the synaptic strengths between the assemblies. By this mechanism both first 
order (neighborhood) and higher order distances can be connected, which allow episodes to evolve 
in multiple directions. In the absence of environmental or body cues (i. e., free recall), assemblies 
are advance by the previous cycles (e. g., PI recalls P2) 
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times longer than a few hundred milliseconds, and synaptic plasticity works at the 
tens of milliseconds scale. The compression mechanism makes it possible that the 
representations of items can be translated into synaptic strengths among neurons 
and assemblies. 
In related research we have established that the life-time of each hippocampal 
assembly is about 10-20 msec (Harris et al., 2004). Neuronal coalitions are 
formed preferentially at this temporal scale because this time window is the most 
efficient to affect target assemblies. This time constraint allows only 6 to 9 cells 
assemblies to be nested in the time period of the theta oscillation (120-140 msec), 
that is we arrive at the same numbers of assemblies as we did with our behavioral 
estimation. Physiologically speaking, the theta oscillation corresponds to the 
build up of excitation in the hippocampal space, while all neurons can be visited 
and terminated by the recruited inhibition. In other words theta periods are tempo-
ral windows of opportunities to search the entire hippocampal space. Assemblies 
are reflected by their time differences within the theta cycle. 
The sequences are stored in the autoassociative CA3 recurrent and CA3-CA1 
collateral systems and can be updated by entorhinal cortex-mediated environmen-
tal signals. During memory retrieval, the CA3 autoassociator is searched in each 
theta cycle, recalling 6 to 9 temporally linked cell assemblies each representing a 
spatial field that the rat would traverse during the next second or so. The predicted 
and perceived locations are replayed in tandem by the CA3 and CA1 assemblies. 
Prediction of future locations is possible because distances are encoded in the syn-
aptic strengths between assemblies (Muller et al., 1996) and reflected by their 
theta time temporal sequences. In short, I suggest that the overlapping past, pres-
ent and future locations are combined into a single episode by the self-organized 
CA3 and CA1 assemblies in successive theta cycles. The theta-cycle compression 
brings not only neighboring but several assemblies together in a time frame that 
allows the strengthening of their connections simply by their temporal differ-
ences. Thus, the physical distances represented by the cell assemblies in the real 
world are translated to time and phase within the theta cycle and eventually synap-
tic connectivity. This simple mechanism can account for the first- and higher or-
der linking of items into the same temporal context, represented by a theta cycle. 
Of course, all experiments described were carried out in animals, which pre-
cluded direct testing of the main hypothesis by free recall. Nevertheless, the 
model outlined above can account for temporal contiguity and the asymmetric na-
ture of recall in episodic memory at the neuronal level. Even though we studied 
animals, the spatial behavior and inferences we can make from these observations 
should apply to episodic learning in humans as well. 
The observation of nested cell assemblies in hippocampal theta oscillations de-
serves a little digression. Our previous work demonstrated that 6 to 9 faster cycles, 
called gamma oscillations, are nested within the theta waves (Bragin et al., 1995). 
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The faster gamma cycles therefore can be conceived as the macroscopic reflection 
of cell assemblies. The theta period would define the span of memory with 7 to 9 
items multiplexed on the successive gamma cycles (Lisman and Idiart, 1985). Im-
portantly, in human subjects, the time of short-term memory scanning increases 
with the set size, corresponding to approximately 25 milliseconds per "to-be-re-
membered" item. Thus, the number of items that can be stored by the multiplexed 
gamma-theta model is identical with the "magical number 7 (±2)," the psycho-
physical^ measured limit of working memory (Miller, 1956). Therefore, the 
multiplexing mechanism described above may be responsible for providing a 
buffer for short-term memories, a process attributed to the operations of neuronal 
circuits in the prefrontal cortex. Because we also found that the magnitude of 
gamma oscillations in the prefrontal cortex are modulated by the phase of 
hippocampal theta oscillations, the common multiplexing mechanism would pro-
vide a physiological link between working memory and episodic memory. 
What Did We Learn? 
Now we are in a position to define theta oscillations from the brain's point of 
view. Experiments with single cells and cell assemblies we briefly discussed show 
that the quantal theta periods are necessary for chunking events and places to-
gether in time so that the participating neuronal assemblies can be tied together. 
The temporal compression of cell assemblies in combination with the rules of syn-
aptic plasticity allows for activity to jump from one assembly sequence to the 
next. Thus, from the perspective of the brain, Grastyán's theta oscillation is an es-
sential temporal organizer, a metric that relates synaptic strengths to the changes 
in the outside world. Theta is the temporal means of navigation in both neuronal 
space during episodic memory and real space during self-motion. 
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THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF TALK 
BRIAN MACWHINNEY 
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 
USA 
For this volume of Hungarian Studies dedicated to multidisciplinary contributions 
of Hungarians around the world, I have chosen to describe my work on a unique 
multidisciplinary effort called TalkBank. This effort seeks to harness the new infor-
mation technology to study the great complexities of human talk. 
Keywords: multidisciplinarity, statistical analysis, databases of written texts, sam-
ple analysis, classroom discourse 
Researchers in the brain and behavioral sciences have benefited immensely 
from the rise of information technology. We now have powerful methods for per-
forming statistical analysis, simulation, modeling, and graphic display. Our com-
puters provide increasingly precise control of eye tracking, brain imaging, and 
stimulus presentation. We can use computers to analyze large databases of demo-
graphic and survey data, as well as huge corpora of written language texts. How-
ever, we have not yet succeeded in harnessing web technologies for the study of 
the most basic of all human social processes - conversational interactions. The 
TalkBank Project (http://talkbank.org) addresses this problem by providing com-
putational support for the online multimedia collaborative analysis of talk. 
To give the reader a sense of what types of materials are currently available in 
TalkBank, consider this sampler: 
1. You can listen to Franciso Ma describe in Nahuatl (with English translations) 
how he lost his teeth when a bandit shot a gun at his mouth. (Thanks to Jane 
Hill.) 
2. You can view and listen to a discussion of a group of medical students en-
gaged in problem-based learning about diagnosis of a case of an amnesic, 
dysnomic aphasie. (Thanks to Tim Koschmann.) 
3. You can listen to Larry Lessig plead the Napster copyright infringement case 
at the Supreme Court. (Thanks to Jerry Goldman's SCOTUS Project.) 
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4. You can watch Bettino Craxi discussing corruption in Italian politics in a TV 
interview. (Thanks to Johannes Wagner and the MO VIN Project.) 
5. You can listen (in Spanish) to Christian Iniguez arguing with a sports talk 
show announcer about his predictions for the soccer match between Guada-
lajara and Monterrey. (Thanks to Christian Iniguez.) 
6. You can listen to a discussion of card playing and shopping between three 
Jewish immigrants who resettled in 1938 from Vienna to London, as they 
code-switch back and forth from German to English. (Thanks to Eva Eppler.) 
7. You can watch videos from Alicia between ages 1 and 3 as she interacts with 
her English-speaking father and other Cantonese speakers in Hong Kong. 
(Thanks to Virginia Yip and Stephen Matthews). 
8. You can watch an elderly gentleman with severe aphasia holding fully effec-
tive gesturally-based conversations with his family and friends. (Thanks to 
Chuck Goodwin). 
9. You can watch German schoolchildren from Dresden singing and dancing to 
Czech songs in their L2 Czech classroom. (Thanks to Angelika Kubanek-Ger-
man.) 
10. You can study transcripts and audio from the CHILDES database from about 
1200 children learning 28 different languages. 
I cite these ten examples simply to illustrate the enormous diversity in the 
CHILDES and TalkBank databases. Alongside this qualitative diversity is the 
quantitative richness of available data, now reaching 300 MB of text and an addi-
tional 2 terabytes of sound and video. 
Viewing TalkBank along disciplinary lines, we can distinguish 17 fields or re-
search circles that are involved in the study of conversational interactions. For 
each of these research circles there are corresponding data in TalkBank: 
1. child development (mother-child attachment, peer groups) 
2. child language development (CHILDES system, test development) 
3. language disorders and remediation (aphasia, stuttering, retardation) 
4. multilingualism (second language learning, code-switching, acculturation) 
5. emergency medicine (ambulance, ER, teaching simulations) 
6. legal argumentation (courtroom, Supreme Court, probation hearings) 
7. small group dynamics (government meetings, security) 
8. psychotherapy (therapist-patient discourse, therapy groups) 
9. conversation analysis (rhetorical analysis, sociolinguistics, text and dis-
course) 
10. computational linguistics (parsing, tagging, data-mining, content analysis) 
11. speech technology (voice recognition, prosodie analysis) 
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12. anthropology (field linguistics, film ethnographies, oral tradition) 
13. gestural communication (narrative, conversational, crosslinguistic) 
14. classroom discourse (science, math, literacy, cultural effects, lectures) 
15. tutorial dialog (dyadic, small group, man-machine) 
16. human-computer interaction (collaborative dialog, usability) 
17. ethology (animal communication and behavior) 
The development of a shared database has been a crucial formative step in the 
maturation of the each of the sciences. In Genetics, projects such as the Human 
Genome Project (www.ornl.gov/hgmis), GenMapp (www.genmapp.org), or Pro-
tein Map (Aisenman - Berman, 2000) are now storing all published genetic se-
quences in forms that are open to analysis and data-mining through the web. In 
fact, gene sequences are not accepted for publication until they have been entered 
in these systems. In Paleontology, museums worldwide preserve fossils whose 
specific physical structure, radiological dating, and stratifícational location are 
crucial to our reconstruction of the history of life and the earth. Electronic records 
and scans based on this evidence are now being made available electronically 
(www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/pdn/) for deeper analysis and data-mining. Internet da-
tabases are now fundamental to progress in Astronomy (van Buren, Curtis, 
Nichols, Brundage, 1995), Physics (Caspar et al., 1998), Economics, Medicine, 
History, Political Science, Experimental Psychology, Linguistics, and other sci-
ences. 
1. TalkBank Data Research Methods 
Psychologists often rely on laboratory studies using reaction time methodol-
ogy, computerized control (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flat, Provost, 1993; 
MacWhinney, St. James, Schunn, Li, Schneider, 2001), and random assignment 
to condition to test empirical hypotheses. Although this particular methodology 
cannot be applied to the study of the real human interactions represented in 
TalkBank data, there are at least seven equally powerful methodologies that can 
operate directly on TalkBank data. These include: 
1. Microanalytic studies. Microanalysis of videos relies on frame-by-frame 
analysis of linkages of conversation, gesture, proxemics, props, and prosodies. 
Exemplary applications of this method already in TalkBank include studies of 
problem-based learning (Koschmann - LeBaron, 2002), Guugu Yimithirr nar-
ratives (Haviland, 1993), and professional problem-solving (Goodwin, 1994). 
These analyses have already served as our first test-bed for published collabo-
rative commentary in journals with CD-ROMs. 
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2. Microgenetic studies. Research programs that study cognitive development 
(Siegler - Crowley, 1991) use careful video analysis to track subtle changes in 
learner's strategies across days and weeks as a result of various types of teach-
ing. 
3. Sampled comparisons. Within the new infrastructure, situations can be sam-
pled across groups and conditions and compared in terms of analytic codings. 
For example, we could compare the gestures of deaf children of hearing par-
ents with those of normal children in terms of a coding system delineating ref-
erence to the here and now (Morford - Goldin-Meadow, 1997). The coding 
system itself would then be the focus of collaborative commentary. 
4. Error analysis. We can, for example, distinguish cases of failed perspec-
tive-taking in phone call survey data (Schober, Conrad, Fricker, in press) both 
by sampling across conditions and by microanalysis within conditions. 
5. Longitudinal studies. In areas where controlled experimentation is not possi-
ble, longitudinal analysis is often equally powerful. For example, we can trace 
the dynamic emergence of the Supreme Court's position in Roe v. Wade and its 
implementation in 25 years of subsequent decisions. Or we can trace the pro-
cess of mathematical development across the 12 years of Carolyn Maher's 
video study of a cohort of learners in Baltimore. 
6. Large sample analysis. We can assess the effects of oral arguments in the 
Court's decision-making, by examining outcomes and processes in a large 
number of oral arguments. For example, attitudinalists (Segal - Spaeth, 1993) 
view oral arguments as largely irrelevant to the Court's decisions making. 
Informationists (Johnson, in press) espouse a contrasting view that emphasizes 
the extent to which justices acquire new information during oral arguments. To 
adjudicate this issue, we can provide representatives of these competing views 
with complete access to transcripts and audio of the Court's oral arguments 
along with simple methods for annotating and coding the transcripts from their 
respective theoretical positions. 
7. Dynamic modeling. We can track individual differences in referential com-
pression in dyadic interactions with computerized systems. Because the behav-
iors being produced in these system are frequent and repetitive, they are ame-
nable to modeling (Anderson - Lebiere, 1998). 
Each of these seven methods fits in naturally with TalkBank and our vision of a 
new community of collaborative commentary. By combining several of these 
methods, we can begin to understand how processes that operate across very dif-
ferent time scales can become entrained by interactions that occur in observable 
interactions (MacWhinney, in press-c). 
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2. Infrastructural Development 
The development of the TalkBank database and programs has been facilitated 
by a series of relatively recent developments in computer and network hardware 
and software, as well as computerized recording technology. These advances in-
clude: 
1. Computational speed. Current desktop computers run at speeds that make it 
easy to examine hundreds of megabytes of transcript data in a few minutes. 
These speed advances make it possible to search quickly for a wide variety of 
lexical and syntactic patterns in aphasie speech. Today's computers can also be 
used to compress video material fast enough to allow users to run compression 
jobs overnight that earlier would have taken weeks. In this project, video com-
pression will be conducted at CMU, where we are already relying heavily on 
these advances. 
2. Network bandwidth. Most users now have access to broadband Internet con-
nections that are capable of playing high-quality compressed video without 
distortion or dropped frames. 
3. Streaming video. Compressed video can now be configured to permit random 
access or hinted streaming. Hinting adds time marks to delineate the beginning 
and ends of small segments of the video. These marks then allow a user to di-
rectly access, for example, a clip that begins at minute 18 of the 42 minutes 
video without having to wait to download the first 18 minutes. 
4. Disk storage. It is now possible to purchase a terabyte of disk storage for $600. 
Three or four years ago, this would have cost $10,000. Because these prices 
have fallen so rapidly, it is easy for the TalkBank Project to store and backup 
large amounts of high-quality video for distribution through streaming servers. 
5. XML. Currently, most documents on the web are in HTML. However, over the 
next few years, materials on the web will move from HTML to the more pow-
erful XML framework. Modern computer software such as Java and C# pro-
vides solid support for documents encoded in XML. Moreover XML has 
strong linkages to the new Unicode standard. 
6. Unicode. The Unicode character-encoding standard provides a single consis-
tent standard for encoding all of the world's languages, as well as the major 
classes of symbol systems. Because this encoding is consistent across com-
puter platforms, it allows us to create a single consistent database for aphasia 
across languages and platforms. 
7. Grid Computing. Working with Bennett Bertenthal's new NSF Social Infor-
matics Data Grid project, TalkBank can configure data analysis and data sets 
across a wide array of machines on the Internet that can be accessed by the tools 
of grid computing. Grid Computing is one component in a set of ongoing ad-
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vances in Cyberinfrastructure that can be tracked by consulting the proceed-
ings of the recent NSF Workshop on Cyberinfrastructure for the Social Sci-
ences at http://vis.sdsc.edu/sbe/Sessions. 
8. Recording Technology. The widespread availability of 3CCD digital video 
recorders using relatively inexpensive mini-DV cassettes makes the construc-
tion of video databases economically feasible. The recent advent of high-qual-
ity portable digital recorders also facilitates the collection of excellent digitized 
audio. 
9. Compression Software. Particularly on the Macintosh platform, there are ex-
cellent systems for quick software video compression. QuickTime 7 and 
MPEG-7 offer still further advances. 
3. TalkBank Tools 
TalkBank and the CHILDES Project that predated it have produced six major 
pieces of software. They are: the CHAT editor, CLAN analysis, the XML conver-
ter, phonological analysis in Phon, the TalkBank Server, and the TalkBank 
Browser. 
The CHAT Editor. The CHAT editor is a full text editor written in C++ that 
runs on Macintosh and Windows platforms. It provides users with four methods 
for linking transcripts to audio or video media. 
1. The Waveform method allows users to drag over a segment of the waveform 
display corresponding to an utterance and then transcribe that utterance in the 
text window. 
2. The Sound Walker method simulates the old foot pedal method of transcription 
that continually replays the current sound and then advances a specified 
amount. 
3. The Transcriber method allows the user to play media and hit a space bar 
whenever an utterance ends. This creates a transcription full of bulleted seg-
ments to be transcribed. Then the transcriber can go back and insert transcrip-
tions for the bulleted segments. 
4. The Post Hoc method allows the transcriber to first create an unlinked typed 
transcript and then to step through that transcript utterance by utterance linking 
the transcript to the audio or video media. 
Each of these methods allows the user to adjust the borders of the sound seg-
ment, replay segments, and relink. The final product resulting from all of these is a 
transcript with markers that can be used to replay each utterance directly. Using 
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the CHECK program, it is possible at each moment to check the extent to which 
the transcript is making legal use of CHAT codes. The editor also provides the 
standard facilities for character search and replacement, automatic line number-
ing, and hiding or showing coding tiers. The CHAT editor also provides facilities 
for transcribing in Conversation Analysis (CA) format. CA researchers have 
found that facilities in CLAN for linkage to audio and video from the transcript 
improves not only their ability to study details of the interaction, but also their 
ability to present analyses in lectures and over the web. Between 2000 and 2003, 
CLAN provided a separate mode of analyses called CA mode that allowed CA 
transcribers to use standard CA characters in a special font. 
CLAN analysis. Once files have been transcribed in CHAT, users can run a 
wide variety of CLAN analysis programs. The CHAT editor and the CLAN pro-
grams are the creations of Leonid Spektor, who has worked on the CHILDES and 
TalkBank Projects for 21 years. There are 28 CLAN programs, each with a wide 
variety of subfunctions and options. String-search programs can compute fre-
quency counts, key-word and line profiles, mean length of utterance, mean length 
of turn, type-token ratios, maximum word length counts, maximum utterance 
length histograms, VOCD, and so on. CLAN has a subprogram called MOR that 
applies part-of-speech taggers for English, Spanish, German, French, Italian, Jap-
anese, Cantonese, and Mandarin. The results of these taggers are then disambigu-
ated using the POST statistical disambiguator (Parisse - Le Normand, 2000). 
These morphological codes can then be used to automatically compute indices 
such as DSS, IP-Syn (Sagae, MacWhinney, and Lavie, 2004), and a simple ver-
sion of LARSP. 
The XML Convertor. Franklin Chen has constructed Java-based tools that 
convert CHAT files to XML. These files can then be reformatted back to CHAT 
and the initial and final versions compared to guarantee the accuracy of the 
roundtrip. Only when the roundtrip runs without differences can we accept the 
data into TalkBank. The process of converting the database to XML was com-
pleted in 2004, after nearly three years of work. An important outcome of this con-
version has been the full systematization of the coding system and an increase in 
consistency in the database. In addition, we were able to convert a wide range of 
discrepant font and character encoding systems to a consistent Unicode format. 
This was particularly important for Asian languages that use non-Roman charac-
ters, but it was also useful for special Roman characters with diacritics in lan-
guages such as French, German, and Spanish. 
TalkBank has made extensive use of the XML format as a method for translat-
ing between alternative transcription systems, including SALT, HamNoSys, 
Elan, MediaTagger, SBCSAE, HIAT, ISL, LDC, TRS, and so on. The actual 
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XML used in this work is too verbose to be useful to users. However, several pro-
grammers outside the TalkBank project have used the TalkBank XML Schema 
(http://talkbank.org/talkbank.xsd) as a simple, well documented, platform for 
writing their own Java programs to process TalkBank data. In this way, the 
TalkBank project has maximized the availability of the TalkBank and CHILDES 
databases on both the file level and the program development level. 
Phonological Analysis in Phon. The study of phonological processes in apha-
sia is important for both theoretical and practical reasons. On a theoretical level, 
studies of phonological processes in aphasia can illuminate theories such as mark-
edness , optimality theory (Kager, Pater, Zonneveld, 2004), and dynamic system 
approaches (Lindblom, 2000). On a practical level, improvements in the control 
of articulatory processes can facilitate smoother communication. Earlier versions 
of the CLAN software for child language analysis provided only marginal support 
for phonological analysis. The only available program for general phonological 
analysis was the LIPP program developed by Kim Oiler in the 1980s. Unfortu-
nately, that program had not been updated in nearly 20 years and was unable to fit 
in well with modem systems of phonological analysis. Recently, the construction 
of the Phon program (Rose et al., 2005) by Yvan Rose at Memorial University 
Newfoundland in collaboration with the TalkBank Project has begun to fill this 
major gap. Phon works directly with CHAT files and allows users to segment and 
analyze children's productions on the level of the syllable and prosodie unit. Once 
high-level segmentation has been done, an automatic algorithm conducts syllabi-
fication. By making reference to a dictionary of standard and variant pronuncia-
tions, the model provides an automatic model-replica (Ferguson, Peizer, Weeks, 
1973) alignment of the child's production to the adult target. This can then be used 
as the basis for analyses of phonological processes (Stampe, 1973), syllabic struc-
tures (Vihman, DePaolis, Davis, 1998), and constraint application (Goad - Rose, 
2003, 2004). The results of the automatic syllabification and model-replica align-
ment can be checked and modified by the researcher in a variety of ways. Phon in-
cludes facilities for conducting a variety of prepackaged and custom analyses on 
large data sets. Finally, segments analyzed in Phon can easily be sent to Praat for 
further detailed phonetic analysis. Here are Screenshots from the Phon Media 
Alignment window (left), Transcription window (top right), and Automatic Seg-
mentation window (bottom right). 
The TalkBank Server. Recently, TalkBank has configured a software/hard-
ware package at that allows institutions outside of CMU to deploy their own full 
TalkBank sites. The code for this server can be located at http://www.talkbank. 
org/tbviewer/local/. This system is particularly useful for projects with tight pri-
vacy restrictions or specific local requirements, since it allows them full access to 
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TalkBank tools without having to contribute their data to an international data-
base. In November 2005, we installed a full TalkBank server configuration at the 
Medical School of the University of Southern Denmark. 
The TalkBank Browser. The most significant recent development in the 
TalkBank system has been the construction of the TalkBank Browser. Users can 
download and install this browser using the Java WebStart facility and the Java 
that is now built in to Windows, Mac, and Linux. Using the TalkBank Browser, 
users can directly access TalkBank transcripts and play them back interactively 
over the web. The program is written in Java, with components running in C#. The 
standard Internet Explorer (IE) browser is embedded within Java on Windows, 
using an API from Sun. On Macintosh, the embedded browser is Firefox, On both 
platforms, C# is used to control QuickTime streaming playback. A simpler form 
of playback can be achieved through the WebData facility built into CLAN. For 
instructions on the use of WebData and the TalkBank Browser, reviewers can 
consult http://talkbank.org/aphasia. 
The TalkBank Browser is now being elaborated to permit collaborative com-
mentary (MacWhinney, in press-a; MacWhinney et al., 2004). This process al-
lows users to view a segment of an interaction with an aphasie and insert com-
ments or blogs in the dialog. These comments can then be stored on the TalkBank 
server and subjected to further peer commentary. 
4. Research Circles 
Our discussion of the software advances underlying TalkBank has temporarily 
deflected focus from consideration of the intellectual core of TalkBank. This core 
is represented by the notion that, although human communication is a unified fact, 
it is analyzed through markedly separate techniques in at least 17 disciplinary re-
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search circles. By creating a single, shared database on human communication, 
we can begin to encourage communication across these disciplines. At the same 
time, much of the initial dialog that has occurred in the TalkBank framework has 
been disciplinary. This is because researchers tend to identify with particular re-
search communities that understand their goals and terminology. We can think of 
these groups as research circles. Although TalkBank research circles are now be-
ginning to use common tools and frameworks, they still continue to focus on very 
different types of communicative interactions and different subject populations. 
Because of this, it is important for TalkBank to realize that true interdisciplinary 
work will only emerge from the increase in communication between parallel re-
search circles that have each reached a high level of technical and theoretical so-
phistication. In this section, I review progress in the development of seven such 
circles in the TalkBank framework: classroom discourse, medical education, 
aphasia, CA, second language learning, legal discourse, child development. 
Classroom Discourse 
Much current research in science education relies on the distillation of longitu-
dinal video, still-image, and observational data to create rich models of learn-
ing-in-context, with specific attention to interactions among tasks, discourse, and 
systems of representation in classroom settings (Greeno, 1998; Sfard - McClain, 
2002). Video work has impacted the study of teacher activities (J. Frederiksen, 
Sipusic, Sherin E., 1998), international comparative studies of videos of mathe-
matics classrooms (Stigler, Gallimore, Hiebert, 2000), learning of demanding 
topics in high school physics (Roth - Roychoudhury, 1993), engineering educa-
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tion (Linde, Roschelle, Stevens, 1994), informal learning in science museums 
(Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, Allen, 2001), interacting with machines (Nardi, 
1996), and the role of gestural communication in teaching and learning (Roth, 
2001). The pervasive impact of video studies was in evidence at the 2002 Ameri-
can Educational Research Association meetings, which included 44 scientific 
panels and symposia using video for learning research,teaching, and teacher edu-
cation. 
Video is also used in teacher training programs (Deny, in press; Pea, 1999) and 
materials illustrating proposed nationwide educational standards (Daro, 
Hampton, Reznick, 2004). The field also enjoys a great range of high-quality tools 
for the analysis of video interactions. Systems such as NVivo (www. 
qrsinternational.com), DIVER, Trans Ana (www.transana.org), ATLAS.ti 
(www.atlasti.com), Elan (www.mpi.nl/tools/elan.html), MacShapa (Sanderson -
Fisher, 1994), CLAN (childes.psy.cmu.edu)), VideoNoter/C-Video (Roschelle, 
Pea, Trigg, 1990), Ethnograph (www.qualisresearch.com), Anvil (www.dfki.de/  
-kipp)), Orion (Baecker, Fono, Wolf, 2006; Goldman-Segall - Reicken, 1989), 
ePresence (Baecker, Fono, Wolf 2006), Informedia (Wactlar, Christel, Gong, 
Hauptmann, 1999), and VideoPaper (Beardsley, Cogan-Drew, Olivero, 2006) are 
allowing researchers to produce large quantities of well-analyzed video interac-
tions. 
Despite the high quality of video analysis methodology, the large quantity of 
data being produced, and the centrality of video to the scientific study of learning 
and instruction, there has not yet been a community-wide acceptance of the im-
portance of a shared database of instructional interactions. There has been exten-
sive discussion of the formation of collaboratories for the study of instructional 
interactions (Baecker, Fono, Wolf, 2006; Edelson, Pea, Gomez, 1996). However, 
without a general method for sharing data across projects, collaboratories are lim-
ited to datasets collected from single projects (Abowd, Harvel, Brotherton, 2000). 
However, many of the most interesting questions in learning and instruction in-
volve comparison between alternative teaching frameworks and situations. This 
type of diversity in the database can best be achieved by having data from many 
different laboratories and groups channeled into a uniform, but distributed data-
base. 
To address this need, the TalkBank Project has begun an effort to construct a 
shared database for the Learning Sciences. TalkBank (http://talkbank.org) is an 
international collaborative effort that has been building a web-accessible database 
for spoken language interactions. All of the video and audio media in TalkBank 
are fully transcribed and each transcribed utterance is linked directly to the corre-
sponding segment of the media. The media and transcripts can be downloaded 
from the web. Users can also open a browser window, scroll through transcripts, 
play back the corresponding audio or video, and insert commentary regarding 
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their analyses. The current TalkBank database has large collections of data in the 
areas of child language (CHILDES), aphasia (AphasiaBank), second language 
learning (SLABank), bilingualism (LIDES), formal meetings, and spontaneous 
conversational interactions (CABank and MOVIN). 
A shared database for the Learning Sciences will have some interesting fea-
tures unique to this area. It will be important to develop a taxonomy of education-
ally-relevant activities, events, and interaction types that can serve as metadata for 
coding and retrieval. It will also be important to supplement video records with 
additional ethnographic materials such as diaries, notebooks, drawings, and class 
records. However, the most powerful feature of a shared database in the Learning 
Sciences will certainly be its availability to collaborative commentary. The idea 
of scientific collaboratories has been developed and discussed elsewhere in this 
volume. With the context of collaboratories, projects such as Orion (Goldman, 
2006), DIVER (Pea, in press), and WebCast (Baecker, Fono, Wolf, 2006) have 
shown how a group of educational researchers can work together to analyze inter-
actions and evaluate competing interpretations. However, for the process of col-
laborative commentary to work as a general model for the learning sciences, it 
must be linked to a commitment to the process of data-sharing. What is unique 
about the TalkBank Project is not its emphasis on collaborative commentary, but 
rather its emphasis on data sharing. However, the greatest value for scientific 
progress arises when data sharing is joined with collaborative commentary. 
Medical Education 
Video analysis has also played a major role in the study of case-based instruc-
tion (Lampert - Loewenberg-Ball, 1998; Lesh - Lehrer, 2000) in medical educa-
tion (Koschmann, 1999). Tim Koschmann at SIU has created a database of analy-
ses of "standardized patients" (SPs) by medical students, residents, and medical 
faculty. The standardized patient cases are widely used as one method for evaluat-
ing medical competency. For example, one such case involve a 3 5-year-old 
woman complaining of headaches and fatigue. An initial working hypothesis di-
agnosis is often for migraine headaches with iron-deficiency anemia. However, 
blood tests later pointed to a diagnosis of polycythemia vera. Another case ini-
tially seems to involve psychiatric symptoms, but these are later seen to arise from 
a primary organic lesion. Koschmann has proposed the establishment of a collab-
orative commentary circle of researchers interested in analyzing these SP video 
protocols, along with the clinical notes, from a set of complementary frameworks. 
These frameworks include problem-solving theory (Koschmann - LeBaron, 
2002), cognitive discourse analysis (C. Frederiksen, 1999), latent semantic analy-
sis (LSA, Art Graesser), and memory-based reasoning (Seifert - Patalano, 2001 ). 
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We will extend this group to include additional viewpoints, with a particular em-
phasis on medical educators. 
AphasiaBank 
In May 2005, we organized a three-day meeting of 20 researchers at CMU with 
the purpose of providing recommendations regarding the construction of 
AphasiaBank. The group decided to focus initially on aphasia as a core with sec-
ondary attention to related disorders. The group also decided that we should for-
mulate a standard protocol for further data collection. This proposal fleshes out 
these two basic proposals. In the context of preparation for this meeting, each par-
ticipant contributed an audio or video record, linked to a CHAT transcript. The 
preparation of the CHAT transcript and the linkage was done in collaboration 
with workers at CMU. The resultant database can be accessed through the instruc-
tions found at http://talkbank.org/aphasia. The current contents of the database 
are: 
1. Four audio recordings of interactions in patients' homes from Beth Arms-
trong. 
2. The crosslinguistic aphasia project data on English, Italian, Chinese, and Ger-
man from the 1990s, directed by Elizabeth Bates. 
3. Chuck Goodwin's video recording of a series of aphasie communications that 
rely heavily on gestural and deictic communication. 
4. Transcripts without audio from 46 patients contributed by Audrey Holland in 
the 1990s. 
5. Video samples of three aphasies contributed by Audrey Holland. 
6. Cookie theft descriptions from patients with dementia contributed by Dan 
Kempler. 
7. Filmed interactions in three situations with a single patient contributed by 
Nina Simmons-Mackie. 
8. Filmed interactions with three patients contributed by Lise Menn. 
9. Seven group discussions involving aphasie patients contributed by Mary 
Oelschlager. 
10. Picture descriptions, story retells, and personal narratives linked to audio con-
tributed by Gloria Olness. 
11. Video interactions in English and Afrikaans contributed by Claire Penn. 
12. Picture descriptions and story retellings linked to audio contributed by Bar-
bara Shadden. 
13. Cinderella story retellings contributed by Cindy Thompson. 
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14. Video of problem solving in participants with TBI contributed by Leanne 
Togher. 
15. Video of discussions of participants with TBI contributed by Lyn Turkstra. 
16. Classic video of a patient with jargon aphasia contributed by Hanna Ula-
towska. 
Conversation Analysis 
Conversation Analysis (CA) is a methodological and intellectual tradition 
stimulated by the ethnographic work of Garfinkel (1967) and systematized by 
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) and others. Recently, workers in this field 
and the related field of text and discourse have begun to publish fragments of their 
transcripts over the Internet. However, this effort has not yet benefited from the 
alignment, networking, and database technology to be used in TalkBank. The 
CHILDES Project has begun the process of integrating with this community. 
Working with Johannes Wagner (http://www.conversation-analysis.net), Brian 
MacWhinney has developed support for CA transcription within CHILDES. 
Wagner plans to use this tool as the basis for a growing database of CA interac-
tions studied by researchers in Northern Europe. 
Researchers studying gestures have developed sophisticated schemes for cod-
ing the relations between language and gesture. For example, David McNeill and 
his students have shown how gesture and language can provide non-overlapping 
views of thought and learning processes. A number of laboratories have large da-
tabases of video recording of gestures and the introduction of data sharing could 
lead to major advances in this field. There are also several major groups studying 
the acquisition of signed languages. One group uses the CHAT-based Berkeley 
System of Transcription. Other researchers use either the SignStream system de-
veloped by Carol Neidle or the Media Tagger system developed by Sotaru Kita. 
Other groups use adaptations of CHAT and SALT. Because each of these groups 
is heavily committed to its own current approach, it may be difficult to find a com-
mon method for data sharing. However, by relying on XML as an interlingua, it 
should be possible to store data from all of these formats in a way that will permit 
movement back and forth between systems. However, the details of this will need 
to be worked out in a meeting with the various groups involved. 
Second Language Learning and Bilingualism 
Annotated video plays two important roles in the field of second language 
learning. On the one hand, naturalistic studies of second language learners can 
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help us understand the learning process. The second use of video in second lan-
guage learning is for the support of instructional technology. By watching authen-
tic interactions between native speakers, learners can develop skills on the lexical, 
phonological, grammatical, and interactional levels simultaneously. TalkBank 
has created a process of data sharing that will address both of these problems. The 
database now has major corpora from learners of French, Czech, German, Eng-
lish, Japanese, and Spanish. In addition to these new corpora from older second 
language learners, there are several extensive new video studies of bilingual de-
velopment in young children. Finally, there are six corpora documenting dual lan-
guage interaction and code-switching in adult bilinguals. 
Legal Discourse 
The SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the United States) project, directed by Jerry 
Goldman at Northwestern University, is currently engaged in digitizing all of the 
oral arguments at the Supreme Court from 1955 to the present. The CMU compo-
nent of this work focuses on scanning and reformatting the transcripts into the 
CHAT format and linking the transcripts to the audio on the sentence level. From 
this point, Mark Liberman and John Bell at the Linguistic Data Consortium will 
provide further word-level alignment of the audio. Once this new database is fully 
constructed and mounted on the TalkBank servers, it will be an outstanding re-
source for legal scholars and an excellent target for collaborative commentary. 
Specifically, we plan to first concentrate our efforts on making available a com-
plete set of cases in these four areas: copyright, privacy and reproductive rights, 
religious expression, and freedom of speech. Working with the University of 
Michigan Press, we will organize collaborative commentary circles in each of 
these areas with the goal of compiling volumes on the legal handling of these is-
sues as reflected in Supreme Court oral arguments. Contributors will include legal 
scholars, historians, conversation analysts, and the attorneys who argued the spe-
cific cases. Kevin Ashley at the University of Pittsburgh and Vincent Aleven at 
CMU will also contribute detailed cognitive analyses of legal argumentation, fo-
cusing on the role of hypothetical and conditional reasoning. 
Child Development 
Finally, we also plan to organize a Collaborative Commentary Circle in the 
subarea of Child Development that focuses on interactional components of social-
ization practices. Within this area, we will include both parent-child interactions 
during the early years and peer group interactions during later years. Many of the 
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members of this circle have already had wide experience with the use of tran-
scripts from the CHILDES database. However, none of them have yet become fa-
miliar with our new facilities for web-based browsing of the video database and 
none have yet been able to think about the application of Collaborative Commen-
tary to these issues. However, this field is a natural for this application. We al-
ready have large quantities of parent-child video in the CHILDES database. We 
have access to peer group data from both school and playground. Catherine Snow 
and Shoshana Blum-Kulka have organized several meetings and sessions involv-
ing workers in the peer-group area. Researchers such as Lois Bloom, Michael 
Lamb, Grazyna Kochanska, and Inge Bretherton have had extensive experience 
with video analysis of parent-child interactions. Our task at this point is to orga-
nize these two subgroups to produce detailed collaborative commentaries. 
5. Collaborative Commentary 
The crucial claim underlying the TalkBank Project is that human communica-
tion is a unified fact and that this unification will eventually force these disparate 
fields to engage in the multidisciplinary study of communication. In order to 
move forcefully in that direction, we have recently been exploring the develop-
ment of a new mode of scientific investigation called collaborative commentary. 
We can define collaborative commentary as the involvement of a research com-
munity in the interpretive annotation of electronic records. The goal of this pro-
cess is the evaluation of competing theoretical claims. The process requires com-
mentators to link their comments and related evidentiary materials to specific seg-
ments of either transcripts or electronic media. 
In order to illustrate how collaborative commentary might work, consider an 
example based on my own interests in the process of word learning. Experimental 
studies of children's word learning have become increasingly sophisticated in re-
cent years, providing evidence for causal cue induction (Ahn - Luhmann, in 
press), analogic mapping (Gentner, in press)), syntactic frame induction (Katz, 
Baker, Mcnamara, 1974), social referencing (Baldwin, 1993) and attentional 
shifting (Merriman, 1999; Smith, 1999). However, there has been virtually no at-
tempt to track the application of these proposed processes to natural word learning 
between parents and children (MacWhinney, in press-b). To explore the neo-
Vygotskyan claim (Nelson, 1998) that word meanings are shaped through com-
municative interactions, I have browsed through online media at the CHILDES 
(childes.psy.cmu.edu) site, locating several instances of videos of mother-child 
book reading in the Julie, Maria, and Rollins corpora. In these interactions, moth-
ers help children turn the pages and name the animals or objects in the pictures. In 
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some cases, children call the pictures by the wrong name. Often mothers use these 
errors as opportunities to provide corrective positive feedback. For example, if 
the child calls a bear a "doggie," the mother will respond, "no, that's a bear, not a 
doggie." 
Building a system to insert comments or "blogs" on these word learning phe-
nomena only makes sense ifit will be quickly picked up by a coherent academic 
community that is deeply committed to the analysis of learning and development 
in real-life contexts. In the area of early word learning, such a community does not 
yet exist. However, there are several research fields where these communities do 
exist. For these areas, practitioners are already waiting for the development of 
tools for producing collaborative commentary. The academic groups that are most 
ripe for the introduction of this tool include: aphasia rehabilitation, medical edu-
cation, and legal argumentation. There are now active research groups engaging 
in collaborative commentary in each of these areas. For example, in the group ex-
amining the oral arguments of the Supreme Court, commentary is currently focus-
ing both on evidence of argument failure in the Napster case and on errors in tran-
scription that reflect serious gaps in the public record of the Court. 
The final goal of TalkBank is the development of an active process of collabo-
rative commentary in each of the 17 research circles studying human talk. This 
process has just now begun, but it is already an exciting beginning. 
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CREATIVITY: METHOD OR MAGIC? 
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Creativity may be a trait, a state or just a process defined by its products. It can be 
contrasted with certain cognitive activities that are not ordinarily creative, such as 
problem-solving, deduction, induction, learning, imitation, trial-and-error, 
heuristics and "abduction", however, all of these can be done creatively too. There 
are four kinds of theories, attributing creativity respectively to (1) method, (2) 
"memory" (innate structure), (3) magic or (4) mutation. These theories variously 
emphasize the role of an unconscious mind, innate constraints, analogy, aesthetics, 
anomalies, formal constraints, serendipity, mental analogs, heuristic strategies, 
improvisatory performance and cumulative collaboration. There is some virtue in 
each, but the best model is still the one implicit in Pasteur's dictum: "Chance favors 
the prepared mind." And because the exercise and even the definition of creativity 
requires constraints, it is unlikely that "creativity training" or an emphasis on free-
dom in education can play a productive role in this preparation. 
Keywords: creativity, creativity training, human mind, unconscious mind, method, 
preparation 
What is "creativity"? Is it a stable cognitive trait that some people have and 
others do not? Is it an occasional state that people sometimes enter into? Or is it 
defined completely by its products: "creativity is as creativity does"? Whatever it 
is, how does creativity come about? How do you do it? Are there rules? Will prac-
tice help make you creative? 
There is probably some truth in all three notions of what creativity is. It is (at 
least sometimes, and to some extent) a trait, because it is a statistical fact that some 
individuals exhibit it repeatedly. It may also be correlated with some other traits; 
some even think it can be predicted by objective psychological tests. But it is also 
obviously a state, because no one is creative all the time, and some people are 
highly creative only once in their lives. Sometimes creativity may not even be a 
special, unique state, but rather a circumstance that is defined by hindsight based 
on something external, something creative an individual happens to have done. 
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There are a number of theories about the underlying mechanisms of creativity, 
theories attributing it to everything from method to madness - none of them very 
satisfactory. As to inducing creativity - by using heuristic strategies or through 
"creativity training" - this has had very limited success. 
Pasteur's dictum. Before proceeding to a discussion of mechanisms and 
methods of creativity, we do well to keep in mind Pasteur's famous dictum, <...le 
hasard favorise l'esprit prepare> ("chance favors the prepared mind"), because 
this will turn out to say more about what can be said about creativity than the more 
ambitious or modern notions. Pasteur was speaking, of course, about a very spe-
cific kind of creativity, namely, experimental scientific creativity. (The quote ac-
tually begins: - "In the experimental fields" or "In the fields of experimentation", 
and was in part concerned with the question of whether experimental discoveries 
- the so-called "serendipitous" ones - are really just lucky accidents.) Pasteur's 
insight seems to apply just as aptly to all forms of creativity, however. 
One can interpret Pasteur's dictum as follows: There is a (perhaps very large) 
element of chance in creativity, but it is most likely to occur if the mind is some-
how prepared for it. Context shows that by "preparation" Pasteur did not mean be-
ing born with the "creative" trait. He meant that existing knowledge and skills rel-
evant to the creative "leap" first had to be sufficiently mastered before a "bolt 
from the blue" was likely. Paradoxically, his suggestion is that the only formula 
for creativity is the most uncreative one imaginable, which is to learn what is al-
ready known. Only then are you likely to have enough of the requisite raw materi-
als for an original contribution, and only then would you even be in a position to 
recognize something worthwhile and original for what it really was. 
Some undefined notions have slipped into this story: "originality", "worth -
whileness", "creative leaps" and "bolts from the blue." Clearly creativity has 
something to do with originality and novelty, but it is just as clear that it can't just 
be equivalent to something new, because so many new things are random, trivial 
or uninteresting. This too has to do with "preparation." A cancer cure (to take a 
mythic example) is unlikely to be discovered by someone who hasn't done his 
homework on what is already known about cancer. He may indeed come up with 
"new" hypotheses no one has ever thought of, but it will be evident to the "pre-
pared" minds of the field when such an untutored hypothesis is simplistic, nonsen-
sical, or a long-abandoned nonstarter (as it is very likely - though not, of course, 
logically certain - to be). 
So novelty is not enough. Something creative must also have some value rela-
tive to what already exists and what is perceived as being needed. (Note that this, 
and all the foregoing discussion, focuses on what might be called "intellectual" or 
"technological" or "practical" creativity, whereas there is, of course, another di-
mension of value that has little to do with practicality and perhaps not much more 
to do with intellectuality, and that is artistic creativity. Here one of the criteria of 
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value is aesthetic value, an affective or emotional criterion that will turn out to re-
surface unexpectedly even in intellectual creativity. We will return to this below, 
but, for now, note that intellectual and practical considerations are not the only 
bases for making value judgments.) 
And even being new and valuable does not seem to be enough: The outcome 
must also be unexpected; there must be a sense that it is surprising. Usually this 
means that it would not have occurred to most people, who were instead attempt-
ing something along the same lines without success precisely because they were 
following conventional expectations - something the surprising result somehow 
violates. 
And here, with this third and last criterion of "unexpectedness", we seem to be 
at odds with Pasteur's dictum. For what can all that "preparation" do but train our 
expectations, establish conventions, move in familiar, unsurprising directions? In 
defining creativity as the production of something that is not only new and valu-
able, but also unexpected, we seem to have put an insuperable handicap on taking 
the path of preparation: For whatever direction the preparation actually leads us 
cannot be unexpected. This does indeed seem paradoxical, but again, a closer look 
at Pasteur's dictum resolves the apparent contradiction: The suggestion is not that 
preparation guarantees creativity. Nothing guarantees creativity. What Pasteur 
means is that the only way to maximize the probability of creativity is preparation. 
He correctly recognized that the essential element is still chance - the unforeseen, 
the unexpected - but that this fortuitous factor is most likely under prepared con-
ditions. 
Having arrived at three (admittedly vague) criteria for what counts as creative, 
we could perhaps strengthen the notion by contrasting it with what is not creative. 
We will find, however, that whereas there are many cognitive activities that are 
ordinarily not in themselves creative, each one is capable of being performed cre-
atively as well, which suggests that creativity is somehow complementary to ordi-
nary cognition. 
What is Not Creative? 
Problem solving. In general, problem solving is not a creative activity (al-
though Stravinsky thought it was - we will return to his view and his rather differ-
ent definition of "problem solving"). Problem solving involves applying a known 
rule or "algorithm" in order to solve problems of an overall type that varies in a 
minor or predictable way. Although some elements of novelty and decision-mak-
ing may be involved - it is an undergraduate fallacy, shaped by the unfortunate 
exigencies of exam-taking, that problem solving can be successfully accom-
plished by rote - and the pertinent rule or formula may require some insight in or-
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der to be understood and applied, conventional applied problem solving is never-
theless a relatively passive and mechanical process. Successfully understanding 
and applying a rule is just not the same as discovering it. However, as our discus-
sion of analogy below will show, sparks of creativity may be involved even in rec-
ognizing that a class of new problems can unexpectedly be solved by an old rule. 
And even in the context of instruction, gifted students may independently redis-
cover new applications of algorithms they have been taught for more limited pur-
poses. 
Deduction. Deductive reasoning, which is defined as reasoning from general 
principles to particular cases (as in deducing from the principles that "All Men are 
Mortal" and "Socrates is a Man" the consequence that "Socrates is Mortal"), is in 
general not creative. On the other hand, viewed in a certain way, all of mathemat-
ics is logical deduction: There are theorems for which it is difficult or impossible 
to see intuitively whether or not they are true, let alone prove they are true by 
showing the steps through which they can be deduced from general principles. 
Hence not all deductions are trivial; some may well require formidable creativity 
to accomplish. In general, it is the size of the deductive gap between the principles 
and their consequences that determines whether or not deduction requires creativ-
ity: "Socrates is Mortal" does not; Fermât's last theorem does. 
Induction. Inductive reasoning, which is defined as "reasoning" from particu-
lar cases to general principles, is also, in general, not creative, but it is more prob-
lematic, for interesting reasons. For whereas in deductive reasoning, once a theo-
rem's truth is known and the proof has been constructed, the path from principles 
to consequences can be traversed relatively mechanically, in inductive reasoning 
there seems to be no available mechanical path other than trial and error; and this 
path, in most interesting cases, can be shown to be either random or endless (or 
both). Hence inductive generalizations that are not trivial (in the way "this apple is 
round, that apple is round, therefore all apples are round" is trivial) do call for cre-
ativity. And even when the general principle is found, there is no "a posteriori" 
path one can reconstruct using hindsight (as one can do after discovering a deduc-
tive proof) so as to lead from the particular to the general - only the other way 
around. 
In other words, there seems to be no general algorithm or rule for doing induc-
tive reasoning. So whereas most everyday induction is very gradual, trivial and 
uncreative, the more substantial instances of inductive "reasoning" are probably 
not reasoning at all, but creativity in action. Note, however, that since the size of 
the "gap" that separates the conventional from the creative is to some degree arbi-
trary (and since it is unlikely that our basic cognitive capacities evolved in the ser-
vice of rare, celebrated events), even "everyday induction" may exhibit bona fide 
elements of creativity that never achieve celebrity. 
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Learning. Although, as with all skills, some people will do it better and more 
impressively than others, learning is, in general, likewise not a creative activity: It 
is the acquisition of knowledge and skills by instruction and example. By its na-
ture it is not something that can give rise to something new and unexpected, al-
though sometimes there are surprises, with creative students discovering (or, just 
as important relative to what they already know and don't know: re-discovering) 
things that go significantly beyond the immediate content of what is being taught 
them. 
Imitation. By definition, imitation gives rise to something that is not new; 
hence it is also in general not a creative activity. And yet it too has been found to 
be an important precursor of creativity, especially artistic creativity. Those who 
ultimately become creative innovators often start out as remarkably astute mimics 
of others. Imitation is also related to other important factors in creativity, such as 
analogy, metaphor and "mimesis" (a Greek theory that art imitates nature). Invari-
ably the new and valuable resembles the old in some (perhaps unexpected) way. 
Trial and error. Almost by definition, trial and error is not creative, involving 
random sampling rather than inspired choice. Yet the role of chance in creativity 
must not be forgotten. "Serendipity" refers specifically to surprising, new, valu-
able outcomes arising purely by chance, and hence potentially out of nothing 
more than random trial and error. Insights may arise from trying a panorama of in-
dividual cases. Nevertheless, random trial-and-error (or "fumble and find") is 
usually a symptom of a particularly uncreative approach. Yet a prominent excep-
tion seems to be the biological evolutionary process (which some have even ad-
miringly described as "creative"): Evolution has produced its remarkable results 
with what, according to the best current theory, is little more than random genetic 
variation, which is then selectively shaped by its adaptive consequences for sur-
vival and reproduction. Similar (usually uncreative) processes are involved in the 
shaping of behavior by its immediate consequences in trial-and-error ("operant" 
or "Skinnerian") learning. 
Heuristics. Heuristics are usually contrasted with "algorithms" in prob-
lem-solving. Solving a problem by an algorithm or failsafe rule is supposed to 
yield an exact, reliable solution that works for every case. "Solving" it by 
heuristics - by an unintegrated and incomplete set of suggestive "rules of thumb" 
that work in some cases, but not in all, and not for fully understood or unified rea-
sons - is just as uncreative as solving it by algorithm. However, many people have 
noticed that heuristic procedures (such as sampling many special cases by 
trial-and-error) sometimes lead to insights, sometimes through inductive general-
ization and analogy with cases in which heuristics succeed, and sometimes be-
cause of the stimulus provided by cases in which heuristics (or even algorithms) 
fail (see the discussion of anomalies, below). 
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Abduction. Peirce has proposed that, besides induction and deduction, there is 
a third process, called "abduction", whereby people find the right generalization 
from considering sample cases even though the probability of finding it is much 
too low. Since this process is hypothetical, it does not really belong in this list of 
things we actually do that are (usually) not creative. However, the rest of the hy-
pothesis does refer to a theme that will arise again when we discuss possible 
mechanisms of creativity. A more recent exponent of Peirceianabduction (and one 
of the most creative thinkers of our age), Noam Chomsky, holds that the reason 
we succeed so often in finding improbable generalizations is that the solutions are 
somehow already built into our brains. Hence, according to this view, creativity is 
a kind of "remembering", much the way Plato thought learning was remembering 
[anamnesis] (not conscious remembering in either case, of course). Ifit is true that 
the innate patterns of our brain activity play such a crucial role in creativity, then 
of course no "preparation" is more important than this (evolutionary?) one, and 
creativity turns out to be in part an instinctive skill. 
Thus ends the (partial) list of suggestive cases of what is ordinarily not creative 
activity. I will now discuss briefly the "state versus trait" issue before going on to 
consider the "creative process" and possible "mechanisms" of creativity. 
Creative Trait or Creative State? 
There is currently considerable debate over whether intelligence is a unitary or 
a plural trait, i.e., is there one intelligence or are there many? Whatever the truth 
may be, it is clear that one sort of "preparation" (not Pasteur's intended one) that a 
mind aspiring to be creative (intellectually, at least) could profit from would be a 
high IQ (or IQs, if there are many). Whether IQ itself is an inherited trait or an ac-
quired "state" is too complex an issue to discuss here (it is probably some of both), 
but note that the unitary/plural issue applies to creativity too. Whether a trait or a 
state, creativity may be either universal or domain-specific, with individuals ex-
hibiting it with some kinds of problems and not with others. The distinction be-
tween intellectual and artistic creativity is itself a case in point (see the discussion 
of the performing arts, below). 
The way IQ tests work is that we pick, in the real world, the human activity or 
skill (called the "criterion") that we regard as intelligent (e.g., doing mathematics) 
and then we design tests that correlate highly with individual differences in this 
criterion activity, high scores predicting high level performance and low predict-
ing low. This is how IQ tests are validated statistically. Trying to do the same with 
"creativity tests" immediately raises problems, however, since the criterion 
"skill" is so rare, diverse and hard to define. So-called "divergent thinking" tests 
of "creativity" have been constructed without any strong validation. They differ 
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from the "convergent" tests of intelligence in that they are open-ended, not having 
a strict correct answer. They are supposed to predict creativity, but the validation 
problems seem insurmountable, because so much of the definition of "giftedness" 
and "genius" is post hoc, based on hindsight after rare cases and unique accom-
plishments. There seems to be a contradiction between the predictiveness of ob-
jective tests and the unpredictable element in creativity. However, if there is a 
(general or problem-specific) trait of "tending to do unpredictable things of 
value", then tests could presumably measure its correlates, if there are any. 
There is also much confusion and overlap with the measurement of the general 
and special intellectual skills, and no clear notion about how they may interact in 
creativity. Life-cycle effects pose problems too: IQ-related skills and knowledge 
increase with age until adulthood, whereas creativity pops up at different ages and 
stages, sometimes early (as with mathematicians), sometimes late (as with writ-
ers). 
In general, the picture we have of creativity based on the objective measure-
ment of individual differences is not very informative, leaving open the very real 
possibility that, except where it depends heavily on a special (noncreative) intel-
lectual skill, there may be no measurable trait corresponding to creativity at all. 
We turn now to creativity as a state or process. 
Underlying Mechanisms 
There are four classes of theories about the underlying mechanisms of creativ-
ity. They can be classified (relatively mnemonically) as: (1) method, (2) memory, 
(3) magic and (4) mutation. The "method" view is that there is a formula for cre-
ativity (usually this is not claimed so crassly). The "memory" view is that the es-
sential factor is somehow innate. The "magic" view is that mysterious, uncon-
scious, inexplicable forces are involved. And the "mutation" view is that the es-
sential element is chance. Let us now consider several candidate theories in terms 
of these four categories: 
The unconscious mind. Creativity as the working of the "unconscious mind" 
is in the class of "magic" theories (such as divine inspiration). It offers no real ex-
planation of the creative process, merely attributing it to a mysterious (and very 
creative) unconscious mind. It is espoused by Hadamard and others in his book on 
mathematical invention, and is, of course, very much influenced by the Freudian 
ideas prevailing at the time. The scenario is that for a time one works consciously 
on a problem, and when one fails, one's unconscious mind somehow continues 
and mysteriously accomplishes what the conscious one could not. From the per-
spective of modern cognitive science this is not very helpful, because all cognitive 
processes are unconscious, and as such, require an explanation, not merely an an-
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thropomorphic attribution to another, wiser (or more primitive) mind analogous 
to the conscious one. 
The problem of explaining creative and noncreative cognition consists of pro-
viding a mechanism for all of our unconscious processing. The only informative 
aspect of the "unconscious-mind" model is the attention it draws to the incom-
pleteness of the role of conscious, deliberate efforts in the creative process. Note, 
however, that Pasteur's dictum had already indicated that preparation was neces-
sary but not sufficient. (Moreover, "conscious, deliberate effort" is not even suffi-
cient to explain such altogether uncreative cognitive activities as remembering a 
name, recognizing a face or adding two and two.) 
Innate structure of the mind. The concept already described as "abduction" 
comes from a "memory" (anamnesis) theory which holds that creativity is some-
how guided or constrained by the innate structure of the mind. (It has a counter-
part theory of biological evolution, "preformationism", according to which 
evolved structure is not shaped by chance and trial-and-error but is already inher-
ent in the structure of matter.) There are two forms that this structural constraint 
can take. Either it works by eliminating many of the possible false starts we could 
take by rendering them (literally) unthinkable in the first place, or it somehow 
guides us in how we select and evaluate the possibilities. Note that this theory at 
first seems to apply more naturally to intellectual creativity, where there presum-
ably exists a "right" or "wrong", rather than to artistic creativity; but of course in 
artistic creativity, where aesthetic (affective and perceptual) criteria prevail, it is 
easy to see how "right" and "wrong" could depend on our sense organs and emo-
tional structure. (The possible role of aesthetic constraints even in intellectual cre-
ativity will be taken up again below.) 
The problem with the abduction view is that it seems to attribute too much spe-
cific innate structure to the mind (and in this respect it has an element of the magi-
cal view). Since language, logic and the mechanical sampling of possible varia-
tions by trial and error seem to allow us to conceive of so much, it is hard to see 
how the first form of abduction - limits on what is conceivable - could have much 
of a role. The problem of creativity seems to begin once we take the vast array of 
conceivable alternatives as given: How do we then find the "right" ones? (This is 
also called the "credit/blame assignment problem" in machine-learning theory.) 
The second form of abduction - selective guidance - may be more promising, 
and will be discussed again below, but for now it should be noted that it is unclear 
to what extent this "guidance" function - the one involved in hunches, conjec-
tures, intuition, etc. (whatever they are) - is an innate, evolutionary one, arising 
from the structure of our minds, rather than an effect of experience, preparation, 
analogy and even chance. The abduction view seems to attribute too much to in-
nate structure without giving any explanation of its nature and origins. 
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Analogy. Although it is not a complete model for the creative process, the view 
emphasizing analogical thinking is clearly a case of method. The suggestion is 
that analogies play an important role in the creative process; that often a new "so-
lution" (or, in the artistic case, a new innovation) will be based on a fruitful and 
previously unnoticed analogy with an existing solution in another area (Hesse, 
Black). This depends a good deal on our capacity and inclination to look for, find 
and appreciate structural, functional and formal similarities. It may well involve a 
basic cognitive process, related to how our knowledge is represented and manipu-
lated. 
There is a more elaborated form of the analogy theory, the "metaphor" theory, 
that applies not only to poetic creation, but to creativity in general. To the extent 
that this theory is not itself merely metaphorical, it is informative about the sur-
prising productiveness of the strategy of finding or even imposing similarities by 
juxtaposing objects, images or ideas and then, in a sense, "reading off or inter-
preting the consequences of the juxtaposition (Harnad). This is not a failsafe strat-
egy, however, any more than systematic induction or random trial and error are, 
for there are many more fruitless and empty analogies than "creative" ones. The 
options are narrowed, however, by preparation (and perhaps abduction), and, with 
the aid of chance, analogy - both deliberate and accidental - does play an undeni-
able role in creativity. 
Preparation. At this point, the Pasteur "method" itself, that of preparation, 
should be mentioned. Creative outcomes tend to be novel recombinations of exist-
ing elements, which must hence all be made readily available in advance by prep-
aration. The probability of generating and recognizing a new and valuable out-
come depends on a sufficient command of what is already available. No surer 
strategy can be recommended to anyone aspiring to make a creative contribution 
in any domain than to master as thoroughly as possible what is already known in 
that domain, and to try to extend the framework from within. This is paradoxical, 
to be sure. First, by definition, a creative contribution will not be with existing 
methods and from "within." Second, there is the well-known problem of falling 
into a mental "set", which involves perseverating with existing methods by habit, 
at the expense of trying out or even noticing new ones (as in going back to look for 
something you've lost in the same place over and over) - precisely what an undue 
emphasis on preparation might be expected to encourage. 
Conventional sets are an everpresent danger, and there exists no formula for 
overcoming them except to bear in mind that mastery does not imply slavishness 
and that the ultimate goal is to transcend conventions, not to succumb to them: An 
attitude of admiration and dedication toward the knowledge or skill one is intent 
on mastering is not incompatible with a spirit of open-mindedness, individuality, 
and even some scepticism; indeed, an early imitative capacity coupled with an el-
ement of rebelliousness may be a predictor of promise in a given domain (al-
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though prodigal gifts sometimes come to nothing). Whether creativity is a state or 
a trait, it is clear that, given the same initial knowledge or skill, some people do 
succeed in making original contributions whereas others fall into fruitless, 
perseverative ruts. The only remaining strategy to be recommended is that if prog-
ress is not being made after a sufficiently long and serious attempt, one should be 
prepared to move on (temporarily or even permanently), perhaps in the hope that 
creativity, like intelligence, is plural, and one will be able to exhibit it in some 
other area. 
The well-known observation that mathematicians tend to make their creative 
discoveries when they are very young may be due to the "set" effect: It may be at 
the point of culmination of one's "preparation" in this most elegant and technical 
problem area - when one is freshly arriving at the threshold of mastery (some-
times called mathematical maturity) - that one is in the best position to make a 
creative contribution in mathematics; then one can spend a lifetime exploring the 
implications of those virginal insights. After longer exposure, unproductive sets 
form and are difficult to break out of. It may be that if they had changed areas or 
had first come to mathematics at a later age, the same precocious individuals 
would have displayed a "later" creativity. It is undeniable, however, that (just as in 
athletics) there are life-cycle - and trait - effects in creativity irrespective of the 
timing or field of one's preparation. The insights and skills of historians and writ-
ers, for example, tend to mature later in life, perhaps because they depend on more 
prolonged and less concentrated "preparation", or because verbal skills mature 
later. 
But despite the everpresent danger of falling victim to uncreative sets, if there 
is one creative "method", then "Pasteurization" is it, with the creative "trait" per-
haps amounting to no more than a rare form of resistance or immunity to conta-
gion from convention despite extensive exposure. 
Intuitive and aesthetic factors. Theories that appeal to "intuition" and "aes-
thetics" as guides for creativity are, as already mentioned, in the "memory" cate-
gory. Apart from what has already been said, it is instructive to reflect on Bertrand 
Russell's anectode (based on a story he heard from William James1) about the 
man who, when he sniffed nitrous oxide (laughing gas) knew the secret of the uni-
verse, but when it wore off, would always forget it. One time he resolved that he 
would write it down while under the influence. When the effects subsided, he 
rushed to see what he had written. It was: "The smell of petroleum pervades 
throughout." What Russell took this anecdote to suggest was that intuition can be 
a false guide too. If one is directed only by one's intuitive or aesthetic sense of 
profundity, then one may be led to attribute cosmic significance to nonsense. So 
Russell suggested that, whereas it may be well and good to allow oneself to be in-
fluenced by aesthetic considerations (what mathematicians have called "beauty", 
"elegance", etc.), one must keep in mind that these subjective intuitions must an-
CREATIVITY: METHOD OR MAGIC? 173 
swer to objective tests subsequently (in the case of mathematics, rigorous 
provability), and that one must not get carried away by one's subjective "epipha-
nies." 
It must be added, however, in favor of intuition, and perhaps abduction, that in 
mathematics there appears to be a "trait", one that only a very few highly gifted 
mathematicians have, of being able to repeatedly make intuitive conjectures that 
turn out subsequently to be proven right. Some even go so far as to say that this 
ability to intuit what is true is the real genius in mathematics, not the ability to pro-
duce rigorous proofs. Of course, the two go together, with no better guide in con-
structing proofs than an intuitive sense of what will turn out to be true and what 
false. In any case, the role of pre-verbal, perceptual and aesthetic intuitions should 
not be under-rated in creativity. Note also that aesthetics need not be innate. Some 
"tastes" may be acquired from preparation, analogy with other areas of experi-
ence, or even chance. 
Anomaly. Another "recipe" for creativity, the preparation/anomaly-driven 
model, is a method based on the observation that creative insights are often pro-
voked by encountering an anomaly or failure of existing solutions. It is not clear 
whether this variable is truly causal or just situational (i.e., where there is to be a 
creative solution, there must first be a problem), but what must ultimately provoke 
a creative solution is evidently some sort of failure of noncreative ones. Some-
times just the discovery that a faithful rule unexpectedly fails to work in certain 
kinds of cases sets one in the right direction. The result, if successful, is a revision 
of an entire framework so as to accommodate the anomaly and at the same time 
subsume prior solutions as special cases. John Kemény used to say: "If I encoun-
ter something new, I first try to fit it into my system; if I cannot, I try to reject it [as 
wrong or irrelevant]; if that fails, then I try to revise my system to fit it" (And, in a 
slightly magical variant of his own, Russell adds: "If all else fails, I consign it to 
my unconscious until something pops up.") 
Despite the role of anomaly as a stimulus (and logical precondition) for creativ-
ity, however, it is hardly a reliable method, as countless noncreative (and unsuc-
cessful) encounters with anomalies must testify. Anomalies may serve to break 
sets, but they may also create them, in the form of repeated unsuccessful attempts 
at resolution. Yet it is undeniable that the history of theory building in science can 
be described as anomaly-driven revision and subsumption." 
Constraints. Another "method" is suggested by Stravinsky's views on the cre-
ative role of "constraints" in what he called "problem solving."3 Stravinsky ex-
plained why he continued to compose tonal music after most composers had aban-
doned the tonal system by saying that "You cannot create against a yielding me-
dium." He needed the tonal system as a constraint within which he could exercise 
creativity. 
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Stravinsky's view may well be a variant on the "preparation" theme, for if 
"anything goes" (because of insufficient preparation), nothing creative can hap-
pen. This is why Stravinsky saw all creativity as problem solving. He felt that a 
creative medium could not be infinitely yielding, infinitely "free." It had to resist 
in some way (perhaps by giving rise to anomalies, problems) in order to allow cre-
ativity to be exercised or even defined. For most of his life Stravinsky personally 
preferred the classical tonal system as a constraint, working to create innovations 
within it; others, such as the twelve-tone composers, rejected tonality, replacing it 
by another system of constraints (possibly, some believe, abductively "unnatural" 
ones, which suggests that even in the arts constraints cannot be entirely arbitrary). 
But Stravinsky's point was that there can be no creativity without problems, no 
problems without constraints, no constraints without preparation. Rules may be 
made to be creatively broken, but they must be mastered before they can be modi-
fied or abandoned, and there must always be new ones to take their place. 
There may be a lesson here for advocates of "touchie-feelie" creative freedom 
(in preference to "pasteurization") in early education. The strategy probably rep-
resents yet another form of ineffectual and perhaps even counterproductive "cre-
ativity training." Although ultimately desirable and even necessary for creativity, 
freedom (the absence of constraint) also makes creativity logically impossible in 
advance of preparation. Moreover, freedom may have more to do with what you 
are than what you do, training hence being better addressed to first showing you 
how to follow rules rather than how to flout them. Perhaps studying the true exam-
ples of creative freedom - and their real-time historical course - would be more 
helpful and stimulating than inculcating fabled freedoms in a yielding medium of 
wishful thinking: The creativity of future generations is more likely to be maxi-
mized by inspired than by indulgent pedagogy.4 
Serendipity. The class of theories that might be called the "cerebral serendip-
ity" school (to which Einstein and Poincare belonged) are mutation theories, em-
phasizing the crucial role of chance in creativity. Pasteur of course believed this 
too. The scenario is one of gathering together the elements and constraints out of 
which a creative solution is (hoped) to arise, and then consigning the rest to the 
(unconscious) "combinatory play" of chance, with intuition perhaps helping to 
suggest which combinations might be fruitful. This view provides an important 
clarification of the role of preparation, for without preparation, the essential ele-
ments out of which a fortuitous combination could arise would simply be absent, 
unrecognized or unappreciated. 
Mental analogs. There are some speculative "mental analog" models, belong-
ing to the memory class, that suggest that sometimes the structure of a problem 
and its solution may have analog counterparts in the mind. Mental "catastrophes" 
and "phase transitions" arising from mental models actually encoded in the brain 
and governed by mathematical catastrophe theory or fractal theoiy have been sug-
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gested, among others. These are still too speculative to be considered, but some-
thing of this sort could in principle mediate abductive solutions, and even ac-
quired ones. 
Heuristic strategies. Another class of methods arises from suggestions (e.g., 
Polya's) to engage deliberately in heuristics - doing random or mechanical 
trial-and-error sampling, trying out analogies and inductive conjectures, etc. - as 
discussed earlier. These strategies might better be described as the heuristic phase 
of preparation. They can clearly guarantee nothing, although they may increase 
the likelihood of a stroke of luck in an otherwise prepared mind. 
Improvisation and performance. A special case combining the heuristic, aes-
thetic and analogic "methods" is suggested by the performing arts, which exhibit 
"real-time", "on-line" creativity while executing, interpreting and, especially, im-
provising upon the formal codes created by composers and playwrights. Musical 
scores and theatrical scripts, together with training in the performing arts, consti-
tute the constraints and the preparation, whereas the performance itself, ifit is not 
merely mechanical but innovative and expressive, is the creative "act." 
There are many misunderstandings of performance as somehow being deriva-
tive or second-rate creativity. This is incorrect. Every creative medium has its own 
constraints, its own "givens". And they all leave room for originality and for inno-
vation - in short, for genius. The performing arts may in fact be especially reveal-
ing about creativity because they "externalize it", so to speak, making it happen 
before your very eyes. The lessons one learns from it are familiar ones: Much 
preparation and craft, considerable imitation of the past, an aesthetic sense guid-
ing one's taste in innovation, and the ability and inclination to do something 
worthwhile, convincing and new with the raw material. Before the "creative" and 
"performing" arts were separated, one might have watched with one's own eyes 
while a performing poet-minstrel, in the thrall of an inspired moment - guided by 
his muse - elaborated an inherited (prepared) tale in a new and inspired way dur-
ing an improvisatory performance. 
Complementarity. Finally, among methods, one must mention the role of col-
laborative, cumulative and complementary efforts in the combinatory play among 
many different minds (perhaps differentially "favored" with intellectual and cre-
ative gifts) in maximizing the likelihood of a creative, joint outcome. The per-
forming arts already suggest that creativity is not a static, and perhaps not even an 
individual process. There is complementary specialization in all creative do-
mains: composer/performer, actor/director, experimentalist/theoretician, intuitive 
conjecturer/rigorous theorem-prover. And then there is the most fundamental 
complementary relation of all: the relation of the present to the past. One's prepa-
ration invariably takes the form of the creative products of one's predecessors. 
They have furnished the constraints on the otherwise yielding medium in which 
one can then try one's own chances at making a creative contribution. 
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Conclusions 
Creativity is a phenomenon with both external and internal contraints. The ex-
ternal ones concern the historical state of the problem domain and the role of the 
unpredictable. The internal ones concern how prepared and how "favored" (en-
dowed) a mind is. Although there are some heuristic methods that one can attempt 
(such as trial-and-error induction and analogy), the best strategy one can adopt to 
maximize the likelihood of creativity is to maximize preparation. Maximization is 
not the same as a guarantee, however; although it is not magical, creativity will al-
ways remain mysterious because of the essential rule of unexpectedness and un-
predictability in its defining conditions. Preparation can only provide a favorable 
setting for chance, not a certain one. Moreover, it is unlikely that chance or free-
dom - i.e., an independent propensity for the fortuitous - can be tutored. Apart 
from problem-specific preparation and open-mindedness, one's only remaining 
strategy is to be prepared, given one's mental, physical and experiential resources, 
to move on (temporarily or permanently) to other potential creative problem do-
mains if a sufficiently dedicated and patient effort ends in unproductive, 
perseverative loops: Finding one's creative calling (ifit exists) may itself call for 
some (prepared) trial-and-error sampling, guided, perhaps, by the native or ac-
quired dictates of one's aesthetic judgment, but ever dependent for success on the 
vagaries of chance. 
Suggested Readings: Black, Models and Metaphors; Hadamard, The Psychol-
ogy of invention in the Mathematical Field; Harnad, Metaphor and Mental Dual-
ity; Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science; Stravinsky, The Poetics of Music; 
Polya, How To Solve It. 
Notes 
http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/jnitrous.html and http://www.theatlantic.com/  
issu es/96may/n itrous/n itrou s. h tm 
New "paradigms", though they may involve startlingly bold innovations, must still be com-
mensurable with the past, at least in the sense of subsuming it as a special case (e.g., the 
flat-earth theory, which will always remain approximately true); this shows that theory build-
ing is actually a cumulative and perhaps never-ending series of closer and closer approxima-
tions converging on the "truth." 
It must be borne in mind that Stravinsky's suggestion may be peculiar to artistic creativity, 
where the constraints can be provided from within, so to speak, unlike in science and mathe-
matics, where they come from without: from external reality and from the formal world of log-
ical and mathematical consistency. 
Readers wishing to form their own judgments about some of the adult creativity training meth-
ods that exist may want to read a book or attend a seminar on "brainstorming", "synectics", 
"lateral thinking" or some other soundalike. Or you may sample the offerings of any organiza-
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tion that also specializes in weekends on "rebirthing" and "making miracles work for you." Do 
not be confused by the fact that the adjective "creative" will tend to be freely appended to most 
of the available offerings, irrespective of their specific benefits. 
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Das Ungarnbild der deutschen Historiographie. Hg. Márta Fata 
Stuttgart (Franz Steiner) 2004. 
(Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Donauschwäbische Landeskunde, 13) 
ISBN 3 515 08428 2, Preis 48,00 €. 
Der vorliegende Band geht auf die Jahrestagung des Instituts für Donauschwäbische Ge-
schichte und Landeskunde im Jahre 2000 zurück. Die Verfasser haben sich nicht die Aufgabe 
gestellt, Vorstellungen über Ungarns Geschichte insgesamt zu überblicken. Vielmehr soll der 
Band, wie Márta Fata einführend fomiuliert, „anhand ausgewählter Themen, Historikerper-
sönlichkeiten oder am Beispiel der Werkstattarbeit eine Bestandaufnahme der bisher gestellten 
wichtigsten Fragen an die ungarische Geschichte leisten und aufzeigen, wie das Ungarnbild der 
deutschen Historiographie entsteht" (22). Während das literarische, publizistische oder landes-
kundliche Ungarnbild schon in verschiedener Hinsicht untersucht wurde, sei das der Historio-
graphie bisher ausgespart geblieben. In der Tat beleuchtet der Band verschiedene grundsätzli-
che Aspekte der Darstellung der ungarischen Geschichte in Deutschland, geht der Deutung und 
Präsentation einzelner Ereignisse und Epochen nach, beschäftigt sich dabei eingehender mit 
Fragen der Rechtsgeschichte und aktuellen Rechtsentwicklung aus deutscher Sicht, blickt auf 
historische Forschungskontakte, aber auch auf deutsche historiographische Einflüsse in Un-
garn und das britische Bild ungarischer Geschichte aus. Ein Beitrag zur Münchener Hungaro-
logie gibt einen Einblick in die Entwicklung und die aktuellen Herausforderungen der historio-
graphischen Beschäftigung mit Ungarn in einer wichtigen deutschen „Werkstatt" - diese Aus-
führungen sind durch die lange Zeit, die bis zum Erscheinen verstrichen ist, freilich eher exem-
plarisch zu lesen. Damit wird ein informatives Mosaik zu wichtigen Fragen der deutschen Un-
garn-Historiographie präsentiert, an dem neben gestandenen Spezialisten für einzelne Berei-
che auch einige jüngere Wissenschaftler mitgewirkt haben. 
Der Band ist locker in mehrere Teilbereiche gegliedert. Nach dem kurzen Grußwort des 
Rektors, Eberhard Schaich und einer Einleitung der Herausgeberin zum „Ungarnbild in der 
deutschen Historiographie" (11-24) folgt ein Hauptteil zu „Geschichtsbildern", der Epochen 
und Probleme von der mittelalterlichen Geschichte bis zum Systemwechsel behandelt. János 
M. Bak betrachtet „Herrschergestalten des mittelalterlichen Königreichs Ungarn in der neue-
ren deutschen Mediävistik" (25-30), István Futaky die „ungarische Geschichte an der Göttin-
ger Universität im 18. Jahrhundert" (31^48), ein weiterer Beitrag Márta Fatas gilt „Ungarns 
Geschichte in deutschen historischen Darstellungen zwischen Nationalismus, Konservatismus 
und Liberalismus im ersten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts" (49-83), Joachim von Putikamer un-
tersucht „Ungarns Nationalitätenproblem im 19. Jahrhundert und die jüngere Nationalismus-
forschung" (84-98). Daran schließen sich die schon erwähnten Exkurse an, die Attila Pók bzw. 
Robert Evans zu „Rankes Einfluss auf Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdenken in Un-
garn" (99-109) bzw. zu „Ungarn in der britischen Geschichtsschreibung" ( 110-125) unterneh-
men. Es folgen László Orosz'' Auswertung der „Verbindungen der deutschen Südostforschung 
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zur ungarischen Wissenschaft zwischen 1935 und 1944", untersucht „anhand des Briefwech-
sels zwischen Fritz Valjavec und Elemér Mályusz" (126-167), Krisztina Kalteneckers Be-
trachtung der „Darstellung der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ungarn in der Bonner Doku-
mentation" (168-191), Gerhard Seewanns Beobachtungen zu den Arbeiten „Deutscher Histo-
riker zur Geschichte Ungarns im 20. Jahrhundert" in der Spannbreite „Zwischen Positivismus, 
Anpassung und Innovation" (192-213) und Andreas Schmidt-Schweizers Beitrag zum „Politi-
schen Systemwechsel in Ungarn 1988/1989 aus der Sicht eines deutschen Historikers" 
(214-224). „Bilder aus der Rechtsgeschichte" betreffen „Das historische Ungarnbild in der 
deutschen Rechtsgeschichtswissenschaft" (Katalin Gönczi, 226-239), „Die Aufarbeitung der 
ungarischen Rechtsentwicklung 1945-1990 durch die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft" (Georg 
Brunner, 240-252) und den „Minderheitenschutz im ungarischen Recht nach 1990 im Spiegel 
der deutschen Fachliteratur" (Johannes Berger, 253-263). Der letzte Abschnitt betrachtet 
„Wege der Vermittlung". Hier schreiben Holger Fischer über „Mythen und Legenden versus 
Fakten und Strukturen", nämlich „Zur Problematik deutschsprachiger Gesamtdarstellungen 
der ungarischen Geschichte" (267-288), Maximilian Keller über „Die Lechfeldschlacht, ein 
Ereignis zwischen historischer Forschung und populärwissenschaftlicher Darstellung" 
(289-298) und Martin Zuckert über „Ungarn in deutschen Schulgeschichtsbüchern" („Schlag-
lichter im Kontext deutscher Geschichte?", 299-309). Ein Beitrag Zsolt Lengyels zur „Hunga-
rologie im Ungarischen Institut München. Grundlagen, Ursachen und Ziele der NeuproFilie-
rung um die Jahrtausendwende" (310-326) läßt den Band mit einem Ausblick in die Realität 
der Forschung abschließen. Ein Personen- und ein Ortsregister (327-332, 333-334) sowie ein 
knappgehaltenes Verzeichnis der Mitarbeiter ergänzen den Band. 
Márta Fata gibt einleitend einen instruktiven Überblick über die Positionierung Ungarns in 
Raumkonzepten der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft vom Wiener Kongreß über die Zeit 
nach dem Ersten und dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis in die Gegenwart im Kontext politischer Rah-
menbedingungen und wissenschaftspolitischer Setzungen. Den Bezugspunkt, die Leistungsfä-
higkeit aktueller Ansätze zu überprüfen, bietet ihr deren Vermögen, der „Ausarbeitung regio-
nalspezifischer Geschichtspfade" behilflich zu sein (16, vgl. 14). Dies gilt gewiß weiterhin, 
auch wenn die um 2000 in der Fachöffentlichkeit vehement vorgetragenen Vorschläge zur 
Aufhebung der ostmittel- oder südosteuropäischen Geschichte in einer allgemeinen Geschich-
te seitdem zur Ruhe gekommen oder in das Inventar der zuständigen, vom Sparzwang her den-
kenden Ministerialbürokratie übergegangen sind. Die Ergebnisse der jüngeren Forschung, so 
resümiert Fata unter Hinweis auf die Beiträge des Bandes, belegen zugleich die zunehmende 
Einbindung ungarnspezifischer Forschung in breitere Fragestellungen und die enger werdende 
Verbindung zwischen eigener und fremder Geschichtsschreibung auch zu Ungarn. 
János M. Bak schreitet in seinem Beitrag chronologisch die Reihe wichtiger mittelalterli-
cher Herrscherpersönlichkeiten - Stephans des Heiligen, Sigismunds von Luxemburg, Mat-
thias Hunyadi - ab. Am Beispiel Stephans läßt sich die primär von Deutschland ausgehende 
Formulierung von Leitfragen und Wahl von Blickwinkeln in der älteren Forschung besonders 
deutlich belegen. Bak würdigt neuere Ansätze, und insbesondere die neuen Ergebnisse, mit de-
nen einzelne deutsche Forscher - Hoensch zu Sigismund, Nehring und Hoensch zu Hunyadi -
vorgelegt haben. - István Futaky liefert eine kurze, wohlinformierte Zusammenfassung der 
Entwicklung der Göttinger Geschichtsschreibung zu Ungarn, von der ersten interessierten 
Kenntnisnahme bis zur zunehmenden Verwissenschaftlichung im späten 18. Jahrhundert. 
Deutlich wird auch die wichtige Rolle, die das Interesse von Studenten und Gelehrten aus Un-
garn und die Kontakte zu Ungarn dabei spielten. Nach 1800 allerdings erlahmte das Interesse, 
ja das Thema schien einer gewissen erneuten Exotisiemng zu unterliegen: die frühere „große 
Generation" war gestorben, und das unruhige napoleonische Zeitalter sei „keine günstige Zeit 
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für die mehr oder weniger 'exotischen Wissenschaften' " gewesen (48). - Márta Fata geht dem 
Ungarnbild von drei exemplarischen Vertretern des Nationalismus, Konservatismus und Libe-
ralismus des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts, nämlich Ernst Moritz Arndt, Friedrich Schlegel und Karl 
von Rotteck nach. Während Rotteck sein Ungarnbild aufgrund zeitgenössischer Literatur und 
vermittelter Informationen als Teil seiner „Weltgeschichte" konzipierte, verfügten Arndt und 
Schlegel zudem über eigene Eindrücke: Arndt hatte auf einer Europareise 1798/99 u.a. auch 
Ungarn bereist, und Schlegel hatte sich als Stabsmitglied der Année Erzherzog Karls 1809 in 
Ungarn aufgehalten. Der Aufsatz ist methodisch höchst interessant und mit dem konsequenten 
Blick auf Ungarn als Fallbeispiel auch hinsichtlich der überindividuellen Differenzen der ge-
nannten Richtungen erhellend zu lesen. Das größte Interesse hat offensichtlich Arndt gefun-
den, der im Spannungsfeld zeitgenössischer Konzepte von Nation und Politik sicher auch be-
sonders ergiebig ist, während Schlegel und Rotteck die erforderlichen Gegenstücke liefern. Al-
len gemeinsam war, daß ihre Beurteilung der neuzeitlichen Entwicklung, insbesondere die -
bei allen Unterschieden im Detail anerkannte - enge Verbindung Ungarns mit den Habsbur-
gern auf Ablehnung stieß, aber auch daß sie mangels wissenschaftlicher Geschichtsschreibung 
und systematischer Rezeption in Ungarn als Historiker keine Wirkung ausübten. - Joachim 
von Puttkamer geht in seinem Beitrag weniger auf das Ungarnbild der deutschen Geschichts-
schreibung als vielmehr auf die Deutung eines Problems der jüngeren ungarischen Geschichte, 
nämlich der Nationalitätenfrage des 19. Jahrhunderts, in der internationalen Geschichtsschrei-
bung einschließlich der ungarischen ein.1 An drei Diskussionsfeldern, nämlich der ungarischen 
Nationalitätenpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert, den Triebkräften der Magyarisierung und der inneren 
Struktur der ungarischen Nationsidee arbeitet er den Beitrag heraus, den die kulturwissen-
schaftliche Perspektive zum Verständnis des Problems wie zum Hinausgehen über die Typisie-
rungen der älteren Forschung leisten kann bzw. schon geleistet hat. Diese kulturwissenschaftli-
che Nationalismusforschung habe auch für Ungarn „den ungeheuren Sog eines ethnisierten 
Nationsbegriffs hervorgehoben", der seinem staatsbürgerlichen Gegenstück in der Vermitt-
lung eines Leitbilds bürgerlicher Modernität und nationaler Selbstbehauptung überlegen war. 
Die ältere Typologie von Staatsnationalismen westlichen und Sprachnationalismen östlichen 
Typs werde damit in den Hintergrund gedrängt. „Deutlich geworden ist ein allgemeiner 
Gleichklang der Formulierung und Inszenierung nationaler Konzepte, die sich ähnlicher Ele-
mente und Formen in nur graduell verschiedener Gewichtung bedienten." In diesem Sinne sei, 
wie die Überschrift formuliert, Ungarn denn auch „kein europäischer Sonderfall". Dagegen 
verlieh die Vielzahl konkurrierender Nationalbewegungen dem ungarischen Fall besondere 
Züge. Der kurze Ausblick auf die spätere Entwicklung aus kulturhistorischer Perspektive zeigt, 
wie sehr aktive Prozesse von Wertsetzung und Selbstverortung die Definition und Redefinition 
nationaler Identität beeinflußten. 
Von Attila Pók stammt der erste Exkurs dieser Betrachtungen, der sich mit Rankes Einfluß 
auf Ungarn beschäftigt. Kenntnisreich stellt Pók Rankes Ungarnbild und die Phasen seiner 
Kenntnisnahme durch ungarische Publizisten und Historiker vor. Produktive Anregungen ent-
nahm Rankes Schaffen Henrik Marcali. Speziell in dessen Werk über die Zeit Joseph II. er-
blickt Pók Parallelen zu Rankes Herangehensweise. Positiver Bezugspunkt war Ranke auch für 
den prägenden Historiker der Zwischenkriegszeit, Gyula Szekfü. Wie schwer sich dagegen die 
Historikerzunft der sozialistischen Ära mit Ranke tat, zeigt schon allein die verquaste Sprache, 
in der sie ihre Wesenszuschreibungen über den auch von ihr nicht einfach abzutuenden Vor-
gänger formulierte. Eine Korrektur und grundsätzliche Nuancierung des Bildes nahm erst 
Agnes Várkonyi in den 70er Jahren vor. Somit ist die Geschichte der ungarischen Ranke-Re-
zeption in erster Linie als Niederschlag der Veränderungen in der ungarischen Geschichts-
schreibung lesen. - In einem weiteren Exkurs geht Robert Evans auf C. A. Macartney und 
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seine Vorgänger ein. Die historische wie publizistische Beschäftigung mit Ungarn, das aus bri-
tischer Sicht weitaus ferner gelegen war als aus deutscher, wurde mit dem Revolutionsjahr 
1848 spürbar intensiver und fand dann in der dualistischen Ära in begrenztem Umfang Fortset-
zung. Einen Umbruch erlebte die bis dahin grundsätzlich sympathisierende Sichtweise mit 
Hugh Seaton-Watsons 1908 erschienene Schrift „Racial problems of Hungary", der schon vor 
dem I. Weltkrieg weitere ähnlich akzentuierte Arbeiten des Verfassers folgten. Auch vor die-
sem Hintergrund war Macartneys erstes Werk innovativ, in dem er auch auf die mit dem Tria-
non-Vertrag vorgezeichneten Konflikte hinwies. In seinem späteren Schaffen widmete er sich 
allen Epochen der Geschichte Ungarns, ganz besonders jedoch seiner Nachkriegsentwicklung, 
die er mustergültig in ihren breiteren Kontext einzuordnen verstand. 
László Orosz knüpft an frühere Arbeiten von Karl Nehring über Fritz Valjavec und Gyula 
Szekfü an und untersucht den Briefwechsel zwischen Valjavec und Elemér Mályusz. Eingangs 
zeichnet er den Werdegang von Valjavec und dessen politischen Prägungsprozeß nach, als des-
sen Ergebnis Orosz die Ausrichtung auf das Südostdeutschrum und die Positionierung als Ver-
treter von Deutschlands „kämpfender Wissenschaft" sieht. Der Briefwechsel mit Mályusz, den 
er unter den insgesamt 117 ungarischen Wissenschaftlern auswählt (166). mit denen Valjavec 
als Redakteur der Südostdeutschen Forschungen, später Südostforschungen in Kontakt stand, 
ist besonders interessant, weil Mályusz - im Unterschied etwa zu dem geistesgeschichtlich po-
sitionierten und in Ungarn maßgeblichen Szekfü - mit seinem sozialgeschichtlich ausgerichte-
ten Konzept von Volksgeschichte einen Ansatz verfolgte, der dem Valjavec1 ähnlich war, des-
sen politische Stoßrichtung jedoch nicht teilte. In mehreren Argumentationssträngen verfolgt 
Orosz, wie Valjavec versuchte, sich selbst auch in der ausländischen Fachöffentlichkeit Repu-
tation zu verschaffen, hierzu potentiell Gleichgesinnte heranzuziehen wie die verschiedenen 
Lager gegeneinander auszuspielen, aber auch den eigenen Standpunkt in jeweils verschiede-
nem Licht erscheinen zu lassen, und im Interesse des internationalen Ansehens seiner Zeit-
schrift möglichst breit Mitarbeiter zu gewinnen. Daß der an einem literaturgeschichtlichen In-
stitut arbeitende Orosz hierzu die feinen Umakzentuierungen von Texten analytisch heran-
zieht, um das Vorgehen von Valjavec zu demonstrieren, gereicht dem Aufsatz sehr zum Vor-
teil. Manches, was er im Detail herausstellt, wird dann in der Zusammenfassung wieder zu-
rückhaltender formuliert - auf die Dissertation, deren Teil dieser Beitrag vermutlich sein wird, 
darf man gespannt sein. - Krisztina Kaltenecker beschäftig! sich mit dem Ungarn-Band der 
1951 begonnenen Dokumentation und Darstellung der Vertreibung aus den Ostgebieten, der 
erstmals 1956 erschien. Insbesondere vergleicht sie das Ungarnbild der Bonner Kommission 
mit den Aussagen der damals zugänglichen Quellen zur Zwangsaussiedlung, um dessen sub-
jektive Züge aufzudecken. Wesentliche Verzeichnungen stellen danach insbesondere die An-
nahme einer eingeschränkten Souveränität „des besiegten und zur Zuständigkeit der sowjeti-
schen Alliierten Kontrollkommission gehörenden Ungarns", der „Mythos des ungarischen Wi-
derstands gegen die sowjetische Forderung" zur Aussiedlung von 500.000 Deutschen und das 
Übergehen des Vorgehens der ungarischen Regierungen dar, die eine internationale Aufforde-
rung zur Aussiedlung und die Kaschierung der Kollektivschuldthese anstrebten (190). Die 
Darstellung der Lage der Deutschen in Ungarn und der Nationalitätenfrage wiederum, wie sie 
die Publikation von 1956 vornimmt, ließe sich auch als „potentielles politisches Argument zur 
Untermauerung der deutschen Position bei den künftigen Friedensverhandlungen", im Sinne 
des Anrechts der Heimatvertriebenen auf ihre alte Heimat (191) lesen. - Gerhard Seewann 
stellt eine „Typologie der sich mit Ungarn befassenden historischen Arbeiten deutscher Histo-
riker" vor, auf die auch der Haupttitel seines sehr kritisch gehaltenen Beitrags prägnant ver-
weist. „Der erste Typ ist von einem vordergründigen Positivismus geprägt, der zweite von ei-
ner Anpassung beziehungsweise Anlehnung an die ungarische Geschichtsforschung und der 
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dritte hat die Stufe der Emanzipation von letzterer erreicht und kann deshalb kritisch-innovativ 
wirksam werden", wobei er Mischungen mehrerer, ja aller Ansätze in einzelnen Studien zuge-
steht (193). Zur ersten Gruppe zählen zwangsläufig viele Historiker, die mangels ausreichen-
der Sprachkenntnisse gestützt auf die Arbeiten ausländischer Kollegen oder deutsche Publika-
tionen von Ungarn arbeiten. Wer wiederum Grenzen überschreiten kann, passe sich mitunter 
zu unkritisch - in bewußter Wertung wie impliziter, terminologisch vermittelter Identifikation 
mit einer dominanten Auffassung - der Binnensicht des untersuchten Landes an. Als anstre-
benswert erscheint demgegenüber der Typus der emanzipatorischen und innovativ wirkenden 
Historiographie. Aufgrund seiner Andersartigkeit im Vergleich zu den im Lande dominanten 
Forschungsansätzen - etwa sozial- und kulturgeschichtlichen Betrachtungsweisen gegenüber 
traditionell staatsbezogenen Themen und Fragestellungen - habe es dieser Ansatz jedoch 
schwer, sich durchzusetzen (195). Über Chancen bzw. über Voraussetzungen, um dies zu über-
winden, reflektiert der Autor im folgenden. Abschließend analysiert er anhand einer gemein-
sam mit Holger Fischer erstellten Bibliographie relevanter Veröffentlichungen zum 20. Jahr-
hundert aus den Jahren 1980-1999 (203-213) die thematischen Gewichtungen der aktuellen 
deutschen historischen Forschung. - Andreas Schmidt-Schweizer stellt, da das Thema in der 
deutschen historiographischen Literatur bisher keine breitere Berücksichtigung gefunden 
habe, eigene Forschungsergebnisse zum Systemwechsel in Ungarn 1988/89 vor. Deren Kern 
ist die Charakterisierung der Entwicklung als „politische Systemtransformation von innen", 
also keinesfalls als Ergebnis von „Ausgleichsverhandlungen zwischen den Machthabern und 
der Opposition". „Maßgebliche Impulse und grundlegende Schritte" seien vom Reformlager 
innerhalb der MSZMP ausgegangen und ohne Druck der Öffentlichkeit gefällt worden (223). 
Auch bei Einbeziehung bisher nicht zugänglicher Quellen meint Schmidt-Schweitzer eine 
„Rückkehr zur These der 'verhandelten Revolution'" ausschließen zu können (224). 
Die „Bilder der Rechtsgeschichte" werden von dem Aufsatz von Katalin Gönczi zum histo-
rischen Ungarnbild eingeleitet. Die historische Schule der Rechtswissenschaft, deren romanis-
tischer Zweig ebenso wie der germanistische, zeigten an Ungarn nachvollziehbarer Weise kein 
Interesse. Das weitgehende Fehlen von Berührungspunkten wie die ungarische Rechtspraxis 
bis Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts mit ihrer fehlenden Trennung von historischem und gelten-
dem Recht trugen gleichfalls hierzu bei. Der entstehende Rechtsvergleich bot dann Anknüp-
fungsmöglichkeiten, die jedoch zunächst nicht realisiert wurden. Während des Dualismus wur-
de zumindest in breiterem Umläng ungarische rechtswissenschaftliche Literatur rezipiert. Mit 
der Entwicklung der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft hin zu einer nationalistisch geprägten und 
politisch motivierten Geschichtsschreibung konzentrierte sich das Interesse auf die Verbrei-
tung deutschen Rechts in Osteuropa. Besonders stark „durchpolitisiert" wurde die Stadtrechts-
forschung. Erst die jüngere Integration nationaler Rechtssysteme habe zur Suche nach den ge-
meinsamen Grundlagen der europäischen Rechtskultur angeregt, die nun auch in der rechtsge-
schichtlichen Ungarnforschung zu beobachten sei (239). - Georg Brunner konzentriert sich auf 
die Beschäftigung der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft mit der Entwicklung in Ungarn 
1945-1990. Seine Ausführungen sind zugleich ein kritischer Kommentar zu dem Projekt 
„Nonndurchsetzung in europäischen Nachkriegsgesellschaften" des MPI, dessen Ertrag Brun-
ner als enttäuschend betrachtet und das er als vertane Chance zur rechtsgeschichtlichen For-
schung wertet. Ein Grund dafür sei, daß das Projekt eben nicht auf dem Stand der rechtsge-
schichtlichen Forschung aufgebaut habe, den Brunner selbst handbuchartig und pointiert und 
mit einigen Seitenhieben auf des erwähnte Vorhaben beschreibt. Anhand der kurzen Vorstel-
lung von Forschungseinrichtungen zur Ostrechtsforschung und zum Rechtsvergleich, ostrecht-
lichen SpezialZeitschriften und allgemeinen rechtsvergleichenden Zeitschriften, sowie zur Tä-
tigkeit von Einzelpersonen, die aufgrund der wissenschaftsorganisatorischen Voraussetzungen 
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entscheidend und prägend waren, sowie in einem abschließenden Blick auf Methodenfragen 
beschreibt er eine schmal ausgestattete, aber intensiv tätige, profilierte und in engem Kontakt 
zur ungarischen Rechtswissenschaft stehende Forschungsrichtung, die von historisch bzw. po-
litologisch arbeitenden Kollegen flankiert wurde. - Johannes Berger sichtet anschließend die 
deutsche Fachliteratur zum ungarischen Minderheitenschutz nach 1990. Generell ist zu konsta-
tieren, daß die deutsche Wissenschaft die ungarische Gesetzgebung und Praxis mit der Frage 
nach geeigneten Modellen für den Schutz von Minderheiten überhaupt - und keineswegs nur 
mit Blick auf die deutsche Minderheit - betrachtet und sich an potentiellen Lösungen für ethni-
sche Konflikte generell interessiert zeigt. Die meisten Beiträge stammen aus der Zeit um die 
oder kurz nach der Veröffentlichung des einschlägigen Gesetzes von 1993 und nehmen folg-
lich theoretische Bewertungen vor. Weitere Veröffentlichungen datieren vom Ende der 90er 
Jahre und können auch die Wirkung des Gesetzes untersuchen. Nonnen und Ziele des Gesetzes 
werden sehr positiv bewertet. Neuere Beiträge weisen auf Probleme hin, die sich aus dem Prin-
zip der freien Identitätswahl ergeben bzw. die bei der Umsetzung des Gesetzes angesichts feh-
lender oder knapper finanzieller Mittel auftreten. Ein besonderes Problem bilden aus der Sicht 
der Literatur die Roma, in deren Fall die Notwendigkeit staatlichen Handelns gesehen wird, de-
ren Probleme aber meist nicht als ethnische, sondern als „soziale und gesellschaftliche" (sie, ?) 
betrachtet, also jedenfalls außerhalb der klassischen Minderheitenrechts-Fragen eingeordnet 
würden. Nicht eingelöst sei nach wie vor das Versprechen einer Beteiligung der Minderheiten 
am politischen Prozeß durch eine parlamentarische Minderheitenvertretung.~ 
Der erste Beitrag zu den „Wegen der Vermittlung" stammt von Holger Fischer und unter-
sucht deutsche Gesamtdarstellungen der ungarischen Geschichte. Fischer interessiert das Ver-
mögen zur Destruktion von Mythen und Legenden und der Umgang der Geschichtsschreibung 
mit den Realitäten der Vergangenheit - ob nun seitens deutscher oder deutsch veröffentlichen-
der ungarischer Verfasser. Wer Holger Fischer kennt, wird nicht enttäuscht - auch hier gibt es 
eine sorgfältig aufbereitete quantifizierende Sichtung der Inhalte und Proportionen der be-
trachteten Werke inklusive graphischer Darstellungen (bes. 271, 287-288). Der Verfasser, der 
selbst als Autor einer Gesamtdarstellung hervorgetreten ist,3 ist ein vorzüglicher Kenner der 
Materie und hat hier fürjeden, der das für seine Zwecke am besten geeignete Werk sucht, den 
wohl besten Überblick vorgelegt, der dazu in kurzer Form gegeben werden kann. Neben den 
auch äußerlich relativ leicht ersichtlichen Strukturmerkmalen (Gliederung, Apparat, Literatur) 
geht er detailliert auch auf Thesen der Werke bzw. in ihnen gepflegte Geschichtsmythen ein, 
die wohl publizistisch wirksam, für die Verbreitung einer objektiven und zumal wissenschaft-
lichen Sicht auf Ungarn aber hinderlich sind und statt dessen thematisiert und selbst zum Ge-
genstand historischer Darstellung gemacht werden sollten. - Maximilian Georg Kellner stellt 
Sichtweisen der Lechfeldschlacht vor. Dabei konzentriert er sich zunächst auf neuere Präsenta-
tionen in Schulbüchern und populärwissenschaftlichen Darstellungen, demonstriert Akzentu-
ierungen und versteckte Botschaften, und holt dann weiter aus, um auch die Behandlung des 
Ereignisses in den Quellen sowie in Texten aus dem 19. und früheren 20. Jahrhundert zu unter-
suchen. Ganz zum Schluß der instruktiven Sichtung erfahren wir auch noch, daß gerade die 
Hagiographie, der die plündernden und modernden Heiden die ideale Szenerie abgaben, um 
ihre Helden ins rechte Licht zu setzen, zu der Einordnung der Ungarn als „Hauptübel" jener 
Zeit beigetragen habe - „obwohl innere Unruhen, Normannen und Sarazenen nicht weniger 
Opfer forderten" (298). - Martin Zuckert betrachtet die Behandlung Ungarns in deutschen 
Schullehrbüchern. Dabei konzentriert er sich auf Schulbücher, die in den 1990er Jahren er-
schienen sind, und schließ damit an die früheren Untersuchungen von Bak und Szabolcs bis 
Mitte der 60er bzw. bis Ende der 80er Jahre an. Er stellt Schwerpunkte und Lücken der Be-
handlung Ungarns zusammen, konstatiert, daß in gewissen Bereichen, etwa der Reformations-
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geschichte, sogar ein Schwinden der Präsenz erfolgt ist, Ungarn dagegen zum 19. und 20. Jahr-
hundert mehr Raum erhält, wenn es auch vielfach als Teil der Habsburgermonarchie oder le-
diglich zur Behandlung der Nationalitätenproblematik erscheint. Nach der Lechfeldschlacht 
verschwindet Ungarn jedenfalls aus der Darstellung deutscher Geschichte, um im günstigsten 
Fall im Kontext der Revolution 1848/49 wieder aufzutauchen. Während Generalisierungen an-
gesichts der Vielzahl betrachteter Werke und im Detail divergierender Lösungen hier schwer 
vorzunehmen sind, sei auf die sehr produktive Vorgehensweise des Verfassers hingewiesen, 
innerhalb der in Schulbüchern immer anstehenden Kompromisse zwischen Genauigkeit und 
knappem Platz s.E. besonders gelungene und methodisch richtungsweisende Lösungen her-
vorzuheben. - Zsolt Lengyel stellt abschließend die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer der 
wichtigsten Zentren ungarnbezogener historischer Forschung, das Ungarische Institut in Mün-
chen, vor. Mußte sich seine Tätigkeit trotz weitergehender Ambitionen seiner Gründer lange 
Zeit auf die Herausgabe wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse in der Buchreihe „Studia Hungarica" 
und im „Ungarn-Jahrbuch" konzentrieren und überwiegend forschungsorganisierend und wis-
senschaftsvermittelnd tätig sein und konnte es weitergehende Ziele nur gestützt auf das persön-
liche Engagement einzelner Forscher verfolgen, so erhielt es 1999 nach gründlicher Evaluie-
rung die Möglichkeit, auch sein wissenschaftliches Arbeitsprofil auszubauen. Lengyel skiz-
ziert abschließend die Entwicklungsperspektive, die sich 2000/01 abzeichnete - und deren ak-
tueller Stand durch einen Blick auf die Website des Instituts ergänzt werden sollte. 
Verfasser und Herausgeber haben also einen lesenwertes und in einzelnen Teilen zudem als 
Nachschlagewerk zu Fragen der deutschen Historiographie zu Ungarn nutzbares Werk vorge-
legt. Die Schärfe der Einschätzungen gerade zu Mythen, Legenden und Befangenheiten man-
cher Kollegen in einigen Beiträgen mag überraschen. Mit Blick auf den fortlebenden ungari-
schen Brauch, Schwächen mancher Werke zwar festzustellen, aber bestenfalls gesprächsweise 
und privatim anzumerken, ist dies vielleicht sogar ein weiteres interessantes Statement zur 
deutschen Ungarn-Historiographie. Wer sozialgeschichtlich arbeitet, wird auch den Einfluß 
immer geringer werdender Mittel auf das ärgerliche Konstatieren vertaner Möglichkeiten und 
mangels neuer Projekte nicht auszuräumender Legendenbildungen darin ausmachen. - Leider 
hat es niemand unternommen, die Behandlung Ungarns in Gesamtdarstellungen oder Schulbü-
chern mit der anderer osteuropäischer Länder - z.B. Polens oder der Tschechoslowakei - zu 
vergleichen. Mit Blick auf die Wirkung nationalgeschichtlicher Forschungstraditionen wie die 
mehrfach angemerkten Selbstmythifizierungen der ungarischen Geschichtsschreibung wäre 
das sicher interessant gewesen. Es ist hier jedoch auch gleich anzumerken, daß dies sicher sel-
ten gegebene parallele Kompetenzen sprachlicher wie historiographischer Art vorausgesetzt 
hätte. Dennoch, eine lohnende Aufgabe bliebe es gleichwohl. 
Juliane Brandt 
Notizes 
1
 Anzumerken ist, daß seine Forschungsergebnisse, die den impliziten Kontext dieser Ausfüh-
rungen abgeben, inzwischen auch als Buch vorliegen: Joachim von Puttkamer: Schulalltag 
und nationale Integration in Ungarn: Slowaken, Rumänen und Siebenbürger Sachsen in der 
Auseinandersetzung mit der ungarischen Staatsidee 1867-1914. München (Oldenbourg) 
2003. 
Gegenwärtige Praxis ist, daß die politischen Parteien auch Minderheitenkandidaten aufstellen. 
3
 Holger Fischer: Eine kleine Geschichte Ungarns. Frankfurt a.M. (Suhrkamp) 1999. 
http://www.ungarisches-institut.de, vgl. den Hinweis des Autors S. 321. 
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Deutschland und Ungarn in ihren Bildungs- und Wissenschaftsbeziehungen 
während der Renaissance. Hgg. Wilhelm Kühlmann / Anton Schindling 
Stuttgart (Franz Steiner Verlag) 2004, XII + 292 S., 28 Abb. (Contubernium. 
Tübinger Beiträge zur Universitäts- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 62) 
ISBN 3 515 08551 3, Preis 50,00 €. 
Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes gehen auf ein Arbeitsgespräch des „Wolfen-
bütteler Arbeitskreises für Renaissanceforschung" und der „Arbeitsgruppe für Renaissancefor-
schung" der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zurück, das 2001 in Göttingen statt-
fand. Der Band gliedert sich in einen ersten Teil zu den „Rahmenbedingungen" dieser Bezie-
hungen (1-108) und einen zweiten, der „Personen und geistige Strömungen" betrachtet 
(117-174). Karten zur ethnischen Zusammensetzung, zur Verwaltungsgliederung des König-
reichs um 1500 bzw. zur Lage nach 1570 und zu den zentralen Institutionen des geistigen Le-
bens - zu Schulen und Druckereien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert - helfen bei der Orientierung in 
diesem historischen Raum, und die einigen Beiträgen beigegebenen Faksimiles von Titelseiten 
zeitgenössischer Bücher und Flugschriften, Albeneinträge und Ortsansichten in ausgesprochen 
guter technischer Qualität lockern die konzentrierte geistige Nahrung auf, die hier geboten 
wird (Abb.verz. 291-292). Ein Orts- und Personenregister ergänzen den Band. 
Ganz allgemein belegt und dokumentiert der Band die Vielfalt der Beziehungen und ihrer 
komplexen Rahmenbedingungen, die - auf verschiedenen Ebenen und aus verschiedenen Mo-
tiven - innerhalb der bewegten politischen Kräfteverhältnisse im zeitgenössischen Europa wie 
innerhalb seiner grundsätzlich supernationalen, sich jedoch allmählich nach konfessionellen, 
politischen und sprachlichen Trennlinien gliedernden Bildungslandschaft zwischen Ungarn 
und Deutschland bestanden. Etliche neue Einzelergebnisse, Befunde zu Quellenlagen und wei-
teren Forschungsperspektiven werden dabei vorgelegt. „Renaissance" wird in einem sehr offe-
nen Sinn als Zeitalterbegriff verwendet. Es geht letztlich mit den Worten der Herausgeber „vor 
allem" um die „vielfältigen Beziehungen humanistischer Gelehrsamkeit [...], die sich im Zu-
sammenhang der Reformation und später des internationalen Calvinismus um 1600 ergaben" 
(VIII). Sehr instruktiv ist die im Ergebnis der Diskussionen des Arbeitskreises in den Beiträgen 
- in Einleitung wie Einzelstudien - vorgenommene Zusammenschau der Beziehungen zwi-
schen Habsburgischem Herrschaftsgebiet, deutschen Territorien und Ungarn auf dem Stand 
der jüngsten Forschungen, die überall spürbar ist. Die einzelnen Beiträge wählen dabei natur-
gemäß unterschiedliche Blickwinkel, und setzen individuelle bzw. von nationalen Forschungs-
traditionen geprägte Akzente. Neben den Detailergebnissen der einzelnen Autoren besteht in 
diesem Zusammenführen und Reflektieren unterschiedlicher Ansätze m.E. ein ganz wesentli-
ches Verdienst des Bandes. Wie die Herausgeber formulieren, ist es „stets bereichernd, wenn 
die Binnendiskurse der nationalen Wissenschaftstraditionen sowie der Einzeldisziplinen zu-
einander in Beziehung gesetzt und über die Fächergrenzen hinweg vergleichend diskutiert 
werden" (XII). 
Das ist hier mit ersichtlichem Ertrag geschehen. Die ungarische und die deutsche Wissen-
schaftstradition unterscheiden sich im Blick auf die Religionsgeschichte des 16.-18. Jahrhun-
derts durchaus. Zwar hat auch die einschlägige ungarische Forschung durchaus sozialge-
schichtliche Fragestellungen rezipiert, die in der Forschung zur Frühen Neuzeit mit der ihr ei-
genen Quellenlage auch in Ungarn immer weitaus stärker implizit präsent waren als beispiels-
weise in der Forschung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Doch erweisen sich einzelne Verläufe 
und Eigenheiten der nationalen - auch religions- und kulturgeschichtlichen - Entwicklung wie 
die daran anknüpfenden fachlichen Diskussionen „langer Dauer" als stark genug, um bestimm-
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te Modelle und Paradigmen nahezulegen bzw. ihre Ablehnung oder doch vergleichsweises 
Desinteresse daran zu prä figurieren, und produzieren Begrifflichkeiten, die immer wieder der 
Reflexion bedürfen - was dann freilich im gemeinsamen Austausch auch erhellend und pro-
duktiv wirken kann. Die konfessionsgeschichtliche Entwicklung in Deutschland, geprägt und 
symbolisiert durch den Augsburger Kompromiß und die Regelungen des Westfälischen Frie-
dens, hat die Entdeckung von strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten in den Entwicklungen der katho-
lischen wie der protestantischen Kirchen und Territorialherrschaften sowie der Verflechtung 
von kirchlicher, mentalitätsgeschichtlicher und staatlicher Entwicklung gewiß nahegelegt. Das 
darauf basierende begriffliche Modell der Konfessionalisierung, das bald zum Paradigma aus-
gebaut wurde und nach wie vor omnipresent ist, ist für andere Länder nur mit Einschränkungen 
anwendbar, aber auf jeden Fall auch und gerade wegen der Spannung zwischen Modell und 
einzelnen Entwicklungen heuristisch produktiv.1 In Ungarn haben die Verkuppelung von anti-
habsburgischer ständischer Opposition und Forderungen nach protestantischer Religionsfrei-
heit bzw. das Bündnis zwischen Katholizismus und Herrscherhaus in der Geschichtsschrei-
bung der protestantischen Kirchen wie in der im 19. Jahrhundert national werdenden und Ele-
mente des Geschichtsnarrativs der Akteure auf der Seite der „nationalen" Unabhängigkeit auf-
greifenden Geschichtsschreibung zum einen zu einer konzeptionellen Verknüpfung von (geis-
tigen) Fortschritt, nationaler Unabhängigkeit und Protestantismus bzw. diesem beerbenden Li-
beralismus geführt, das auch der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts seine Um- und Fort-
schreibung erlebte. Im Ringen der unterschiedlich aufgestellten Seiten scheint dann die Be-
trachtung von katholischer Reform und Bildung protestantischer Konfessionskirchen als spe-
kulativ, ja als Sakrileg. Zum anderen führt ein in der Kirchengeschichtsschreibung noch deutli-
cher präsenter engerer ekklesiologischer Ansatz zur Konzentration auf die eigene Gruppe, 
nicht in ihrer Vergleichbarkeit und (ebenfalls gegebenen) strukturellen und kulturgeschichtli-
chen Determiniertheit, sondern in ihrer Eigenart. Entwicklungen wie das Fehlen einer christli-
chen Obrigkeit im osmanischen Eroberungsgebiet mit seinen interessanten eigenen volks-
kirchlichen Entwicklungen, der siebenbürgische Religionskompromiß der 1560er Jahre, das 
Nebeneinander von Luthertum und Calvinismus in Oberungarn, selbst in einzelnen Städten, 
der Widerstand gegen Exzesse der Gegenreformation oder das (spätere) Phänomen des Wie-
derauflebens sogenannter verwaister Gemeinden, also die erneute Organisation von protestan-
tischen Kirchen in Gemeinden, die jahrzehntelang, z.T. ein Jahrhundert lang keinen protestan-
tischen Gottesdienst haben durften, nach dem josephinischen Toleranzedikt bestärken die 
Skepsis; die weitaus ungünstigere Quellenlage zu Entwicklungen vor dem 18. Jahrhundert, auf 
die auch der Band immer wieder rekurriert, wirkt unterstützend. 
Zu beobachten ist aber auch, daß deutsche und ungarische Forscher vorrangig gestützt auf 
ein eigenes Corpus von Quellen und Literatur arbeiten. Auch weil diese beiden Traditionsli-
nien hier in einem Band zusammengeführt werden, ist das vorliegende Werk so lehrreich und 
wichtig. Man darf annehmen, daß die in Ungarn zu beobachtende Hallung zum Konfessionali-
sierungsparadigma auch auf den Gang der Rezeption und auf die nur selektive Zugänglichkeit 
einschlägiger Werke - in den mit sinkenden Mitteln ausgestatteten Bibliotheken - zurückzu-
führen ist. So wird es oft rundheraus abgelehnt, statt, was spannender wäre, es im Detail zu kor-
rigieren oder zu falsifizieren. Aber auch auf deutscher Seite ist zu beobachten, daß es einen ei-
genen deutschen „Umlauf von Fachliteratur gibt, in die die Ergebnisse der ungarischen For-
schung nur auswahlweise über die deutschen bzw. fremdsprachigen Publikationen ungarischer 
Kollegen eingebunden sind. Was sonst in Ungarn erscheint oder aus der älteren Literatur er-
neut herangezogen werden könnte, bleibt ausgespart. Angesichts des frühen Übergangs zur 
Volkssprachlichkeit in bestimmten Genres der Reformationsliteratur legt dies Felder fest, auf 
denen Beobachtungen möglich sind, und grenzt andere aus, was das Gesamtbild beeinflussen 
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muß. Ausgesprochen verdienstvoll ist es, daß einige Teilnehmer (Zach, Seidel, bes. 156, 228) 
auf diese Grenze ihrer Arbeit hinweisen. Eben auch daher sind Unternehmungen wie diese Ar-
beitsgespräche so wichtig. Offensichtlich beherrscht nur der Ausnahmespezialist alle Spra-
chen, und Wissenschaft ist ohnehin ein kollektives Projekt und findet in kulturell vorgeprägten 
Köpfen wie auch in durch nationale Diskurse geprägten Milieus und Institutionen statt. Ein 
Übersetzen zwischen Rednern und ein Übersetzen von Texten ist immer auch eines zwischen 
Kulturen, und daher eines, in dem die scheinbar semantisch äquivalenten Begriffe doch nur un-
ter Kenntnis ihres Kontextes annähernd zugänglich gemacht werden können (wie eben am Bei-
spielfall skizziert wurde). 
Vorprägungen der nationalen Wissenschaftstraditionen sind freilich auch dahingehend zu 
beobachten, was breiter und was weniger eingehend erforscht wurde. Das Bemühen, bildungs-
und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Ungarn in ihrer gan-
zen Breite zu thematisieren, hat auch ein „'katholisches Forschungsdefizit'" deutlich werden 
lassen. Aus Wolfgang Asches Beitrag zu den Studienbeziehungen geht hervor, was die Diskus-
sion offensichtlich noch deutlicher gemacht hat, nämlich „dass gerade für die katholische Seite 
noch zahlreiche Untersuchungen zur Literatur- und Bildungsgeschichte sowohl in den Territo-
rien des Heiligen Römischen Reichs als auch in Ungarn notwendig sind" (X, vgl. allgemeiner 
zu Detailforschungen und neuen Quellen auch: 107, 117, 156, 208, 225, 251). 
Ein Vorzug dieses Bandes sind die breite Dokumentation sowohl der herangezogenen neus-
ten Fachliteratur als auch der Quellen, sowie die Diskussion von Forschungsmöglichkeiten, die 
sich aus neuen bzw. in den letzten Jahrzehnten nicht zugänglichen Quellen ergeben. Aus den 
Archivbeständen der oberungarischen Städte hat offensichtlich vieles doch den 1. und II. Welt-
krieg überlebt und bietet die Chance zur Schließung bisher zu konstatierender Lücken, zur Prä-
zisierung von Thesen und zur Ergänzung von disziplinar beschränkten Ergebnissen sowie zum 
Ausbau der bisher lückenhaft entworfenen mentalen Landkarte z.B. der oberungarischen 
Stadtlandschaft des 16.-17. Jahrhunderts. Aber auch in Städten wie Ödenburg (Sopron) liegen 
Bestände vor, die, mit neuen Fragen betrachtet, neue Einsichten versprechen. Der Band ist da-
her jedem einschlägig arbeitenden Forscher allein schon informationshalber unbedingt zu 
empfehlen. 
Nachdem der Band als Gesamtwerk - was er verdienstvollerweise tatsächlich ist - betrach-
tet wurde, nun zu den Einzelbeiträgen: Die Herausgeber, Wilhelm Kühlmann und Anton 
Schindling, beschränken sich in ihrer „Einführung" zu „Deutschland und Ungarn in ihren 
wechselseitigen Beziehungen während der Renaissance" (VIII—XII) darauf, einen allgemeinen 
Rahmen zu skizzieren und auf Themen und wichtige Punkte der Einzelbeiträge hinzuweisen. 
Franz Brendle stellt detailliert das Geflecht der Beziehungen, Interessen und Abhängigkei-
ten dar, die „Habsburg, Ungarn und das Reich im 16. Jahrhundert" im Wechselspiel der euro-
päischen Mächte verbanden (1-25). In seinem Beitrag wird u.a. deutlich, wie politisch schwie-
rig die Mobilisierung von Ressourcen des Reichs für die Türkenabwehr war, wie sehr damit der 
Kaiser zu Kompromissen mit der ständischen Opposition - nach Ansicht Brendles auch in reli-
giösen Fragen (bes. 12-14,25) - gezwungen war, die Frage aber auch ein letztes wichtiges Ele-
ment eines katholische wie protestantische Reichsstände verbindenden Reichspatriotismus bil-
dete. 
Der anschließende Beitrag im Kranz der Texte zu den Rahmenbedingungen der geistigen 
Beziehungen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts von Matthias Asche ist den „Bildungsbeziehungen 
zwischen Ungarn, Siebenbürgen und den deutschen Universitäten um 16. und frühen 17. Jahr-
hundert" gewidmet (27-52). Noch vor der osmanischen Eroberung weiter Teile Ungarns wa-
ren die Universitätsgründungen des 14. und frühen 15. Jahrhunderts in Ungarn gescheitert. 
Weniger als die durchaus gegebene starke Konkurrenz der benachbarten älteren Einrichtungen 
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in Prag, Krakau oder Wien hatte die fehlende dauerhafte Grundlage für diese Prestigeprojekte 
zu deren Untergang beigetragen (28). Dieses Fehlen von Landesuniversitäten bis zum ersten 
Drittel des 17. Jahrhundert wurde dann „für den Verlauf der ungarischen Bildungsgeschichte 
konstitutiv" (31). Asche resümiert kenntnisreich, welche Universitäten in der Folgezeit in be­
stimmten politischen Konstellationen und konfessionell geprägten Bildungsinteressen von 
wem bevorzugt frequentiert wurden. Dabei bezieht er den gesamten Raum von Siebenbürgen 
über Oberungarn bis zur Adria mit seinen vielfältigen ethnischen und sozialstrukturellen Vor­
aussetzungen wie divergierenden und in Bewegung begriffenen konfessionellen Bindungen 
ein. Während eine Universität in Ungarn 1635 in Thyrnau (1777 nach Buda verlegt) wieder 
entstand, erfolgte angeregt durch die Impulse der Reformation auf den Ebenen darunter jedoch 
der Ausbau eines Netzes von städtischen Lateinschulen und akademischen Gymnasien (Kolle­
gien), die sich am Bedarf der lokalen Bürgerschaft und deren kulturellen und politischen Präfe­
renzen orientierten bzw. den Personalbedarf der Kirchen und der regionalen Verwaltungen 
deckten (bes. 37, 44). Auch Lehrer und Leiter dieser Einrichtungen wurden teilweise aus dem 
deutschen Raum rekrutiert - berühmtestes Beispiel ist das Kolleg in Weißenburg - bzw. bega­
ben sich zum Studium an deutsche Universitäten. Wittenberg und Heidelberg wurden - vor 
Leipzig, Marburg und Jena - insgesamt von Protestanten bevorzugt aufgesucht, Wien und 
Graz waren die erste Wahl für die Katholiken. Sie wurden dann auch Ausgangspunkte für die 
katholische Reform in Ungarn „unter jesuitischem Vorzeichen" (47). 
Márta Fata stellt ihren Aufsatz unter die Überschrift „Deutsche und schweizerische Ein­
flüsse auf die Reformation in Ungarn im 16. Jahrhundert. Aspekte der frühneuzeitlich-vormo­
dernen Identität zwischen Ethnie und Konfession (53-107). Dabei geht es ihr um die „Formie­
rung und Abgrenzung des konfessionellen Bewußtseins, sowie die Identitätsbildung der Ma­
gyaren im Calvinismus und die der Deutschen im Luthertum im 16. Jahrhundert" (56). Bevor 
sie diese Entwicklung in mehreren Phasen darlegt, geht sie auch auf Probleme der Forschung, 
genauer auf das „zum gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Paradigma aufgewertete Konzept der Kon-
fessionalisierung" (51), auf seine Nutzbarkeit für Ungarn bzw. die weitgehend ablehnende 
Haltung der ungarischen Forschung dazu ein (51-57). Wichtige Ursachen sind i.E. Vorprägun­
gen des Diskurses über die Nationalgeschichte sowie die disziplinare Abschottung der ein­
schlägigen Forschung. Die „miserable Quellenlage", „die für einen westeuropäischen Histori­
ker oft kaum vorstellbar ist" (55), schaffe weitere Schwierigkeiten bei der Klärung zentraler 
Fragen, insbesondere der nach dem „warum" bestimmter Entwicklungen. Doch ließen sich 
auch bekannte und erschlossene Quellen durchaus erfolgreich neu auf derartige Fragen hin 
auswerten (57). Eine grundsätzliche Andersartigkeit der ungarischen Verhältnisse stehe der 
heuristischen Anwendung der These - wie selbst von dem auf dem Gebiet der Reformations­
forschung in vieler Hinsicht innovativen Ferenc Szakály behauptet wurde -jedoch nicht im 
Wege (55). Fata optiert unter Verweis auf Jenő Szücs dafür, die ungarische Entwicklung „als 
Bestandteil einer eigenständigen ostmitteleuropäischen Regionalentwicklung" zu begreifen, 
innerhalb derer „methodische und thematische Vergleichsanalysen der in West- und Ostmittel­
europa abweichenden europäischen Wandlungsvorgänge" aufschlußreich werden könnten 
(55). 
Die folgenden Ausführungen zur Konfessionsentscheidung von magyarischem Adel und 
deutschem Bürgertum - denn auf diese Gruppen konzentriert sie sich wesentlich - liefern eine 
pointierte Zusammenschau und problemorientierte Erweiterung der in ihrem Buch präsentier­
ten Entwicklung" und führen exemplarisch vor, wie ein Neulesen der Quellen erfolgen kann. 
Im Falle des Adels beobachtet sie zunächst einen schwierigen Weg zum Luthertum - behindert 
durch sein Selbstverständnis als christliches Bollwerk, das mit der Lutherschen Deutung des 
türkischen Vordringens kollidierte, und durch seine Loyalität zum Haus Habsburg. Doch nach 
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den 1530er Jahren vermochte eben diese Lehre „Antwort auf die nationalen Schicksalsfragen" 
zu geben (90). Im Westen des Reichs bleib diese Entscheidung auch bestehen, während der Os-
ten, angezogen von dem Deutungsangebot der calvinistischen Lehre, die Wendung zum refor-
mierten Christentum vollzog. Nach Fata waren es „gerade die [...] schweizerischen Lehren 
über die Prädestination und den freien Willen, mit deren Hilfe der Adel die lutherischen Lehren 
über die völlige Entwertung des freien Willens und damit seine passive politische Haltung 
überwinden und seine Berufung durch Gott zur Befreiung der eigenen Nation erkennen konn-
te" (69). Angesichts der Spannbreite der individuellen Ausdeutungen von „Sendung" und 
„Vorsehung" wie der Vielzahl divergierender theologischer Rezeptionen der schweizerischen 
Vorbilder - die die Autorin kenntnisreich in nuce vorstellt - ist es mutig, aber m.E. auch pro-
duktiv für die weitere Diskussion, diese Zusammenfassung vorzunehmen. Untersucht wird 
dann die „Erweiterung der adeligen Identität um die ethnische Komponente" (71), als deren 
Marksteine die Selbstinterpretation der Magyaren als auserwähltes Volk (in biblischer Paralle-
le) und die Entdeckung der Muttersprache durch die Späthumanisten und protestantischen Pre-
diger standen. Die Verknüpfung der politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Interessen des ma-
gyarischen Adels mit dem Calvinismus, die im Zuge dieser Entwicklung erfolgte, verlieh die-
sem einen spezifischen ethnischen Charakter- wie auch bei anderen Gruppen dauerhafte Ver-
bindungen von Konfession und Ethnie entstanden, die auf die kulturelle Mentalität der jeweili-
gen Konfessionsgruppe einwirkten. 
Interessant ist auch, wie Fata die Rolle des ungarischen Adels insgesamt im Verlauf der Re-
formation in Ungarn einschätzt. In der Literatur wird bekanntlich vielfach davon ausgegangen, 
daß der Adel maßgeblichen Einfluß auf das Bekenntnis seiner untertänigen Bauern ausgeübt 
und auf seinem Besitz die Reformation vorangetrieben bzw. sein eigenes Bekenntnis durchge-
setzt habe. Das deutsche „cujus regio, ejus religio" sei dabei im Sinne eines grundherrlichen jus 
reformandi umgedeutet worden. Dieses Bild zeichnet im vorliegenden Band auch Brenale (u.a. 
9). Fata weist dagegen auf die Eigenart der Adelsreformation in Ungarn im 16. Jahrhundert hin, 
„wonach die ungarischen Magnaten und Adeligen nicht den Anspruch erhoben, die Konfes-
sionszugehörigkeit ihrer adeligen Servienten oder ihrer bäuerlichen Untertanen zu bestimmen. 
In Ungarn waren konfessionelle und territorial-herrschaftliche Identität bis zum Ende des 16. 
Jahrhunderts keineswegs deckungsgleich" (90).3 
Beim deutschen Stadtbürgertum habe sich die Entscheidung für die lutherische Reformati-
on bzw. das Festhalten an ihr ebenfalls in mehreren, u.a. von sozialen und politischen Konflik-
ten bzw. Interessenlagen beeinflußten Schritten, im Ringen zwischen Bürgern und Stadtrat 
vollzogen. Das schließlich als verbindlich angenommene lutherische Bekenntnis stellte dann 
„den gemeinsamen städtischen sakralen Raum und die städtische Einigkeit wieder her", das 
„politische Bündnis der evangelischen Städte mit dem katholischen König" habe anschließend 
einem weiteren Abdriften zu schweizerischen Ideen entgegengestanden (91 ). Wesentliches Er-
gebnis ist der Nachweis, daß „die Teilnahme der ethnisch-sozialen Gruppen an der Reformati-
on bzw. ihre Präferenz für die eine oder andere reformatorische Richtung nach der Selbstdefi-
nition und den gruppenspezifischen Interessen entsprachen, in denen politische Konzeptionen, 
soziale Interessen und ethnische Ansichten wirksam werden konnten". Interessante weiterfüh-
rende Fragen ergeben sich m.E. auch aus der These: „Die sich aus der Konfessionalisierung er-
gebende Notwendigkeit der religiösen Abgrenzung bedeutete zugleich eine sich seit dem Mit-
telalter allmählich vollziehende und sich im 16. Jh. verstärkende ethnische Abgrenzung" 
(ebd.). 
Die Vorstellung der Rahmenbedingungen schließt Mihály Imres Aufsatz über den „ungari-
schen Türkenkrieg als rhetorisches Thema in der Frühen Neuzeit" ab (93-107). Kenntnisreich 
stellt der Verfasser die mittelalterliche Vorgeschichte einschlägiger Gedanken, u.a. des Motivs 
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vom „Bollwerk der Christenheit", seine mit dem Vordringen der Türken erfolgende engere, ja 
ausschließliche Verbindung mit Ungarn, sowie die Behandlung einschlägiger Topoi und Argu-
mente in der zeitgenössischen Rhetorik dar. Seine Rekonstruktion der Verwendung einzelner 
Motive, ihrer Entlehnungen und der dabei wirksam werdenden personalen Beziehungen führt 
zugleich vor Augen, wie nachhaltig die Anwesenheit von Studenten aus Ungarn an den deut-
schen Universitäten für die Verwendung der Problematik und die Verbreitung einschlägiger 
Texte war. Nicht vernachlässigt werden sollte lmres abschließender Hinweis auf den fragmen-
tarischen Charakter seiner Überschau, die durch weitere Analysen des vorliegenden umfang-
reichen Quellenmaterials an lateinischen und deutschsprachigen Reden, Predigten und Gebe-
ten ergänzt werden sollte. Auch mit Blick auf die dünne Quellenlage zur Reformation in Un-
garn, so wäre hinzuzufügen, ist dies ein hoffnungsvoller Hinweis. 
Die Reihe der Beiträge zu Personen und geistigen Strömungen eröffnet András F. Balogh 
mit einer Untersuchung über „Literarische Querverbindungen zwischen Deutschland und Un-
garn in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts" ( 117-127, sowie 111.). Er weist einleitend auf die 
Spezifik dieser Werke und ihr Verhältnis zur kanonisierten Literatur hin: die meisten deut-
schen Texte mit Ungambezug seien „nicht in einem primär literarischen Bereich aufzufinden", 
sondern vielmehr von einem journalistischen, chronikalischen, theologisch-politischen Kon-
text bestimmt (118). Um der Eigenart der Texte gerecht zu werden, sei die Anwendung eines 
allgemeineren Begriffs von Schrifttum ratsam. Femer hätten damit auch die Kontakte, die aus 
den Texten beleuchtet werden können, nicht nur literarische Aspekte, sondern seien „auch 
theologischen und zeithistorischen Charakters" (119). Im engeren Sinn literarische Beziehun-
gen seien in der volkssprachigen Literatur gerade im frühen 16. Jahrhundert noch nicht zu be-
obachten. Zu beobachten ist vielmehr die Aufnahme von Motiven, Ideen oder (realen wie fikti-
ven) Personen in den Texten, in erster Linie auf deutscher Seite, während sich in der ungari-
schen Literatur Spuren eines deutschen Kultureinflusses nach Balogh erst ab der Mitte des 
Jahrhunderts zeigten (119). Die vorgestellten Beispiele auf verschiedenen Textgattungen 
illustrieren denn auch die stark fiktive Einfarbung der als real vermittelten Bereichte über Un-
garn - das in den Texten wiederum zu einem fernen Randbereich eines deutschen Kulturraums 
wird - , oder aber die starke Anbindung an allgemeinere deutsche Diskussionen, zu deren illu-
strierender Folie Ungarn wird (Unterredung gegen die Türken, 125). In die Hochkultur dran-
gen diese Themen und Motive nicht vor (127). Dennoch will Balogh einen gewissen Einfluß 
des Ungarn-Themas auf die Entwicklung der deutschen Literatur nicht rundheraus verneinen. 
Die journalistische Beschäftigung mit ihm habe immerhin „Stil und Sprache der Kriegsbericht-
erstattung befördert", die „Lokalisierung der Schauplätze zur Festigung der literarisch-geogra-
phischen Grenzen und des Selbstbildes in der deutschen Literatur beigetragen", und schließlich 
sei in den Traktaten der „Übergang vom theologischen zu einem säkularisierten Diskurs ge-
schaffen worden" (127), um nur einige wichtige Argumente zu nennen. 
Ulrich Andreas Wien beschäftigt sich in Anknüpfung an das Motto „Sis bonus atque humi-
lis, sic virtus Deusque / Tollet in excelsum, constituetque locum" mit der humanistischen Re-
formation im siebenbürgischen Kronstadt, mit Johannes Honterus und Valentin Wagner 
(135-150). Diese Verbindung von Humanismus und Reformation, die schon Schullerus und 
Reinert herausgestellt haben, und ihre „integrative Einheit" (139) erscheint als das besondere 
Merkmal gerade der Kronstädter Reformation unter Honter und Wagner. Eine der Vorausset-
zungen dafür waren die weit ausgreifenden internationalen Kontakte, in die der siebenbürgi-
sche Humanismus eingebunden war. Eine zentrale Rolle im Werk beider Reformatoren nahm 
auf dieser geistigen Grundlage die Pädagogik ein. Gerade bei Wagner, der wichtige Anregun-
gen von Melanchthon bezog und in seiner Lehre von der Willensfreiheit teilweise noch über 
diesen hinausging, nahm deshalb die Ethik eine zentrale Position ein. In der Auseinanderset-
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zung mit der aufkommenden calvinistischen Theologie ab Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts konser-
vierte die sächsische Kirche ihre einmal erreichte Position und entwickelte einen Standpunkt, 
in dem sich dieses geistige Erbe in einer konservativen lutherischen Kirchenordnung mit dem 
Festhalten an überkommenen Formen des Kirchentums in spezifischer Weise verband (139, 
150), und die in der siebenbürgischen Religionsgesetzgebung - von Wien als Religionsfreiheit 
begriffen und für 1571 angesetzt - ihre Rahmenbedingungen erhielt. 
Unter dem Motto „'... Eine kleine Biblia..."' rekonstruiert Krista Zach „Rezeption und Re-
sonanz des reformationszeitlichen Katechismus im historischen Ungarn (1530-1640)" (151-
179, III.). Nach einem Rückblick auf die Vorgeschichte von Katechese und Katechismus und 
der Kennzeichnung ihrer Stellung in den zeitgenössischen reformatorischen Kirchen und im 
Katholizismus stellt sie die Verbreitung einzelner Katechismen im historischen Ungarn vor. 
Einzelne Strömungen der Reformation stellten hier in unterschiedlicher regionaler Kombinati-
on ihre Lehren in den Volkssprachen dar - so entstanden „magyarisch-, deutsch-, bibeltsche-
chisch- wie slowakischsprachige Katechismen in Oberungarn und der Zips; magyarische und 
deutsche wie rumänische und griechische in Siebenbürgen bzw. magyarische in den Regionen 
West- und Zentral Ungarns sowie in Süddeutschland oder Wittenberg, Bücher in südslawischen 
Idiomen und Schriftarten für Kroatien, Slawonien und Dalmatien" ( 158). Die wichtigsten Vor-
lagen bzw. Katechismusmodelle in Ungarn waren Luthers Kleiner Katechismus (1529 und fol-
gende Ausgaben) und Bremens Fragstücke (1535), der Zweite Genfer Katechismus Calvins 
und der Heidelberger Katechismus, der die vorige Filiation nach 1565 verdrängte. „Pertrus Ca-
nisius' Katechismen werden in den Quellen erwähnt, auf die Dottrina Christiana brève (1597) 
des Erzbischofs Bellarmin konnte kein Hinweis gefunden werden. Bischof Petrus Mogilas 
Confessio Orthodoxa (1642) war schlussendlich ein Reflex auch auf rumänischsprachige Ka-
techismen im Fürstentum Siebenbürgen von calvinistischer Seite." (161) Diese Situation wur-
de dadurch noch komplexer, daß neben den gedruckten Varianten, die vielfach abgewandelt 
wurden, und den „hausgemachten" Katechismen, die belegt, aber vielfach nicht überliefert 
sind (173), auch - u.a. als Ergebnis von Auslandstudien - viele individuell erstellte hand-
schriftliche Varianten Verwendung fanden. Zachs Aufsatz gibt einen Überblick über eine Gat-
tung und die dabei wirksamen europäischen Beziehungen im Prozeß einer „Mehrfachkonfes-
sionalisierung" (179) in einem mehrsprachigen und politisch zergliederten Raum, wobei die 
Sammlung und Erschließung selbst der einst bzw. noch heute vorliegenden Werke noch nicht 
als abgeschlossen gelten kann. 
Bálint Keserű widmet sich mit dem „Fall Imre Újfalvi. Die reformierte Opposition in Ost­
ungarn und die Melanchthon-Anhänger in Sachsen" (185-195, 111.) „einer der spannendsten 
Gestalten" des von Magyaren bewohnten reformierten Gebiets des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen 
(185). In den 1580er und 1590er Jahren studierten in Wittenberg bedeutende ungarische Hu­
manisten und von ihnen begleitete Adelssöhne in so hoher Zahl wie nie zuvor. Im Spätsommer 
1591 kam auch Imre Újfalvi (mit vollem Namen Imre Szilvas-Ujfalvi Anderko, geboren kurz 
vor 1570, gestorben vermutlich 1616 oder danach) nach Wittenberg, und die Erfahrungen, die 
er in dieser Phase der Ablösung der Philippisten und ihres Versuchs zur Beseitigung scholasti­
scher Relikte in Unterricht und Wissenschaft machte, erwiesen sich als prägend für seine wei­
tere Laufbahn. Keserű weist anhand u.a. des Album Amicorum Újfalvis nach, wie engen Kon­
takt dieser - als Anführer des selbst in Schwierigkeiten geratenen ungarischen Coetus in Wit­
tenberg- zu verbannten oder geflüchteten Melanchthonianern hielt. Nach seiner Rückkehr ins 
Partium, vor allem in seiner Position als (reformierter) Pastor und Senior in Großwardein und 
als einer der bedeutsamsten Organisatoren des literarischen Lebens seiner Zeit initiierte er eine 
Bewegung gegen den autokratischen Bischof des Distrikts, Lukács Hodászi. Dafür wurde e r -
unter Zuhilfenahme der weltlichen Autorität - eingekerkert, ausgepeitscht, mit der Todesstrafe 
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bedroht und schließlich in die Moldau verbannt (186). Újfalvi ist gelegentlich - auf der Basis 
problematischer Indizien - als Vorläufer der ungarischen Puritaner gewertet worden ( 187). Bei 
genauer Prüfung ist sein Auftreten gegen die Vermischung weltlicher und geistlicher Autorität 
und gegen das Vorgehen des Bischofs jedoch von eben jener Haltung des Ankämpfens gegen 
scholastische Praktiken getragen, die auch die sächsischen Melanchthonianer vertraten. Gene­
rell, so Keserű, sei für die Beziehung zwischen Intellektuellen des ungarischen Partium und 
Vertretern des sächsischen Philippismus „zu dieser Zeit ein Scheinparadoxon charakteristisch: 
Die Ungarn verkoppelten die Vorbereitung auf eine nationale Mission auf ideale, weil hem­
mungslose Weise mit dem Kosmopolitismus der humanistischen respublica litteraria" So war 
auch der Zusammenstoß zwischen Újfalvi und Hodászi mehr bzw. anderes als der spätere 
Kampf zwischen Puritanismus und Orthodoxie. Indem jedoch die Ujfalvi-Partei zum Schwei­
gen gebracht wurde, habe in Ostungarn und auch in Siebenbürgen eine letzte Phase der Konfes-
sionalisierung begonnen. 
Péter Ötvös beschäftigt sich am Beispiel des Matej Kabat oder Thoraconymus mit den 
„Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Aktivität in der Heimat" für die aus Wittenberg Heimgekehr­
ten (199-206). Thoraconymus bekleidete 1571-77 das Amt des Schulrektors in Käsmark, war 
ab 1578 ein Jahr lang Schulrektor in Kauschau, das er aber nach heftigen konfessionellen An­
griffen verlassen mußte, und ging nach einem Interim als Prediger in Újhely 1559 nach 
Sárospatak, wo er bis zu seinem Tode lehrte und weiter den Kontakt zum Humanismus zu hal­
ten suchte. Thoraconymus war nach Einschätzung Ötvös' eine der führenden Persönlichkeiten 
einer antiorthodoxen Gruppe an Melanchthon orientierter einstiger Wittenberger Studenten, 
die „gegen die ideologische und organisatorische Verstärkung der Kirche für breitere Frei­
heitsmöglichkeiten" eintraten (202) und vor allem auf pädagogischem Gebiet wirksam wur­
den. Ötvös analysiert die pädagogische Haltung des Thoraconymus und die Angriffe, die auf 
ihn unternommen wurden, um die Frontstellungen innerhalb der evangelischen Zipser Städte 
in diesem Zeitraum herauszuarbeiten. Im 17. Jahrhundert sollte ihnen die Rezeption Johannes 
Arndts schließlich eine andere Richtung geben. 
Katalin S. Némeths Aufsatz über „Eine wiederentdeckte Reisebeschreibung. Veit Marcht-
haler, Ungarische Sachen, 1588" (207-218) belegt, daß Entdeckungen auch in den gemeinhin 
als bekannt und bibliographisch erschlossen geltenden Quellen immer wieder zu machen sind: 
Zum einen beschäftigt sich das 1632 in Straßburg erschienene „Itinerarium Gemaniae nov-an-
tiquae. Teutsches Reyßbuch" des Martin Zeiller keineswegs - wie der Titel vermuten läßt und 
weswegen es als Hungaricum nicht registriert wurde - nur mit Deutschland. Zum anderen geht 
es - wie in der Erstausgabe noch angegeben - auf einen Bericht des Veit Marchthaler (207) 
über seine Reisen in Ungarn zurück. Németh konnte im Ulmer Stadtarchiv auch die zugrunde­
gelegte Schrift, nämlich die „Ungarischen Sachen von Anno 1588" entdecken. In ihrem Bei­
trag rekonstruiert sie Werk und Lebensweg Marchtalers, diskutiert den Zweck seiner Schrift 
und verfolgt, welchen Abwandlungen die - stark dokumentarisch gehaltene - Vorlage im „Ite-
nerarium" unterworfen wurde. Insbesondere erweist sich Marchthalers Handschrift als Fundus 
für Beobachtungen zum Alltagsleben der von ihm bereisten Gegenden und zu Überlieferungen 
und Ansichten seiner Kontaktpersonen, die der sprachbegabte Reisende interessiert und in gro­
ßer Breite festhielt. -
András Szabó beschäftigt sich mit dem „Copernicus-Jünger Georg Joachim Rheticus in Un­
garn" (219-225). 1551 mußte der Arzt und Naturwissenschaftler Rheticus, der Homosexualität 
bezichtigt, fluchtartig seinen bisherigen Wirkungsort Leipzig verlassen. Ab Herbst 1554 lebte 
er lange Jahre in Krakau und starb schließlich in Kaschau, wo er, wie Szabó rekonstruiert, be­
reits seit einiger Zeit tätig war. Einige Umstände seines Todes teilt das Vorwort Valenthin 
Othos zu dem von ihm vollendeten Werk seines Meisters über die Dreiecke {Opus Palatinum 
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de triangulis, 1596) mit. Szabó geht diesen Hinweisen nach, verfolgt auch den Lebenslauf Ot-
hos inmitten der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Lutheranern, Philippisten und Calvinisten, 
bei denen Otho schließlich in Heidelberg eine dauerhafte Arbeitsmöglichkeit fand, und weist 
auf weitere Quellen hin, deren Auswertung möglicherweise weitere Details des Ungarnaufent­
haltes des Rheticus klären könnte. 
Robert Seidel wendet sich in seinem Beitrag „Der ungarische Späthumanismus und die cal-
vinistische Pfalz" (227-251) nicht wie z.B. Keserű und Ötvös dem Wirken ungarischer Stu­
denten in ihrer Heimat zu, sondern untersucht die Begegnungen in Deutschland selber und ihre 
literarischen Reflexionen. Ab 1562 hielt sich eine wachsende Zahl ungarischer Studenten in 
Heidelberg auf, die nach der Vertreibung der Kryptocalvinisten aus Sachsen ab 1591 noch wei­
ter wuchs. Viele von ihnen reüssierten in dem humanistischen Heidelberger Milieu, Seidel be­
legt anhand von Texten aus dem Umfeld der Dichterkrönung des Georgius Thurius und Johann 
Philipp Pareus im Dezember 1600 die Denkweise und politischen Konzepte der Ungarn und 
den Kontext, in dem sie an der Meinungsbildung der intellektuellen Zirkel der Pfalz mitwirk­
ten. Hervorgehoben wird, daß im Medium der Dichtung auch in der Zeit sich zuspitzender kon­
fessioneller Konflikte noch lange der gemeinsame Abwehrkampf gegen die Türken unter Füh­
rung des Kaisers beschworen wird (231, 242). Anders als schlesische Studenten kehrten die 
Ungarn aus Heidelberg meist wieder in ihre Heimat zurück. Daß die Liebe zum leidenden Va­
terland meist der Ergänzung durch das Drängen der Mäzene bedurfte und der Abschied nicht 
leichtfiel, belegt Seidel am Beispiel des Thurius, der dies in Briefen an eine der Zentralfiguren 
der Heidelberger Ungarn, Albert Szenei Molnár, bekannte. Molnár, der jahrzehntelang blieb, 
war damit eine Ausnahme - nur hier, im Umkreis der calvinistischen Zentren Marburg, Her­
born und Heidelberg schien ihm sein Plan einer Neuausgabe der ungarischen Bibel und der 
Übersetzung der Psalmen zu verwirklichen. Und für diese Leistung, für diesen „Beitrag zur 
Entwicklung der ungarischen Sprache als Medium der religiösen Unterweisung", gestanden 
ihm seine Landsleute dieses lange Fernbleiben auch zu. Wiederum steht ausblickend der Hin­
weis auf die Notwendigkeit weiterer Forschungen, die den Realitätsgehalt der vielfach ange­
nommenen und hier in einigen wichtigen Verbindungen nachgezeichneten „calvinistischen In­
ternationale" weiter erhellen können. 
Den Grundton mit der Formel „Tristia ex Transilvania" vorgebend, betrachtet Achim Aurn-
hammer abschließend „Martin Opitz' Ovid-Imitatio und poetische Selbstfindung in Sieben­
bürgen (1622/23)" (253-272, 111.). 1622 war Opitz dem Ruf Gábor Bethlens an das Fürstliche 
Gymnasium in Weißenburg gefolgt, im Sommer des folgenden Jahres kehrte er allerdings 
schon wieder nach Schlesien zurück. Der kurze Aufenthalt, so die These Aurnhammers, mar­
kiere dennoch eine „werkgeschichtliche Zäsur, da Opitz sich während des 'siebenbürgischen 
Exils' seiner Berufung zum deutschen Nationaldichter bewußt wurde" (253). Neben lateini­
schen Huldigungs- und Gelegenheitsgedichten und einem verschollenen wissenschaftlichen 
Werk, der hier begonnenen Dacia Antigua, entstanden in Siebenbürgen auch zwei bedeutende 
deutschsprachige Dichtungen, an denen diese These belegt wird. Die Berücksichtigung gat­
tungsspezifischer Motive in den von Opitz vorgenommenen Betrachtungen seiner Weißenbur­
ger Existenz hilft dabei, Momente der Selbststilisierung und des Entwerfens neuer Rollen in 
den auch, aber eben nicht nur autobiografischen Texten auszumachen. Das Motiv der Heimat­
losigkeit durchzieht wiederum auch andere Texte, in denen es dann zu erwartende andere Mo­
tive - etwa das Lob Pannoniens - in die Nebenrolle abdrängt. Ausgeprägter Neustoizismus und 
Subjektivismus prägen alle in Siebenbürgen entstandenen Texte Opitz' und schlagen sich in ei­
ner Transgression der Gattungstradition nieder. Als Opitz eigene Frage erweist sich in diesem 
Lichte die Frage eines seiner Gedichte, „Wo aber will ich hin?" (269), und der Wunsch seines -
gleichfalls auf Ovid bezug nehmenden - Programmgedichts „An die deutsche Nation", in der 
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er seine Rolle als deutscher Dichter in seinem „Vaterland" entwirft. Somit kommt der sieben-
bürgischen Episode - in Aurnhammers Worten: „dem siebenbürgischen Exil" - „eine für Mar­
tin Opitz' dichterische Selbstfindung entscheidende Bedeutung bei" (272). 
Der vorliegende Band untersucht somit vor allem hochkulturelle Beziehungen zwischen 
Deutschland und Ungarn, die sich in d e m - einleitend von Brendle so kenntnisreich geschilder­
ten - Beziehungsgetüge politischer Art entfalteten. Schon auf dieser Ebene, das machen viele 
Beiträge deutlich, sind die Quellen rar und sind sie im Laufe der Jahrhunderte dünner gewor­
den. Von ihnen her rekonstruierbar sind in erster Linie denn oft auch nur allgemeine Verläufe 
auch des Schicksals der Reformation bzw. der Konfessionalisierungsprozesse im historischen 
Ungarn - warum diese oder jene lokale Entscheidung getroffen wurde, wie sich konfessionelle 
und soziale Identität z.B. nicht nur des magyarischen Adels und des deutschen Bürgertums 
(Fata), sondern auch der magyarischen und slowakischen Bauern in Oberungarn oder Zentral­
ungarn - oder anderen Zielgruppen z.B. der von Zach vorgestellten Katechismen - entwickel­
te, bleibt auf dieser Ebene offen. Auch hier, auch in der Einordnung und Deutung von Entwick­
lungen auf dieser Ebene, wären solche gemeinsamen Diskussionen wie die hier dokumentierte 
sinnvoll. Auf nicht endgültig geklärte Probleme bei der Deutung von DetahV weisen z.B. die 
Deutungen „der siebenbürgischen Religionsfreiheit" oder deren Datierungen hin, die offen­
kundig von der Lesart vorliegender Gesetze mit Blick auf einzelne Gruppe getragen sind. Wie 
Keserűs abschließende Frage zur Einordnung von Bethlens - immerhin etwas menschen­
freundlicheren, und zudem aus Sicht der Staatsräson nur vernünftigen - Versuch zur Schaffung 
einer souveränen Fürstenmacht und reformierten Hegemonie andeutet - Keserű scheint sie 
ausgehend von der vorgestellten Deutung Újfalvis als möglicherweise doch retrograd gegen­
über dieser so dynamischen Strömung (195) - , betrifft die Begriffsbildung letztlich grundle­
gende Fragen der Einordnung zentraler politischer Prozesse wie des Schaffens der vorgestell­
ten Humanisten und Reformatoren. 
Die Herausgeber geben eingangs ihrer Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß der im Jahr des EU-Bei­
tritts Ungarns erschienene Band zur Befestigung und Vertiefung der „überkommenen guten 
gelehrten Beziehungen zwischen ungarischen und deutschen Forschern" beitragen möge. An­
gesichts der in Deutschland zu beobachtenden Kürzungen und Schließungen von Institutionen, 
die sich philologisch und historisch mit den gerade beigetretenen Ländern beschäftigen, auch 
und gerade auf dem Gebiet der ungambezüglichen Forschung, hinterläßt der gute Wunsch ge­
mischte Gefühle. Es wird zunehmend fraglich, ob in professioneller Form an das angeknüpft 
werden kann, was der vorliegende Band an neuen Herausforderungen ausgehend von einem 
differenzierten Forschungsstand aufzeigt. 
Juliane Brandt 
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